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The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, 
Peace and Security has put gender on the international agenda. Since then, 
the international community has renewed its commitment to UNSCR 1325 by 
adopting UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009) and UNSCR 1960 (2010) on 
Sexual Violence in conflicts. They recognise sexual violence as a tactic of war, 
war crime and crime against humanity and call for preventive actions and end-
ing impunity. Fulfilling these obligations requires adequate handling of sexual 
violence in military operations and the prevention of sexual harassment within 
the ranks. The international conference on Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces 
and Military Operations in Oslo, June 2011, offered a unique forum for experts 
and practitioners to discuss the interconnectedness between these issues and 
to draw implications for the armed forces. 
Targeting military personnel, keynote speaker and UN Secretary General’s Spe-
cial Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, urged:
“… As commanders, you have to make sure that the message is clearly conveyed 
that there can be no impunity for this type of crime. “This will not happen on my 
watch. You will be punished; you will be pursued if you commit such a crime.” We 
should also talk about men as victims, because today men and boys are among 
the victims of sexual violence; I still remember a young man who we met in the 
DRC in a panel where we interviewed for a reparation scheme. This young man 
told us that he did not even know about rape before. He was totally traumatized. 
He said: “I have nothing left. I have the shirt, the clothes that I have on my body, 
but that is all.” He lost his wife and his child, and is now totally lost in a world that 
he could no longer really understand and in deep shock over having been gang 
raped… 
… It is not only, although it is still primarily, women or girls who are victims of 
sexual violence, but it is also boys and young men. Does this mean that we can 
mobilize more men to fight with us against sexual violence in war and conflict? I 
hope so… “
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7Foreword
The conference on “Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Mili-
tary Operations” arranged by the Gender Project at the Norwegian 
Defence University College (NDUC) 17th of June 2011 was a great 
success and marked an important milestone for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ work to prevent such atrocities.
The conference emphasized an important realization: There is a clear 
link between how we deal with internal issues on sexual misconduct 
and our ability to deal with issues related to sexual violence in in-
ternational operations. This is something I take very seriously and 
will keep focusing on.
Unfortunately, I was unable to attend the conference in person. 
However, this conference report gives me and my fellow soldiers the 
opportunity to study the clear message and interesting insights from 
both civilian and military experts to learn more, to understand more, 
and eventually all become better soldiers.
I congratulate the NDUC on their ability to put difficult and deman-
ding issues on the agenda, and remind you of the responsibility we 
all have to act according to our core values as soldiers; with respect, 
responsibility and courage.
Harald Sunde
General
Chief of Defence
8
9Introduction to the report
 
Dear Reader!
You may have experienced a colleague telling you about a great conference he/
she attended, upon which their enthusiasm and professional appraisal making 
you really wish you had been there. The conference on “Sexual Violence, the 
Armed Forces and Military Operations,” arranged by the Gender Project at 
the Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo 17th of June 2011, was that 
kind of a conference.
By taping and transcribing the presentations, assisted and approved by the 
contributors, we are happy to offer a conference report. The report seeks to 
provide the insights and sentiments of the conference to those unable to attend, 
as if they were actually there.
The speakers were given the opportunity to clarify the transcripts and made 
minor changes, or added comments, to better get their message across. It is, 
however, important to emphasize that the ultimate responsibility for the content 
of the presentations belongs to the speakers, not their associated institution. The 
report outline is, with only one adjustment, as conveyed during the conference. 
I decided to start the report with the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Grete 
Faremo, together with the keynote speaker, UN Special Representative Margot 
Wallström, to emphasize the relevance of the contributions. Any mistakes, 
misquotes, spelling or grammatical errors is my responsibility alone. All the 
speakers did an outstanding job, and their contributions were complementary 
in ways that reinforced the interconnectedness of the main conference topics.
I would like to thank former gender advisor at the Gender Project; Lillian Angelo 
for her idea for the conference, present gender advisors; Cecilie Fleming and 
Anita Schjølset for embracing the idea and turning it into a unique and great 
program and together with Ole M. Totland contributing in so many ways to 
make the conference a reality.1  For the first time we were able to unite military 
experts and academic researchers to talk about tough issues related to sexual 
violence, sexual harassment and the consequences for military operations. This 
report’s sole purpose is to keep the issues on the agenda, educate the public 
and ultimately contribute to ending sexual harassment and sexual violence.
1 The Gender Project has gained two new members since the conference was held; Lt Col Birgith An-
dreassen and Maj Elin Rørvik.
10
The work behind this report has been tedious, but convinced me that the mes-
sages conveyed during the conference need an even bigger audience. 
I hope you enjoy the report! 
Lena P Kvarving
Lieutenant Colonel
Leader Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College
11
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Opening Remarks
Lt Col Lena P. Kvarving
General, Admiral, Honoured Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
I am Lt Col Lena Kvarving, Manager of the Gender project at The Norwegian 
Defence University College, together with the rest of the Gender Project Team, 
the Gender Advisors Cecilie Fleming, Anita Schjølset and Ole M. Totland - we 
will do our best to guide you through the conference today, so please – do not 
hesitate to ask us questions during the breaks, if there is any way we can be 
of assistance.
We have an excellent program for you today, so let’s get started. First to the 
welcoming address – The Commander of the Norwegian Defence University 
College, Rear Admiral Louise Kathrine Dedichen
14
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Welcoming address
Rear Admiral Louise K. Dedichen
Special representative, ladies and gentlemen. As the Commandant of the 
Norwegian Defence University College I am honoured and proud to welcome 
you to “Gamle Logen” and to the first international military conference on 
“Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations”. And to all of 
our international guests, it is a pleasure to welcome you to Oslo and Norway.
First, I would like to thank each one of you for making this conference a 
priority and for coming here today. I am especially pleased to welcome all our 
international guests and contributors, representing national and international 
organisations and institutions in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, Rwanda, Sudan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Nepal, Argentina, Guatemala, Canada and the United 
States of America.
I am also pleased to welcome all of you from my own organisation. I know 
how difficult it is to find time in a busy schedule and would therefore like to 
commend you all for being here.
Finally, I would like to extend my special thanks to those of you who have 
come here to contribute, as speakers and as participants in the debate. Your 
commitments and your initiatives are important for us all. I am deeply grateful 
for your contributions. 
I am very proud of our conference program, which includes some of the 
most significant contemporary authorities on military operations and sexual 
violence in conflict. We also have with us representatives from our own political 
and military leadership to help us make this conference not only a theoretical 
debate, but also provide a pragmatic approach to dealing with sexual violence 
in military operations.
With your commitment, however, I would like us to focus not only on the 
work being done in the Norwegian Armed Forces, but also on the challenges that 
we are all confronted with every day, in the theatres as well as in the political 
and military decision-making forums.
It is therefore with the deepest respect I ask you to focus on an important 
and serious matter that have fundamental and comprehensive consequences 
for thousands of people’s lives; individuals, families and communities around 
the world, every day. 
The conference has been organised by the Gender Project at the Norwegian 
Defence University College. The project has a mandate to support the Norwe-
gian Armed Forces with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1325 and gender perspectives in their military operations. 
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The project has only been operating since 2010. However, focusing on 
operationalizing Security Council Resolution 1325 and institutionalizing a 
gender perspective through our operational education, analysis, structure and 
planning, the project’s initiatives have already had a significant impact on our 
operational practice.
I would like to thank our associates in the National Defence Staff and Na-
tional Armed Forces Joint Headquarters who have recognized both the need for 
responsible leadership and the challenges that our missions are confronted with 
in theatre. Confronting sexual violence as a crime of war requires not only for 
us to understand local culture and violent practices, but also for us to redefine 
our own operational standards as well as our self image as both a war fighting 
and a peacekeeping organization.
I would also like to thank especially our associates in our Nordic neighbour 
countries, in NATO and in the UN. The experiences that we share with you, is of 
great importance to us all, as the implementation processes taking place in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces need to be rooted in international law and practice. 
Today, we hope to gain from your experience as well, and that this would help 
us all to do an even better job.
However, important work remains before we can say we have met our in-
ternational obligations. Despite our focus here today, and despite the priorities 
already made, we are in great need of further effort and further commitments, 
both in the political forums and in the Armed Forces, not at least among our 
leaders, who are both administrative, operational and social responsible for the 
organization that we lead and command. And the task of developing guidelines 
on how to handle sexual violence in our visions has been given our national 
defence. But the work to operationalize the required standards still remains. And 
I hope and believe that this conference will contribute positively to this process, 
and in the long term strengthen our operations, our common responsibility and 
capability to carry out our mandate.
Sexual violence in warring conflict is not a new phenomenon.  Used delibe-
rately, targeted especially on women and girls, this is a well-known strategy for 
causing physical injury creating lasting traumas and suppresses both individuals 
and communities, socially and politically, in all types of conflicts.
However, since the mid 1990’s we have seen a growing awareness and a 
greater commitment from the international society to deal with this brutal and 
destructive part of war. And with the Security Council Resolution 1820, United 
Nations draw the conclusion that the international community has not taken 
the responsibility to protect women seriously enough, and children and men 
affected by rape and sexual violence in wars and conflicts. As a consequence, 
sexual and gender based violence are still used effectively as a weapon in con-
flicts around the world every day, even in conflicts where Norway and our allies 
are involved. And the international criminal court investigation of war crimes 
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committed by colonel Mohammad Kaddafi’s forces in Libya, points precisely 
to the issue that we want to address with this conference.
How can we, as actors and contributors to international peace and security, 
protect the victims of sexual violence and prevent the use of sexual violence 
as a strategic weapon in conflicts in our areas of operation? As leaders, and as 
contributors to this debate, it is our common responsibilities to take this issue 
seriously and to implement the measures we believe are necessary to fight these 
crimes of war. On the other hand, today’s widespread acceptance of sexual vio-
lence as a natural consequence of war indicates not only a lack of knowledge, 
but also a lack of responsibility to confront attitudes and values that accept 
sexual violence, physical or psychological, as a legitimate use of power. As a 
result, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual and gender based violence 
also takes place in our own organization. This, again, has great impact, not 
only in our internal organizational commitments, deterioration of interpersonal 
relations and decreased moral, but also on military operations itself. 
However, little attention has been put to external limitations and consequen-
ces of these conditions. Internal incoherence caused by sexual harassment may 
hamper the effect of the operation and compromise troop security, and it may 
affect the troops’ ability to handle conflict related sexual violence or engage in 
preventive action against the use of sexual violence. Using our authority and 
leadership to confront the attitudes, values, and cultural practices that allow 
sexual harassment to take place, therefore comply with the provisions of the 
United Nations Security Council’s 1325 and 1820, to prevent and protect the 
civilian population against the use of sexual violence in conflict.
I now have the great honor and opportunity to introduce the most distin-
guished guest, and also one of the most important authorities on today’s topic. 
United Nation’s Secretary General’s special representative on sexual violence 
in conflicts, Miss Margot Wallström. Miss Wallström serves as chair of the 
inter-agency network, UN Action against sexual violence in conflicts. She has 
been an advocate of the rights and needs of women throughout her political 
career. First, as minister in the Swedish government, and later as Environment 
Commissioner and Vice President of the European Commission. Her many 
distinctions include several honorary doctorates and awards for work on sustai-
nable development and climate change. She was voted Commissioner of the 
Year by the European Voice Newspaper in 2002, and in 2004 she co-authored 
the book ”The people’s Europe, or why it is so hard to love the EU?” She was 
also the co-founder of the European Union’s inter-institutional group and key 
supporter of the 50-50 Campaign for Democracy by the European Women’s 
lobby, where she worked to promote a more gender balanced EU. Miss Wall-
ström has long played a leadership role in raising awareness about the urgent 
need to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions on women, 
peace and security and conflict related sexual violence.
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Before I leave my word to Miss Wallström, I want to use this opportunity 
once again to express my deepest gratitude to you all who have made the prio-
rity to come here today as participants and contributors to this conference. I 
sincerely hope that you will enjoy the program, as well as your stay in Oslo, and 
I wish you all good luck and I look forward to an exciting and interesting day.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN
Keynote speaker: Margot Wallström
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Dear colleagues.
Thank you very much for those kind words of welcome. For me this is indeed a 
very special occasion. Unthinkable only a few years ago, I guess, that a special 
representative on conflict-related sexual violence would be invited to a place 
like this and with an audience like this. So I am going to say a few words about 
conflict-related sexual violence, but I would actually like to talk about men, 
because I imagine that most would think this is about women, women being 
most of the victims and survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, but I really 
want to talk to you as men.
In the words of one peacekeeper in Darfur: ”If you want me to fly, first 
give me wings and then say if I flew well.” What he expressed through this 
statement is that men as peacekeepers now are expected to do a very different 
job in many ways and need to be well resourced and prepared. Because most 
of the peacekeeping mandates today contain a provision about the protection 
of civilians. If you want to protect civilians, this is not a task that can be gender 
blind. Civilians are not only men; civilians are also women and children. So 
it means that you will have to ask: Where do women go? Where do women 
live? What are women’s needs? – in order to be effective. And, of course, this 
is in the end not only the right thing to do, but it is also very important for the 
credibility of any peacekeeping operation. 
I have observed how for example MONUSCO in the DRC, conducts market 
escorts that have improved women’s sense of security and enabled them to 
resume trade, and it also allowed men to come with those market escorts. This 
contributes to development. In Darfur, firewood patrols and the construction of 
fuel-efficient stoves have reduced the number of rapes. Simple things, but very 
important: If women are unable to safely collect firewood or access markets 
or water points, if girls are unable to safely get to school, then socio-economic 
recovery of course will be stalled. These are the long term effects of not under-
standing what the protection of civilians mandate really contains. So it has to 
do with our own credibility, with your own credibility also, as peacekeepers.
I want to say something to men as soldiers and as commanders, because 
this is really about a response to the changing nature of war and conflict. And, 
of course, you all here know better, but public opinion I still think assumes 
that many of today’s wars and conflicts are like the traditional ones, with two 
well-trained, well-disciplined armies on a battle field. But we know that this 
is not how a modern war or conflict looks. It is very often intra-state, civilian 
wars, it is between groups that are difficult to control, and it is in very remote 
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areas or in the jungles of the DRC, for example, and other areas as well. Very 
rarely are they disciplined or with some kind of command order that is easily 
identified. That leaves women and children on the frontlines of war. It means 
that civilians make up most of the casualties. 
We met with people in an IDP camp, and we asked them ”What about rapes 
here?”, and they said that luckily there were no rapes in the camp. But as soon 
as women left this camp, they ran a high risk of being attacked, raped and 
killed. So we asked the men: ”Why don’t you go with them?” or even: ”Why 
couldn’t you make it the men who actually fetch water or fire-wood?” – Which 
they thought was a hilarious idea. We said: ”But why don’t you go with them?” 
They looked a bit surprised and said: ”Then we can get attacked!” So does it 
mean that we sacrifice the women? We know that they will be attacked, but it 
is a lesser evil than having the men maybe being attacked and killed. Is this 
how we look at it? Is this what we have arrived at? This is something to discuss 
and reflect upon. 
As commanders, you have to make sure that the message is clearly conveyed 
that there can be no impunity for this type of crime. ”This will not happen on 
my watch. You will be punished; you will be pursued if you commit such a 
crime.” We should also talk about men as victims, because today men and boys 
are among the victims of sexual violence; I still remember a young man who 
we met in the DRC in a panel where we interviewed for a reparation scheme. 
This young man told us that he did not even know about rape before. He was 
totally traumatized. He said: ”I have nothing left. I have the shirt, the clothes 
that I have on my body, but that is all.” He lost his wife and his child, and is 
now totally lost in a world that he could no longer really understand and in deep 
shock over having been gang raped, while hiding in the forest. 
This is maybe something that we have to mention more and more often. It is 
not only, although it is still primarily, women or girls who are victims of sexual 
violence, but it is also boys and young men. Does this mean that we can mobilize 
more men to fight with us against sexual violence in war and conflict? I hope 
so. I hope that it means also that the empathy or the deeper understanding of 
what kind of crime this is, and what it does to a person’s dignity, will help us. 
I am talking to men as decision makers, because this is, as I said, not exclu-
sively a women’s issue, but a human rights issue. We expect men as decision 
makers to take this into account, to make sure to make room for women at the 
table where decisions are being made, to make sure that there is not one peace 
agreement, peace accord, made without women being present, because you 
exclude half of the population. And there can be no peace without peace for 
women. So we have to make sure that we correct the imbalance that has existed 
over the years, and of course also in recognizing this as a crime and something 
that you have to follow up, to offer psycho-social counseling to understand the 
deeper effects of this after the war in trying to restore peace.
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I also would like to address men as husbands, village or religious leaders. 
There is so much still to do to avoid the fact that women are the ones who feel 
the shame. They are the ones that carry both the blame and the shame of being 
raped, not the perpetrator. Do we know of any other crime where this is the 
case? That we put the blame on the victim? Why don’t they come forward and 
report rapes in Libya and other countries? Because they may risk being flogged 
or accused of adultery. In some countries they risk being stoned, and in some 
countries the legislation or the informal rules say that you actually need four 
male witnesses to report a rape. Have you ever heard of somebody reporting 
a rape case where there are four male witnesses? And if there were four male 
witnesses, why didn’t they intervene and help the woman? But this is the case, 
so this is of course very effective in making sure that no rape cases are ever 
reported. There is still so much to do when it comes to legislation and rules to 
allow for sexual violence to be recognized as the crime that it is. 
And, really, this is the basic challenge, to understand that this is not a lesser 
crime. It has until now been placed lowest in a false hierarchy of war horrors. 
And even in some trials the perpetrators themselves have expressed this in 
the words: ”But I could have killed her…” So they mean that that would have 
been worse and this is actually a lesser evil. But women don’t look at it that 
way. Instead, in for example Bosnia, women still tremble when they talk about 
what was done to them 15-16 years ago. They said to me: ”They took my life 
without killing me. I go on living only because of my children. But my life 
and my dignity have been taken away.” I think it is exactly the same for many 
men, who are also victims of sexual violence. But we have to understand that 
it is not a lesser crime, because it affects not only the individual, it affects her 
family, it affects the whole society. It can also destroy her capacity to contribute 
to the economy in her village or in her country. And women, as you know, are 
very often the backbone of the economy of their villages, they are the ones 
who bring produce to the market etc. So this is what it does. An effect that will 
be felt for generations to come. But it is not inevitable. I truly believe that we 
can put an end to it. But it requires that men and women stand side by side to 
say: ”This has to stop. It will end now.” 
So that is why I will finish with a challenge to all of you here, to Norway 
and to all of you participants: Why is rape used as a weapon of choice today? 
We have seen how it can spread fear and terror. We can see how it can be used 
to displace people. This is what we can see in Libya today, but it is also used 
for ethnic cleansing, to destroy a village, and to destroy a society. 
I expect from you, or I would wish from you, first of all, that you can help 
to put it or to keep it on the peace and security agenda, and continue to treat it 
as a peace and security threat. We can continue to describe it as the war crime 
it is, to make sure that the rules are well-known and respected, to include this in 
the training on international humanitarian law, which has to include obligations 
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relating to the protection of women. I think we can spread the good examples, 
and you will soon hear from Letitia Anderson in my team also how we can 
do that. I think the MONUSCO market patrols and other examples are good 
practices that we can make sure are known generally.
I think you can put Norway in the forefront of the fight, and maybe you 
can also challenge others. I believe that you here demonstrate already the level 
of gender equality in your country. In this part of the world you demonstrate 
the professionalism by which you take this on. You demonstrate the kind of 
discipline we expect from those in uniform. I think that this issue is not yet 
included in military training everywhere. Maybe you can be the ones who show 
how it can be done, what kind of modules of training can be inserted or can be 
added to your curriculum, that this will be a natural part of any education. It 
has to be done in the kind of scenario-based training that you will hear more 
about, so that it is realistic, that it is relevant to all the soldiers in any national 
army or in our training of peacekeepers, so that we see how important an is-
sue it is, and also that we can actually root it out. And with your help, I am 
convinced that we can.
Thank you very much for listening to me, thank you for inviting me and 
my team – I think this conference is a great beginning, and I hope that our 
cooperation will continue. 
Thank you very much.
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Introduction to Minister of Defence 
Grete Faremo
Lt Col Lena Kvarving
General, Admirals, Honoured Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
In order to keep focusing on the important issues presented in resolution 1325 
and related resolutions, we need leader commitment. Our next speaker is a 
shining example of a leader committed to doing the right thing when it comes 
to resolution 1325, willing to put these issues on the agenda, pursuing results 
and takes the role as a front runner in issues related to gender perspectives in 
military operations and equal rights.
She has had an impressive career both in the corporate world and in politics. 
She has been Minister of Development Cooperation, Minister of Justice and 
Minister of Oil and Energy – to mention a few, and today she is here in the 
capacity of Minister of Defence. I am honoured to present to you: Grete Faremo 
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Address by Minister of Defence 
Grete Faremo 
Dear All,
Let me start by thanking the ”gender-project” at the Norwegian Defence Uni-
versity College for initiating this conference. We need to combine our efforts 
and skills in order to make progress in the work against sexual violence in 
conflict. Additionally, greater political determination is needed.
I would like to especially thank Margot Wallström for visiting Norway, at-
tending this conference and for giving such an inspiring lecture. Her unit at the 
UN is making great progress. And I am convinced that the report she presented 
today; ”UN Action’s Analytical Inventory and training guidelines”, will benefit 
us greatly in the future.
Sexual violence demands a broad approach. Our primary focus should be 
on women’s need for protection, in war and armed conflicts. Furthermore, we 
have to underline the significance of female participation in the prevention 
and resolution of conflict and in peace-building. Women are both victims and 
agents of change. This balanced perspective is essential.
Women are particularly vulnerable and often targets in war and armed con-
flicts. They have had little influence on conflict resolution and peace-building. 
They now need to be included. Their equal right to participation is undisputed. 
Furthermore, they have the ability to play an important role. Just look at women’s 
involvement in conflict resolution in Liberia. 
It is important to remember that the initiative for resolution 1325 came from 
those women who had experienced armed conflicts, suppression and physical 
violence. In some conflict areas, being a woman is more dangerous than being 
a soldier.
This challenges the traditional concept of security, which traditionally has 
been state-centric. The new security dimensions do not only concern states, 
but human security as well.
This begs the question: What does security entail to women? 
My address today will firstly focus on why women’s need for protection 
and women’s right to participation are important security policy issues and 
concerns for the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
Secondly, I will turn to Norway’s implementation of resolution 1325 and 
the role of the armed forces in this regard.
Norway is engaged in multiple international operations, and our most 
extensive engagement is currently the operation in Afghanistan. This is not a 
conflict where sexual violence is being used as a systematic weapon of war. 
Nevertheless, women’s rights have suffered serious setbacks due to 30 years 
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of civil war, and women in Afghanistan are to a great extent victims of gender 
based violence. 
In other conflicts where Norway has been or is engaged, such as the Bal-
kans and in Africa, sexual violence as a weapon of war is present. And the 
tales coming out of Libya are alarming. We may be sure of one thing: We will 
face it again. 
We may expect that different parties to armed conflicts in which we are 
engaged, utilize sexual violence as a weapon of war. What do we do about 
this? To what degree do our forces address women’s need for protection? Can 
their involvement contribute to enhancing women’s involvement in political 
processes?
Soldiers are role-models and have to behave responsibly when partaking 
in international operations. Apart from the obvious adherence to the code of 
conduct, what attitudes and values are they exhibiting? How do they behave 
toward the women they encounter? How do they behave toward their female 
comrades? In mentoring local military personnel, what values do they com-
municate?
Why is it important to have a gender perspective in international operations?
- Better fulfillment of our mandates. Our mandates dictate that we contribute 
to security for the whole population — women and men alike. This can only 
be achieved through implementing a gender perspective. 
- Human rights. By having a gender perspective, we can better contribute 
to ensuring the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts. 
- Operational effectiveness. Having a gender perspective will enhance the 
operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces, for instance by contributing to 
greater situational awareness. 
Engaging women is about security and smart policies; about creating the 
best solutions possible and the most prudent policies. Peace processes where 
half of the population is excluded are not sustainable.
Women are pivotal in improving local conditions in fields such as health 
care, food production and education to mention some – and as such in contri-
buting to building democracy and sustainable peace.  Around the world, war 
and peace are too important to be left to men only.
It is counterproductive to neglect women. This is why it is so important for 
us to counter the occurrence of systematic sexual violence perpetrated against 
women, as these crimes do not only come at a terrible cost to each of the wo-
men - but to the local community as well.  
Norway wants to be at the forefront of international efforts to counter sys-
tematic use of sexual violence in conflict. This is why I tasked the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in 2010 to develop guidelines on sexual violence in conflict. 
This work has not yet been completed, and I look forward to receiving the 
recommendations.   
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Implementation of 1325/1820 in the Norwegian Armed Forces
How do we implement the obligations laid out in resolution 1325 and subsequent 
resolutions in our armed forces and in international operations?
In 2007, the Norwegian Armed Forces were directed to implement resolution 
1325. And it is no secret that the armed forces have struggled with realizing 
this task.
This is why we have produced a list of 21 measures for the defence sector 
to assist the implementation. We must turn words into action.
Our focus is first and foremost on the application of a gender perspective 
in operations. We need to increase knowledge about what this entails. An in-
stitutional and holistic approach is required.
Secondly, we must hold military leaders accountable. And let me be clear 
on this. I want all leaders of all ranks in the Armed Forces to implement this. 
Personal preferences concerning the relevance of 1325 have no place here. I 
want to see leaders instructing their units and demanding results.  I want to 
see military leaders at conferences like this one. There is much here to learn, 
for them as well.
Thirdly, we are working to recruit more women. Female soldiers and officers 
are important assets for doing a better job in operations abroad in general, and 
also in relation to 1325, as recognized by, and called for in resolution 1325. That 
said, we need to stress that implementing 1325 is the responsibility of the entire 
international community – not just that of women or female military personnel.
I often hear people in the Armed Forces complain that resolution 1325 is 
ambiguous. How can we be more concise? This entails how our soldiers patrol, 
who they talk to, who they meet, how they create security around areas where 
women meet, and how they can provide protection for girls on their way to 
and from school. We have to understand women’s security needs in order to 
meet them. And we have to listen to women to ensure those needs are met. By 
engaging women we gain a better understanding of the situation where our 
soldiers operate. At the same time, we must ensure that our approach does not 
expose the women to risks they themselves are not prepared to faces. 
Let me add that if 1325 and all it entails sounds complicated and ambigu-
ous – well, then, take the time to educate yourself and your staff. A conference 
such as this one provides an excellent opportunity. I salute all those attending 
the conference today.
Institutional Approach
If we are to succeed with the implementation of 1325, we will need the orga-
nization on our side.
This in turn means that the Norwegian Armed Forces must strengthen its 
ability to include a gender perspective in the planning, execution and evaluation 
of operations, as well as training and education. 
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Prior to an operation, a gender-analysis of the area of operation should be 
conducted. Routine instructions on how soldiers and officers should behave in 
the field must be reviewed and revised. And eventually reporting must include 
gender-specific activities.
We will support academic discourse on the subject, to gain more knowledge 
on the issue. We will consider coaching leaders and other key personnel. We 
will recruit more women to operational units. By the end of 2011, guidelines 
for countering sexual violence in war and armed conflicts will be in place. 
Implementing a gender perspective in military operations is largely about 
changing attitudes and gaining a new perspective on how we perceive our mili-
tary missions. It is demanding work. Which is why I am exceptionally pleased 
with the Gender-Project at our Defence University College. Ever since its launch 
a year and a half ago, the staff has been working diligently with lecturing and 
educating the armed forces. Attitudes can only be changed through knowledge 
and experience, and by making our military leaders prime stakeholders in this 
endeavor. They cannot rely solely on the Defence University College to do 
the job. They must themselves seek the knowledge and pass it on to their unit. 
To carry out 1325 our forces are engaging local women. We are identifying 
possible female agents of change. We are meeting with local women leaders 
and representatives in our PRT in Meymaneh, we are improving the competence 
of our personnel and we have established new positions and functions. We are 
starting to report on the progress of our work.
We have a gender field advisor in our PRT in Meymaneh, who is dedicated 
towards ensuring the integration of a gender perspective in our operations. The 
gender field adviser is leading the female engagement team in the PRT.
Additionally, we have a full-time Gender Advisor in the ISAF HQ. And 
we are deploying an officer to the NATO Training Mission — Afghanistan 
(NTM-A) in Kabul. He will advise Afghan officers and police about gender 
and human rights. This is an excellent example of how 1325 is not only about 
women, but equally about men, our male soldiers and local male powerbrokers. 
Much work remains. In Afghanistan our approach should be permeated 
by a gender perspective – not just from a few specialists, but from the entire 
organisation. 
Our military forces are training and mentoring the Afghan forces to protect 
and respect local woman. By doing so, we hope to influence men’s attitudes 
towards women. The latter is probably the most important part of what we do 
to prevent sexual violence against women. The brutal sexual assaults against 
women in the Congo and other countries are not only part of military strategies. 
They are expressions of sexual aggression and hatred against women. 
This is why Defence and Security Sector Reform is such an important 
measure to prevent sexual violence against women. It is an important tool 
in assuring a continued focus on gender – and it is key to making important 
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changes possible. I believe this tool has not yet been used to its full capacity. 
Norway is deeply committed to Security Sector Reform, in Afghanistan, in the 
Balkans, in the Caucasus, in the Horn of Africa and we are considering stepping 
up our efforts in Sudan. From the defence side, this is one of the most important 
measures we undertake to contribute to the implementation of resolution 1820.
 
A larger portion of women in the Norwegian Armed Forces
Resolution 1325 calls for an increase of the number of female military personnel 
in the armed forces. More women will ensure a more competent force, a broader 
spectrum of competence. Research shows that women have a tendency to be 
more dialogue-oriented and may bring a different mindset to conflict resolution 
and prevention. Furthermore, female military personnel often send important 
signals to the local population. Increased recruitment of women provides the 
armed forces with more tools for the toolbox.
We know one thing; we are no better abroad than we are at home. If the 
leaders and employees of the armed forces are not conscious about equality 
and human rights, such issues may be easily forgotten in operations. We not 
only bring our weapons, we also carry our values. Let us be aware of and honor 
these values.
We have a job to do at home as well. According to a new survey, sexual 
harassment and assault occurs in the Norwegian Armed Forces. We have various 
surveys showing different figures. Typically, the number of women who have 
experienced such treatment is significantly higher than men. Now we are wor-
king to find out more. Such findings are completely unacceptable. Appropriate 
measures are being implemented. 
Let me assure you that I will monitor progress in this area. It is related to 
today’s topic. There is a limit as to what we tolerate — among our own, al-
liance partners or local associates. On several occasions, the ISAF command 
has expressed criticism about Afghan development adverse to the promotion of 
women’s rights. ISAF is not willing to defend governments regardless of their 
agenda or human rights record. Therefore, we cannot either. Let me remind you 
that if we neglect women and women’s rights we actually make a conscious 
choice — for the suppressors of women. 
Conclusion
I hope this will be a day of learning for us all. I would like to finish by thanking 
the Norwegian Defence University College for organizing this conference. 
Today’s conference is historic in its focus and expertise. 
Let me call on all good forces to combine in the effort to combat sexual 
violence in war and conflict. We have our work cut out for us! 
Thank you for your attention.
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Session 1
Conceptual Framework for Handling 
and Responding to Sexual Violence
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UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Con-
flict, ”Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual 
Violence: The Analytical Inventory of 
Peacekeeping Practice and Scenario-bas-
ed Training for Peacekeepers”
Letitia Anderson
Thank you, I am delighted to be here. I think when it comes to gender equa-
lity and advancing women’s rights, military institutions are often regarded as 
the ‘final frontier’. But in the context of conflict-related sexual violence as a 
Protection of Civilians challenge, the security sector - including military com-
ponents - has a critical role to play and a critical impact on women’s security. 
Dag Hammarskiöld, the second UN Secretary-General once said: ”Peace-
keeping is too important to be undertaken by soldiers, but soldiers are the only 
ones who can do it.” Clearly, in integrated peacekeeping missions, soldiers are 
not the only actors, but they are one important piece of the overall protection 
puzzle. This is especially true when mass rapes occur in remote, volatile areas 
that can only be reached by well-equipped patrols – in places where it might be 
too precarious even for police or humanitarian actors to operate. In this context, 
the quote I mentioned captures a central tension between the training soldiers 
generally receive, often in conventional war fighting, and the complex demands 
of contemporary multi-dimensional, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations. The 
latter often require close interaction and consultation with host communities, 
as well as the ability to respond to new and non-conventional security threats. 
As you may know, conflict-related sexual violence has recently been recog-
nized by the UN Security Council as a tactic of war, a threat to security, and 
an impediment to peace-building. The Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping 
Practice, which is the document that I will discuss today, captures some of the 
promising practices, tasks and tactics by the military components of peace-
keeping missions to address it.
To put this recent progress in perspective, it is worth recalling that sexual 
violence has traditionally flown under the radar of regional and international 
security institutions. It has, for a long time, been dismissed as the random, 
isolated acts of a few renegades, an inevitable byproduct of war or merely part 
of wars’ collateral damage. Over the past three years, however, it has been 
decisively elevated to a place on the agenda of the world’s paramount peace 
and security body, the UN Security Council. This is reflected in a series of 
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resolutions that represent a breakthrough in Security Council practice, namely 
1820 (of 2008), 1888 (of 2009) and 1960 (adopted in December 2010). As a 
result, sexual violence has increasingly been featured in Protection of Civilians 
mandates given by the Security Council to UN peacekeeping missions. This 
has resulted in a dramatically increased political and media profile for an issue 
once called ‘history’s greatest silence’. 
From having long been considered the world’s least condemned war crime, 
sexual violence is now central to a number of ICC (International Criminal Co-
urt) investigations, including at the level of command responsibility, as seen 
in the Bemba trial concerning the conflict in the Central African Republic. In 
the peacekeeping arena, sexual violence as a tactic of war by belligerents and 
spoilers to the peace has tended to be conflated with, or even eclipsed by, the 
issue of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers themselves, 
which has a much higher media profile. In 2009, when our team travelled to 
various peacekeeping missions to broach the subject of proactive responses 
to sexual violence as a tactic of war, we had to spend the first half of every 
meeting explaining that we weren’t there to point the finger at military com-
ponents themselves regarding conduct and discipline, but that we were talking 
about preventing and deterring sexual violence as a proactive protection task. 
Moreover, the knowledge base on the causes and consequences of sexual 
violence has traditionally been one-sided. It has been largely based on the 
anecdotal experiences of survivors, rather than on an understanding of the 
motivations of the perpetrators, the restraining and enabling factors that relate 
to the conduct of armed groups, State and non-State actors. This is particularly 
important, because we cannot prevent what we don’t adequately understand. 
The UN now has a mandate to engage in dialogue directly with State and non-
State actors to obtain protection commitments to refrain from sexual violence 
and to leverage the credible threat of listing, that is the ‘naming and shaming’ or 
‘blacklisting’ of perpetrators, and of sanctions. This enables us, especially with 
armed groups that have a political agenda or political aspirations, to leverage 
concerns related to their international image, as well as the threat of measures 
like travel bans and asset freezes, to try to effect behavioral change. 
Most dramatically, there has, in recent years, been a shift from sexual vio-
lence being seen as exclusively a women’s issue, relegated to what is often 
called ”the pink ghetto of gender”, to viewing this in a Protection of Civilians 
paradigm. This paradigm shift is important because  it opens the door to a 
broader constituency or set of stakeholders, and breaks down the traditional 
schism between ‘hard security’ and ‘human security’. It underscores that the 
‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda is indivisible from the agenda of ‘Inter-
national Peace and Security’. It shifts the terms of the debate from reacting to 
sexual violence like any other tragedy or public health problem, to preventing 
sexual violence like any other security threat. As a result, I think we have seen 
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a genuine mainstreaming of this issue. Increasingly, we see sexual violence 
included on the agenda of meetings about the Protection of Civilians, on civil-
military coordination (CIMIC) conferences and of meetings such as this one. I 
think cultivating non-traditional champions, such as Generals, as well as gender 
experts, is an important part of this process. Peers speak most persuasively to 
peers. And this is particularly true in military and police circles. 
In his 2007 report on the Protection of Civilians, UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon pointed to “the lives destroyed by sexual violence in conflict” as 
exemplifying our collective failure to ensure effective protection. He stated: “In 
no other area is our collective failure to ensure effective protection for civilians 
more apparent than in terms of the masses of women and girls whose lives are 
destroyed each year by sexual violence perpetrated in conflict”. Similarly, in 
2008, General Patrick Cammaert, a former Force Commander – in the quote 
that is shown on the slide –said that “it has probably become more dangerous 
to be a woman than a soldier in contemporary conflicts”, and that, when he was 
Deputy Force Commander of MONUC, the sexual violence that he witnessed 
in Eastern Congo was among the worst atrocities he had ever seen in over thirty 
years of military service. 
When people from the military speak like this, it resonates broadly with 
other members of the military and opens new doors for engagement. General 
Cammaert made these remarks at a 2008 Wilton Park conference, at which 
we posed the question: What role can military components play in preventing 
and addressing conflict-related sexual violence? It became clear from that 
discussion, involving peacekeepers with recent or active service, that they had 
developed enterprising solutions and responses in the face of sexual violence 
in their areas of operation rather than be bystanders to atrocity. However, these 
responses were largely improvised and ad hoc, and members of the military 
were clear that they cannot continue to operate in an environment of ambiguity: 
that is, in the absence of doctrine, in the absence of clear training, and in the 
absence of explicit mandates. 
Our team then visited several peacekeeping missions to try to validate 
some of the tactics and tasks that we had collected. In June 2010, these were 
launched as the Analytical Inventory that is available today. This document 
is essentially a compilation of promising practices. We don’t call them ‘best 
practices’, because we are still at a stage when we cannot definitively say 
these practices have been experienced by women as ‘best’; the aim is simply 
to capture strategies that have been employed  in field missions and convert 
them into scenario-based training on the ‘how to’ of sexual violence prevention 
and response. This training will enable peacekeepers to recognize and react 
more swiftly and appropriately to sexual violence as part of their operational 
readiness standards. The exercises also provide a tangible demonstration that 
prevention is possible. 
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This new training package has been pitched to Troop Contributing Coun-
tries as part of a concerted effort to give peacekeepers the tools they need to 
succeed. The scenarios aim to immerse potential peacekeepers in a hypothetical 
situation, asking them to formulate appropriate courses of action (COA). So, 
for example: the scenario is provided that women are routinely being robbed 
and raped on their way back from market in your area of operations. How do 
you respond within your Rules of Engagement and mandate? How do you 
link up with other mission components, like Police, Human Rights, or Civil 
Affairs? How do you take steps to prevent the repetition of such violence in 
future? This invites participants to think through how they would respond if 
confronted with that reality. The training package consists not only of case 
studies, Power Points and scenarios, but also of film clips to show prospective 
peacekeepers, who may never have left Dhaka or New Delhi and are about to 
be deployed to Darfur or the DRC, what the operating environment or ‘risk 
environment’ actually looks like. And, more specifically, what it looks like 
through the eyes of women. 
The UN has established a ‘mobile training support team’ to roll this training 
out in major Troop Contributing Countries at their request, and in 2012 we 
hope to do an evaluation by going back to relevant peacekeeping missions to 
find out whether this increased recognition and attention to good practice has 
created a virtuous cycle of greater confidence, better preparedness and improved 
practice over time in confronting the challenge of sexual violence as a tactic of 
war and terror. In assessing the evolution of practice, it will also be important to 
identify residual gaps and challenges. The Inventory is conceived as a continual 
work in progress, given the changing face of conflict and the evolving nature 
of peacekeeping missions. We continually have to adapt training standards to 
suit the circumstances. The Inventory and indicative training scenarios reflect 
the reality that we are facing a moving target.
I will highlight just some of the tasks and tactics reflected in the Inventory. 
Some of the short-term, kinetic examples include: preventive physical patrols 
and protection tailored to women’s mobility patterns, such as firewood patrols, 
water-route patrols, and market escorts. Examples from eastern DRC include 
sealing off the market entrance for the duration of women’s trade, so that there 
would be a ‘weapons free zone’ in which women could work safely. There have 
been various levels of success associated with these patrols depending on how 
well they are coordinated with women’s movements, whether women are aware 
of the timing or calendar of patrols in advance, whether there are women who 
are able to accompany the patrols so they are not seen as intimidating, and 
whether effective outreach to women civilians is undertaken beforehand. Also, 
we need to think critically about the quality, not just the quantity, of patrols: 
Are we talking about patrols on foot that really penetrate into the community, 
and night patrols in places where women are not safe, or is it just a matter of 
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going from point A to point B on the main artery in your APC?
We also documented innovations like Joint Protection Teams, namely 
mechanisms for increased civilian-military interface or patrolling from a joint 
team-site, quick impact projects (QIPs) and substitution efforts like the provision 
of fuel-efficient stoves, which reduces the need for women to venture beyond 
camp perimeters, at great personal risk, to collect firewood. This technique 
also reduces the need to disperse the force and dilute troop density by sending 
patrols out after every group of women who goes in search of fuel. So in es-
sence, this substitution or quick impact project doubles as a kind of front-end 
prevention tactic.
Other interesting practices involve working with communities to enable 
them to raise the alarm swiftly in the face of emerging threats, so-called ‘village 
vigilance’ or ‘village defence committees’ that can activate a quick reaction force 
to dispatch to the area in a timely manner, and cordon and search operations 
that demonstrate how liaison with women can enhance situational awareness 
regarding the location of threats or weapons caches. Equally important are 
improved community liaison strategies, such as making sure that we don’t just 
consult with the first Sheik or other male elder who steps forward, but consult 
in a way that is representative of the community as a whole. In fact, consulting 
with women can set an example and set the tone for the rest of the community, 
showing that women are valued contributors to the consolidation of peace, and 
that they have a voice in matters of security. Often the behavior of peacekeepers 
is emulated by the community – indeed, the presence of women in peacekeeping 
missions can serve a positive role-modeling effect. For example, the all-female 
Formed Police Unit (FPU) in Liberia is widely credited with helping to triple 
the number of women applying to join the Liberian National Police Force. In 
addition, the all-female FPU took certain proactive measures like community 
self-defence and security awareness training for women at a number of schools 
and community centers, in a context where rape remains the most frequently 
reported crime many years after the close of civil conflict. 
It is clear from the research undertaken in the course of compiling the 
Inventory, that peacekeepers often have an indirect or derivative role in secu-
ring the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, including logistical 
support in transporting PEP kits (Post-Exposure Prophylaxis) to prevent HIV 
transmission after acts of sexual violence, given these need to reach survivors 
within 72 hours. They can also play a role in supporting gender-sensitive camp 
design and management, as we know that the location of lighting and latrines 
in refugee or displaced persons camps can have a security dividend for women, 
as can efforts to ensure that camps are constructed in a way that is responsive 
to women’s specific security concerns.
In the context of DDR processes, following up on ex-combatants who have 
been reinserted into civilian communities can be an important protection acti-
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vity. A number of women in the DRC told me that 50 dollars a month does not 
convert a combatant into a civilian; sometimes it converts them into a more 
proximate threat to civilians, because they continue the patterns of violent 
conduct and predation acquired during years of conflict. So it becomes impor-
tant to ask the questions: What follow-up can we do to support communities 
receiving and reintegrating former combatants, and what options are available 
to ex-combatants in terms of employment and vocational training? Also, it has 
been shown that having more women at DDR cantonment sites makes women 
who have been associated with armed forces more likely to come forward and 
participate in the disarmament process. There have also been examples where 
peacekeepers have intervened to secure the release of women who have been 
held as sexual slaves or in trafficking scenarios. In sum, there are a range of 
tasks and tactics used to combat sexual violence, and there are different ways 
of executing these tasks and tactics in different operational settings.
When we considered why one practice seemed more effective than another, 
it was generally due to the following ten common concerns, listed in the Inven-
tory as ‘Ten Emerging Elements for Effective Response’. The first is when the 
mission has the ability to ‘see’ the risks facing women and girls and conducts 
gender analysis as a routine part of security assessments. Often you only see 
what you are looking for, and sexual violence may be invisible in chaotic, 
conflict-affected settings, often brutally and deliberately silenced, so carrying 
out a basic gender analysis can enhance the situational awareness of the force, 
and is a basis for giving better advice to your commanders to inform planning 
decisions. 
Secondly, exemplary leadership on the part of the Force Commander has 
a significant impact on whether the force will be responsive to this issue. The 
third point is that training without the ability or willingness to respond is nuga-
tory: there must be willingness and wherewithal to respond to sexual violence 
even in unconventional spaces, such as private or semi-public spaces. Fourth, 
community-driven strategies and close community liaison, including through 
having female interpreters available, can help to ensure meaningful dialogue 
including with local women who are typically hardest to reach, which has a 
huge impact on the overall effectiveness of the strategies. Fifth, a policy of 
promoting gender balance in the process of force generation helps to ensure 
more women are deployed as uniformed or civilian peacekeepers and as mi-
litary observers. Women tend to have a comparative operational advantage in 
sexual violence outreach and response, which enhances the ability of the force 
to reach the community as a whole. 
The sixth factor involves recognizing and rewarding promising practice and 
profiling successful initiatives while imposing consequences for non-perfor-
mance or omission. Seventh, it is critical to engage in capacity building of the 
national authorities, the role of the UN being not to supplant, but to support, 
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the national security sector and to leave a legacy of a security sector that is 
accessible and responsive to women. Building national capacity to prevent and 
punish sexual violence should be part of the exit strategy of any peacekeeping 
missions. The eighth factor is robust coordination with other protection stake-
holders; humanitarians often have better proximity to the affected communities. 
Ninth is clear guidance on mandate interpretation and how sexual violence fits 
within the Rules of Engagement (or ROE), so the various responsibilities are 
clear, from command to platoon level. Finally, the tenth emerging element for 
a successful intervention is to ensure personnel undergo scenario-based trai-
ning, like the modules that we have recently developed, requiring participants 
to engage in the thought process of applying the ROE to the situation at hand. 
Such training can help uniformed peacekeepers to be operationally ready to 
confront sexual violence as a war tactic and impediment to the restoration of 
security. Pre-deployment and in-mission training, coupled with adequate human 
and materiel resources, is critical to success.
They say in the Australian Defence Force, and I believe it is a widely used 
expression, that “if the only tool in your box is a hammer, all your problems 
look like nails”. The point is that contemporary peacekeepers need more in their 
tool box than a hammer. There may be a need to be more creatively configured 
for so-called ‘soft soldiering’, having more logistical and engineering capacity, 
having more level-hospitals, being able to build the trust and the confidence 
of the community, often referred to as ‘winning hearts and minds’, or ensuring 
that a peace and security dividend flows equally to all components of the host 
community, including women and girls. 
In the case of the mass rape in Walikale in Eastern Congo last July and 
August, the forces had actually been in the area for less than one month, others 
have told me less than one week, when the atrocities occurred. So if we wait 
for in-mission training, it will always be too late. There is a great need for pre-
deployment training as part of operational awareness. And the aim is really to 
replace improvisation with systematization. I would not say ‘standardization’, 
because often best practice replicated in inappropriate circumstances, can 
become worst practice, or, as we call it in the UN, ‘lessons learned’, (as you 
can imagine, we rarely say ‘worst practice’ in UN language!). The point is 
that we need to systematize and normalize the response, without prescribing a 
‘one size fits all’ approach, when clearly there is a need to tailor strategies to 
suit the context.
On the slide is a quick snapshot of how the Inventory is being rolled out today. 
It has been presented in Bangladesh, Nepal and India, some of the largest UN 
troop contributors, and also presented at the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Trai-
ning Centre. We have planned a briefing to all Military Advisors of Permanent 
Missions to the UN in New York. 
In terms of some future directions for our collective efforts to combat sexual 
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violence – I think the Inventory is an example of the importance of capturing 
and disseminating success stories, not just horror stories. I think it is much 
more motivating to show the modest interventions that can actually have an 
impact and make a difference, especially as sexual violence has been steeped 
in a sense of historical inevitability. Obviously, peacekeeping is never the pa-
nacea and the point is to work with national authorities and mobilize them to 
end sexual violence. Finding effective ways to engage with non-State actors 
and armed groups is an on-going challenge, but there are cases where sexual 
violence has not been used in a conflict scenario by an armed group. That is, 
there are negative and asymmetrical cases we could look into to inquire why 
rape was not part of the repertoire of violence, and how an armed group ma-
naged to narrow its repertoire of violence to exclude certain atrocities against 
civilians. Reflecting on variation in this way underscores that rape in war is not 
inevitable. Another forward-looking challenge is the need to obtain real-time 
information (or intelligence) for prevention and real-time response. There is 
also a need for sustained political resolve and resources to ensure that we are 
not continually asking peacekeepers to do more with less. 
Let me give one concrete example, in case there are any cynics sitting in 
the back of the room, which highlights how the Security Council resolutions 
have actually been applied for real-world impact. In the mass rapes in Wali-
kale, eastern DRC, which attracted unprecedented media, public and political 
outrage, the Security Council responded in a way that I have never seen before 
in almost ten years of working on this issue. They hosted an Open Debate, 
which featured the Assistant Secretary-General of DPKO and the Special Re-
presentative on Sexual Violence in Conflict followed by a closed consultation 
where they looked at concrete recommendations for improving the response. 
As a result of that, sexual violence is now included on the front page of all 
SITREPS, that is Situation Reports, transmitted from the field to headquarters. 
They also discussed how to improve communication, how to make sure there 
are community liaison interpreters affiliated with the military component, and 
how to intensify patrols in the affected area. The Security Council issued public 
statements expressing a willingness to impose targeted and graduated measures 
(meaning, sanctions) against the perpetrators and following the visit of the 
SRSG to the DRC, we saw a high-profile arrest, with MONUSCO support, of 
so-called “Lt. Colonel’’ Mayele of the Mai-Mai, who was allegedly associated 
with the mass rapes. We have seen increasingly swift and serious responses to 
cases of mass rape as a core part of collective efforts to protect civilians and to 
deliver a comprehensive response to the needs of survivors.
Ultimately, practical tools like the Inventory and scenario-based training 
modules are efforts to translate the normative, policy and legal progress we 
have seen at the global level into improved security at the level of the village 
in Eastern Congo, the IDP camp in Darfur, the hinterlands of Liberia, or the 
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mountains of Afghanistan. This is in recognition of the fact that there can be no 
security without women’s security. In other words, enhancing women’s safety 
enhances situational awareness, it enhances force protection by building trust 
and confidence with the host community, and it enhances your prospects for 
mission success. As the Inventory shows, the new Security Council resolu-
tions calling for an end to sexual violence are not just aspirational – they are 
operational. 
Thank you.  
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NATO’s Action Plan for Implementing 
UNSCR 1325
Loredana Alemanno-Testa, NATO HQ
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for having invited 
me to this conference. I am really honored to speak to such a distinguished 
audience. Today I would like to brief you on what NATO has accomplished 
with regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 into its NATO-led opera-
tions and missions. 
As you know, each NATO Ally contributes to the ISAF and KFOR opera-
tions. Each Ally individually adheres to the principles of the UNSCR 1325 and 
related resolutions, including the one on children in armed conflict and sexual 
violence in armed conflict.  
Since 2010, and therefore I would say that it is rather recent, NATO as an 
Alliance has been looking to find ways to implement these resolutions into 
NATO-led operations and missions in a collective manner. This initiative gained 
momentum on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 last year. 
At that time, a number of defence ministers approached the NATO Secretary 
General, Mr Rasmussen, to draw his attention to the fact that it was time for 
NATO to have a coordinated approach to this issue. The Secretary General 
himself became a champion of this and he support the implementation of the 
UNSCR 1325 in a very concrete fashion. In fact, we pride ourselves in saying 
that on this topic NATO is aiming at tangible outcomes from the outset.  I am 
going to explain to you how and why.
In fact, in order to meet the requirements of defence ministers the Allies, 
together with ISAF and KFOR non-NATO contributing countries, worked 
very hard to define an action plan that would allow a generic implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in NATO Operations , as well as a specific implementation in 
these two particular operations. As you can see on this slide, the NATO Action 
Plan was endorsed at the highest possible level at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 
in November 2010. It was elaborated in the Operations Policy Committee – you 
know that NATO works by committees and reaches decisions by consensus. The 
Operations Policy Committee is one of the highest bodies of the Alliance and 
reports directly to the North Atlantic Council. It includes national representatives 
from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. The OPC 
provides strategic political- military advice to the Council on all issues related to 
operations and therefore it made perfect sense to ask the OPC to take on board 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations and missions.
The concrete aspects of the NATO Action Plan are to be underlined. The Plan 
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contains approximately thirty goals and within each goal there are a number of 
actions that are expected. NATO entities and committees are identified to lead 
in each particular item and they are also responsible for reporting progress.
The Plan is very much focused on operations and is structured in a way 
that easily identifies actions to be conducted as part of crisis management and 
operational planning, training and exercises, and the conduct of operations in 
ISAF and KFOR. It reflects a top-down approach in the sense that it was man-
dated by Heads of State and Government. It assigns specific responsibilities 
to NATO bodies such as the International Staff (of which I am a member), 
the International Military Staff, and NATO Commands throughout their long 
chain of command. 
It does expect deliverables by specific deadlines. There are no ifs or buts: 
all those NATO bodies and NATO staffs have to deliver. 
The Operations Policy Committee imposes a very tight battle rhythm, and 
in fact, as we speak, the Action Plan is being revised.  It has to be revised initi-
ally every six months and indeed we have now completed the first six months 
of its implementation. Furthermore, as you can see from this slide, we must 
produce a progress report to Foreign Ministers by December 2011 and to the 
next NATO Summit. 
What are the challenges and the strengths of the Action Plan? As I said, the 
strength of course is that it is mandated top-down, that it defines who needs to 
do what, by when. But there are a number of challenges that come with it. As 
you may imagine, the implementation of the Action Plan requires the inter-
vention of many actors at different levels, ranging from the strategic level at 
NATO HQ itself, to NATO Commands and their own chain of command, and 
to the Office of the Senior Civilian Representative in the case of Afghanistan. 
Therefore, one of the biggest challenges is to collect all the good work that is 
being done at each level and make sure that we can derive some best practices. 
To this purpose we have organized a number of activities and among these are 
briefings by the Nordic countries - In fact, I must compliment you, the Nordic 
countries: You are much more advanced with regard to gender perspectives than 
many other countries - We would like to offer the Nordic countries a forum to 
be a role model.  We have invited for example a Swedish Mobile Observing 
team to brief the OPC. Through their eyes, the political and military masters of 
NATO have been able to see how the inclusion of female soldiers can impact 
in a very positive way the conduct of the ISAF operation, as well as have a 
positive influence on the lives of ordinary women in Afghanistan.
It is important that the effects of adopting a gender perspective in opera-
tions be tangible and valuable for the achievement of mission objectives.  As 
you may imagine, another big challenge is to convince certain commanders 
of the usefulness of dedicated gender advisors in the chain of command.  In 
every country resources are scarce and in NATO operations the situation is 
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not different.  Therefore it is very important to make sure that through our 
work, through the implementation of the Action Plan, we can answer two key 
questions: How can commanders benefit from the role of gender advisors in 
conducting an operation in a hostile environment? How can gender advisors 
and their commanders impact positively the lives of local women – the other 
half of the population, that is-  so that they can indeed win the hearts and minds 
of 100 per cent of the population?
In order to facilitate progress reporting, we intend to organize a number of 
events at NATO HQ (seminars or workshops). NATO countries have not yet 
discussed this opportunity, but the International Staff will propose to gather 
both the theorists and the practitioners of gender perspectives and draw up a list 
of best practices, so that we can identify what has been done, what has worked 
well in operational areas and what has not, with a view to providing a better 
guidance to our political masters as well as to our commanders in the field.
As UNSCR 1960 was adopted just after the Lisbon Summit, this particular 
resolution is not mentioned in the Action Plan.  However, the Action Plan does 
refer to the UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions.  Indirectly, this subject 
is tackled in there as well. For example, there are two goals in the Action Plan 
and they relate to Afghanistan. One of these is the following: The chain of com-
mand is to issue guidance so that gender perspective is taken into account in 
capacity building programs under the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. 
This means that we are encouraging the recruitment of Afghan women in the 
Afghan National Police. As you know, female police can have a crucial role in 
preventing sexual violence or ensuring that sexual violence is addressed as soon 
as it happens. Although this is of course an Afghan-led process, we encourage 
the hiring of a greater number of Afghan female police, because their role in 
patrolling or their role in holding for example female shuras is very much a 
means to prevent and combat sexual violence and to be closer to the female 
community, which in the traditional Afghan culture is not usually listened to.
I would like to point out that NATO also has other initiatives. There is – and 
you can find it on the website – a Bi-Strategic Command Directive for integra-
ting UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure, 
including measures for protection during armed conflict. There is also a policy 
which has been elaborated at the level of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-
cil. It is being reviewed as we speak. Then there is a NATO building integrity 
initiative which is being implemented with the cooperation of the Afghan 
government, which provides support for a broad range of activities to combat 
corruption and promote good government. In this particular case NATO will 
host an event for Afghan businesses led by women. 
Therefore, as you can see, we are in the process of implementing UNSCR 
1325 and gender perspectives in NATO operations through a wide spectrum 
of actions and initiatives which aim not only at changing the mind sets of our 
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political masters and commanders, but also at influencing the local population 
so that they also change their own mind set and improve the lives of local, 
ordinary women.
Thank you very much.
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Training Military Personnel to Respond to 
Sexual Violence
Ann Livingstone, PhD, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
Good morning. Let me thank the organizers on behalf of the Pearson Centre for 
the kind invitation to be here. It is quite an honor and I am very pleased. I do 
also want to apologize for my attire; I do know how to dress for conferences, 
but my luggage has gone walk-about some place and I have no idea where it 
may show up. 
Training military personnel to respond to sexual and gender based violence 
is a part of the PPC’s work with uniformed personnel. We have been working 
with police since 2004, military personnel since 2008, and we conduct training 
in places like Congo and Darfur and in Latin-America. We use applied research, 
we use lessons learned and good practices that many of you in this room pro-
vide. Our approach to training is based on adult learning methodology that we 
know is very useful. Adults remember 90 per cent of what they do and 20 per 
cent of what they hear. So scenario based training using case studies is the way 
that we work. I make my staff limit Power Points to no more than six, and the 
rest of the time is spent in small groups and in working through case studies. 
The structure of the presentation today is: I want to just briefly touch on the 
changing nature of conflict, look at the impact of conflict on women, the role 
for military personnel of training, and some recommendations that we have 
created over time.
Because I am an academic, I think context is very important, and I think we 
sometimes forget the magnificent changes that occurred with the end of the cold 
war, when inter-state conflict of warfare came to basically an end, and we now 
have intra-state conflict. However, I would suggest that much of our training 
within our military frameworks and with the military colleagues and to some 
degree with police still assumes that the enemy is going to come through the 
Fulda Gap and we need to be prepared for that. But in reality, when we look at 
intrastate conflict I would suggest that what we face is what General Rupbert 
Smith  named war amongst the people, and is by far a better way of thinking 
about how we need to train for this landscape of conflict.
When we talk about sexual violence, I think we are oftentimes disquieted 
by the topic and we lump it together as mass rape or mass something, rather 
than looking at the various kinds of sexual violence there is that we are going 
to have to deal with. Each one of these has a different response that is going 
to be needed by the first responder being a military peacekeeper or a police 
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peacekeeper. Having a clear idea of what this mean will affect how we train, 
how we think, how we respond, and fundamentally how we listen.
We can also talk about the impact on women, and I can give you statistics, 
and we can all talk about statistics. But I find that statistics are very numbing. 
50 000 of that and 75 000 of something else, and 200 000 of something else, 
makes us inured to the reality that behind every number is a face. And behind 
every face is a family. And behind every family is a history. And behind every 
history is a contributor to peace and security. So I would like for us, when we 
talk about this subject, to really understand the variations on the theme that 
there is on sexual and gender based violence. 
We also find that many of the individuals that come as peacekeepers them-
selves have experienced the greatest violation of their being. They never had a 
chance to deal with it, and that also complicates the landscape. 
As we have thought about how we prepare people to be trained to be good 
peacekeepers military and police, we have come up with a model that we think 
is quite useful in training.  We use a conflict tree to assess the factors which 
impact on how we train peacekeepers to respond to sexual violence as a tool 
of war. There is a difference between a cause and a factor that contribute to 
vulnerability. I am going to use the phrase ”uniformed peacekeepers” that get 
my military colleagues and my police colleagues in the same category. We 
tend to think of factors that contribute to and causes of a little bit differently, 
so one of the first things we have to do with them is to say, right, this is what 
you are dealing with, there are whole series of factors whether it is cultural, or 
religious, or historic, or economic, or the socially constructed roles that you 
are dealing with. That is a factor that you look at. And how you listen, how you 
observe, how you data-collect, how you do your intelligence gathering impacts 
on responding to sexual and gender based violence. There are causes, whether 
it was an economic border crossing, or whether it was an inter-tribal warfare, 
or whether it was something about stealing a chicken from somebody else that 
created the sexual response or violence response. That is a cause. Knowing 
what you are looking for will impact on how you think of training and how 
you think of responding. It will impact on you as a military and police person 
for how you do your particular work.
We spend quite a bit of time on this, understanding what the acts are, the 
variety of acts, what the causes and factors are, and then: What is the impact 
in your area of operations? How does this affect the peace and security? How 
is this going to have a long-term impact on your mission, and how is it going 
to have an impact on how you mentor, work with, advise your national coun-
terparts. Because many of the mandates now have the military or police doing 
advising and working with their counterparts.
We tell them that we can never be far removed from the notion that ”you are 
going to leave”. The folks that stay are going to have to live with the impact 
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of your having been there. So make sure that the response you have to sexual 
and gender based violence is the appropriate response that has credibility and 
legitimacy and does not destroy the mission. That is quite a sobering moment 
in the training, and we spend about literally half a day on this, with a whole 
series of exercises and activities. They get a small burst of information and 
they go off into small groups and some scenarios and try to sort their laundry 
list of how they would respond to this issue.
Because we are talking specifically about our colleagues here, I would sug-
gest to you that the key role of military personnel has shifted dramatically with 
the change into intra-state conflict. First of all, the military responsibility for 
creating a secure environment has not changed. But how they do that, secure 
the environment, has changed, I would suggest. In today’s armed conflict con-
text, oftentimes military peacekeepers are the first point of contact with local 
populations, and oftentimes maybe the first point of contact with victims of 
sexual violence. So when we are talking about that role that is a substantively 
different role than perhaps my colleague Fred was trying to do.
How do you patrol in this kind of environment? How do you investigate in 
this kind of environment? What is the procedure and policy and protocols to 
being a first responder. How do you listen? How do you interview a woman? 
How do you interview a child? How do you interview a man? How to ask the 
right question will oftentimes have an impact on how you are viewed as le-
gitimate or credible. As a military peacekeeper, you want to be, you must be, 
legitimate and credible. 
The military peacekeepers oftentimes are mandated to help influence natio-
nal security forces through training and mentoring. How you respond is being 
observed. If you response is to marginalize this as ”the girl thing” or ”we really 
don’t know what to do, so we do very little” is observed by the very individuals 
who are going to have to take up this mantle when the mission is gone. So this 
business of knowing how your roles have changed becomes even more critical.
Where are the woman peacekeepers? If you look at the statistics in terms 
of women involvement in military and police peacekeeping, it is relatively 
small. The idea of recruiting female military peacekeepers and female police 
officers is also important. 
Another issue that we look at when we talk about the changing role of mili-
tary personnel is how to do the trend analysis? How to do reliable data gathering? 
How do you do intelligence gathering by walking around the market? What 
do you mean by monitoring movements? How do you observe? What are you 
observing? Do you know what to look for? How do you profile a perpetrator? 
Is the area with former child soldiers? Is it an economic drive? What is the 
profile of the perpetrator? What are the common characteristics of the attacks 
– because there is always a pattern! What are the co-ordinations that you have 
with your police colleagues, both inside mission and outside mission?
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Oftentimes the military response to the training is ”But that’s not our job”. 
Our response is ”It is your job”, because the world has shifted on its axes. 
When we do gender training at the PPC, we have a model that is used for 
the police training. As we are getting ready to go to the Congo in July, this is 
the integrated training that we are doing with military and police in the same 
classroom with the smattering of civilians, which I think is going to be extra-
ordinarily exciting. The focus of that course is going to be: What is actually 
SGBV?1 What is its role in conflict prevention strategies? And let us do a con-
flict analysis again. Not only do we need to do an analysis of the causes and 
factors of SGBV, but we need to do a conflict analysis. Because the conflict 
analysis helps us understand the context in which this action is taking place. 
And oftentimes that is not done very robustly. 
We also train our participants to measure their effectiveness, because we 
must remember that training changes somebody’s life forever. So if you are 
going to be monitoring and evaluating you impact, this is a spider map that one 
of the participants drew of the skills that were enhanced in terms of monitoring 
and advising. 
Recommendations are again fairly clear. Pre-deployment training is a na-
tional responsibility. And it needs a champion. I think oftentimes we relegate 
this whole subject to the 35 minutes or 45 minutes in a staff officer’s course. I 
would suggest to you that it is far more critical than that, and I would suggest 
to you that if the leadership at the very top level from a minister of defence to 
a minister of interior to a minister of foreign affairs is not behind this and does 
not firmly set the standard for it, that the training for this  is a non-negotiable, 
we will tend to have military peacekeepers and police peacekeepers who are less 
than fully useful on the ground. And I must say that the issue is too dangerous 
to leave unattended, because sexual and gender based violence is a huge peace 
and security issue and cannot be ignored.
My time is up, so I must sit down. I will be happy to answer questions as 
they come up.
Thank you.
1 SGDV: Sexual and Gender Based Violence.
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Training and Mentoring the Congolese 
Armed Forces on SGBV Prevention and 
Response in a Security Sector Reform 
Framework
Col. Tom Hermansen, Deputy SSR Coordinator 
Guillota Ayele Ayivi, SGBV Coordinator MONUSCO
Tom Hermansen:
Ladies and gentlemen!
Thank you very much for this opportunity to come from Kinshasa in DRC to 
tell you about our experience. You have got quite a lot of the framework and 
also recommendations that have been given, and we have tried to implement 
some of these in Congo and we just finished up some training, and that is why 
we would like to share this experience. I have brought with me my colleague, 
Guillota Ayivi, who has been the program coordinator or officer in this training.
Due to the fact that Hermansen and Ayivi have ended their engagement in Con-
go, we will only publish the following talking points on training and mentoring 
the Congolese Armed Forces on SGBV Prevention and response in a Security 
Sector Reform Framework that was approved prior to the conference (red.)
Overview
“Uniformed persons” are suspected to account for the vast majority of the 
incidents of sexual violence perpetrated in Democratic Republic of Congo, 
including foreign armed groups, Congolese irregular groups, the National 
Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), and, increasingly, civilians, that often are 
demobilized former combatants.
In response to this phenomenon, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1794 with the support of the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict 
Network, MONUSCO and UN agencies have developed a Global Strategy for 
the Fight against Sexual Violence in DRC, through a multi level consultation 
process: provincial, national and international institutions engaged in programs 
and advocacy on sexual violence. The Strategy was formally adopted by the 
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Government of the DRC on 1 April 2009 and was incorporated into the UN 
International Support Strategy for Security and Stabilization (ISSSS) dedicated 
to Eastern DRC (the conflict zone). 
The Sexual Gender Based Violence Strategy in DR Congo has five com-
ponents: each component is coordinated by a specialized UN agency that 
developed an action plan to implement the strategy:
Component 1: Protection and Prevention (UNHCR - UN High Commissione 
 for Refugees) 
Component 2: Ending impunity for perpetrators of crimes (Joint Office of 
 Human Rights-JHRO) 
Component 3: Reform of the Security Sector (Security Sector Development 
 Unit/MONUSCO) 
Component 4:  Multi-sectorial assistance to victims (UNICEF-United Nations 
 Fund for Children) 
Component 5: Data and mapping (UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund) 
The third pillar coordinated by MONUSCO Security Sector Development unit 
has as mandate, to facilitate the political consensus between the international 
community actors and the DRC Government on key issues addressed by the 
Security Sector Reform. Among these issues:
- To ensure the census and the numerical control of the Congolese army;
- To ensure the garrisoning of the national armed forces into proper 
 barracks;
- To ensure the regular payment of their salary;
- To build and/or enhance their technical and institutional capacities 
- To set-up a vetting mechanism to evict the elements suspected of having 
 committed human rights violations.
 
The Security Sector Reform pillar of the Sexual Gender-Based Violence 
Strategy aims at ensuring that MONUSCO Security Sector Development unit 
incorporates in its broader agenda, concrete practical initiatives that effectively 
assist in combating sexual violence in DRC. Key aspects of this are a focus on:
i) The training and awareness raising amongst the DRC security forces and 
 agents on ethical issues 
ii) Holding the chain of command accountable, and 
iii) The establishing of a vetting mechanism.
SGBV strategy implementation: Enhancing Congolese Armed Forces capacities
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MONUSCO Security Sector Development is currently implementing a training 
program on sexual gender based violence and related topics. This program aims 
at enhancing the technical and institutional capacity of the Civic and Patriotic 
Education Service (SECP) of the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans 
(MoDV), which is in charge of fostering moral within the army and coordinate 
the ethics training provided by the several stakeholders, in accordance with the 
national directives and constitution.
The main objectives of this program are to reinforce technical and institu-
tional capacities of the FARDC through the SECP and promote standardized 
training policies and didactic materials, owned and handled by the Congolese 
national counterpart.
The program main activities consist of:
1. Developing standardized modules 
2. Developing didactic material 
3. Training 130 military trainers 
4. Sensitizing 2000 troop soldiers 
5. Providing the SECP with office furniture
6. Rehabilitating SECP office premises
Training the Congolese military armed forces: towards standardized training 
modules
With the “reintegration process”, former rebels were integrated to the national 
armed forces that lead to a composite army with different backgrounds and 
professional levels. Military assignments and/or promotions were dictated by 
politico-military affiliation criteria rather than merit and competences. The 
actual FARDC officers are mostly unaware of the basic principles of military 
justice and main legal instruments related to protection of civilians and hu-
man rights promotion. To compensate the political vacuum, the international 
community is providing ethics training to FARDC without having a national 
guidance and orientations. 
To actually assist the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans with the 
elaboration of a standardized training politics, MONUSCO/SSD supported the 
Civic and Patriotic Education Service (SECP) in the elaboration of 6 training 
manuals comprising 16 modules2. The Congolese Military Chief of Staff will 
introduce those modules to the MoDV for their political validation. With official 
2 Train-the-trainer sessions with pedagogical tools and practices were also provided.
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modules, the international stakeholders will necessarily transit via the SECP 
to provide and training related to ethics: the main goal is for the Government 
to guarantee the coherence of the ethic training that are conducted in DRC: 
1. Democracy, security Sector Reform and Military Justice
2. Human Rights 
3. Child Protection
4. Gender mainstreaming in the Defense Sector
5. Sexual Gender Based Violence: health and medical implications, legal 
 application of SGBV infractions, prevention and protection of civilians 
6. Law of war/International Humanitarian Law 
In this framework, MONUSCO/SSD organized a “workshop on FARDC trai-
ning harmonization” with the participation of experts from 48 institutional 
(Ministries/national services) and non institutional (civil society), national 
and international (UN agencies and international organization) structures to 
harmonize the training modules.
Training prerequisites: the selection process
Prior to the training, the future trainees were selected according to their techni-
cal aptitudes and their moral profile. The officers firstly went through a writ-
ten and an oral test. The successful candidates were submitted to a screening 
process conducted by a joint team composed by the UN Joint Human Right 
Office (UNJHRO), MONUSCO/Child Protection unit and the Joint Military 
Analysis Cell (JMAC). 
Training the Congolese military armed forces: the training itself 
MONUSCO/SSD conducted 3 training sessions in the 2 military regions co-
unting one of the highest rates of sexual violence in Congo: 50 officers were 
trained in the 9th military region3 and 50 in the 10th4. 
Out of the 6 training manuals, 16 modules were taught: 
• Module 1: The basics of democracy and reform of the Security Sector
• Module 2: Democratic integrated citizenship 
• Module 3: Military leadership in the military reform process
3 Oriental and Ituri Provinces 
4 South Kivu Province
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• Module 4: Human Rights
• Module 5: Child Protection
• Module 6: Basics of International Humanitarian Law
• Module 7: Principles of International Humanitarian Law
• Module 8:  Overview of gender issues in DRC society 
• Module 9: Violence against women
• Module 10. The role of gender in the Security Sector Reform
• Module 11: Security and protection of victims of sexual violence.
• Module 12: Preventing sexual violence and health implications.
• Module 13 Legal framework of lawsuits related to sexual violence.
• Module 14: Sexual violence and HIV
• Module 15: The Code of Conduct
• Module 16: Methodology of the elaboration pedagogical and teaching tools 
The training methodology was based on interactive and participative approac-
hes. Each training sessions started with a so called “identity workshop”, where 
trainees were asked to introduce themselves and decline their identity. Grades 
were taken off to ensure equity and equality of treatment among the trainees. 
A code of conduct for the training was established by the trainees for their 
own discipline. 
Holding the chain of commandant accountable and monitoring the training 
30 high ranking officers were briefed on the training content and the sanctions 
provided by the law in case of extortion committed by the soldiers under their 
command.
A “sensitization set” was delivered to the trainees and their commandants, 
composed by the code of conducts, cartoons, the training manuals and three 
tools: they were jointly developed with the SECP to ensure the programming 
and the monitoring of the sensitization sessions to be delivered by the 100 
trained officers to the 2000 troop soldiers and for which, the military region 
commandant, is fully committed.
The SSR military section will be involved in the sensitization process and 
will accompany the training officers in their mission.  
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Q & A Session 1
Discussant Sidsel Aas, Independent Consultant
Thank you to all of you!
It has been really interesting to listen to all the different initiatives that have 
been taken as to how peacekeeping operations can increasingly strengthen our 
efforts on how to react to sexual violence in conflict. As we know from the UN 
resolutions, peacekeeping missions are increasingly being specially mandated 
to address sexual violence. As somebody already has mentioned, UN Security 
Council resolution 1325 recognized the importance of specialized training for 
all peacekeeping personnel, and the protection of special needs and human rights 
for women and children in conflict situations. Further, it also invites states to 
incorporate these issues into their national training programs for military and 
civilian police personnel prior to their deployment.
In addition, as you probably also know, resolution 1820 do require that 
security actors respond to sexual violence with as much determination as they 
would to any other atrocity. In this, how are the peacekeepers and the military 
personnel equipped to meet the challenge of sexual violence? I think that what 
we have heard from the panelists here today is that there are a lot of great ini-
tiatives to increase and strengthen the efforts by the peacekeeping operational 
personnel and the military personnel, to how they can meet or react to sexual 
violence in conflict situations. 
Starting with Letitia from the UN, I think the inventory and training gui-
delines for military peacekeepers are very comprehensive, and I have a lot of 
good examples and strong training tools for future operations as well as future 
training. I am so happy that you did not want to say best practices, but you 
wanted to moderate that into good practices, as I understand that a long term 
impact has not really been measured, and is something that you are going to 
do next year looking at the different missions. 
Given these good practices, I am thinking: What would it take to make it 
standard practices for all missions and peace operations in different contexts? 
And what would it take, as this is a national responsibility, and of course with 
all the different nations being involved in UN peace operations, what would 
it take to make this a standard practice for all the different nations involved?
I would also like to congratulate NATO on their action plan for implemen-
tation of 1325. I am just a little bit curious as to how you are responding to 
sexual violence in conflict especially within the action plan. You said a little 
bit about how you were training or made it a point to train female officers and 
female police officers in Afghanistan, so they could respond to sexual violence 
in Afghanistan. But I am just curious as to how this is implemented into the 
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action plan as to how the different NATO peace operations will respond to 
sexual violence in their peace operation efforts. 
I was also very inspired by you, Ann Livingstone, as to how you are doing 
your training. I also think how you go into the field of gender based violence 
and sexual violence and trying to understanding where this does come from in 
all sorts of contexts of peace, not just in conflict, and understanding the em-
powerment of women as an important issue when combating sexual violence.
You also touched upon this – some of you or all of you have touched upon 
this – the importance of recruiting more women into peace operations. But, as 
all of us know, the number of women in the armed forces, and also the number 
of women that are involved in peace keeping operations, are still quite low. This 
morning, when we listened to Margot Wallström, who wanted to address men 
especially, and you also said something about how to involve men, I would like 
to know a little bit more about how to involve men and how to strengthen men’s 
understanding of their responsibility in their work to combat sexual violence.
Lastly, Congo. I was also very inspired to hear about your training program 
in Congo, and also that from the report launched by Human Rights Watch in 
2009, I think you have taken a lot of the recommendations from that report into 
your training, which I think is very interesting. At the same time it is the chain 
of command – I think it goes for all of you – the chain of command is very 
important. Who takes part in these training programs? Will the commanders 
also take part in the training programs? And how is the responsibility put back 
on the commanders, as this will in the end be their responsibility? 
I started out just jumping into all these questions. But, of course, I would 
advise all of you to ask questions to the panelist, as I think this should be a 
two-way conversation.  I have given you some questions now, which I hope 
you can respond to very quickly, or very shortly, and then I would open for 
the audience to come with further questions. And I would also kindly like to 
ask you to be very short, as that will give the possibility to many of you to ask 
questions. We do not have a lot of time, but we will spend the time we have, 
and I would also encourage you to ask things that you have not been able to 
ask or answer in the session. We will have a long lunch where you will be able 
to interact and ask further questions.
I will start with Letitia, and then we will give you presentations.
Letitia Anderson:
I think the way we move from promising practice to standard practice can be 
expressed in four key principles or four key steps. I think the first step is for 
the Security Council to expressly include conflict-related sexual violence in 
the mandate, in the first place, of all peacekeeping missions. The second step 
is for all troop contributors to include conflict-related sexual violence as part 
of their pre-deployment training curriculum, at both the strategic planning or 
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command level and at the tactical, operational level. The third step is that senior 
mission leadership in all peacekeeping operations hold the force and the Force 
Commander accountable for delivering on implementation of this aspect of the 
mandate and that the Security Council not just outsource the whole exercise to 
the mission, but follow up periodically and ask questions about what resources 
are required, and what the challenges to implementation are, as indeed they 
did in the wake of the Walikale mass rapes in DRC last year. Fourth, I think all 
‘end of tour’ reports by the participants of military components of peacekeeping 
missions have to expressly capture their experience in responding to conflict-
related sexual violence, the challenges and lessons learned from implementing 
that mandate, as part of building an institutional memory.
Thank you.
Loredana Alemanno Testa:
One of the areas where we address this issue is definitely through training. We 
are trying to enforce training on UNSCR 1325 at all levels.  One of the goals 
in the NATO Action Plan is indeed to adapt course curricula in all NATO trai-
ning and education facilities to make sure that this is taken into account and 
not just with a briefing here and there, but through mainstreaming and focusing 
on this aspect in a wider manner.  As NATO, we cannot tell nations what to 
do, but the NATO Action Plan encourages nations that have not yet done so, 
to address UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of similar resolutions into 
their own curricula. What we would like to see happen in the context perhaps 
of lessons learned and collection of best practices, is to see a wider number of 
nations that are a step ahead of others, or nations who have a wider experience 
than others, to open their national training courses to other allies and other non-
NATO contributing countries from ISAF and KFOR. That could be a way to 
start.  With regard to Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF NTM-A’s training of the Afghan 
National Police also addresses sexual violence and domestic violence. Other 
nations that provide training in a bilateral manner do that as well.
Ann Livingstone:
Two questions: One on the importance of recruiting women into the uniform 
services absolutely. What we have found is that if we are consistent with men-
toring, advising, consulting; our experience has been that after four to five 
years we can see lasting change. One of our examples was working in Sierra 
Leone for a period of five years. They did change the law to allow women to 
join the gendarmes, and they credited the training that they had over time with 
the center in awareness raising. So, I think it is about a consistent, small-step 
approach, but also battles of cultural realities about how women are socialized 
to function in the society. We, as outsiders, are not going to change that any time 
soon, so it is recognizing what is within the room of the possible, and not, over 
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reaching, as Louise said, to be a little bit modest in our assumptions. In terms of 
how we find it most useful – if I could find a general who is confident, robustly 
blustering about the SGBV issue, I will have a man give that talk. Because if 
I could get a general up there saying ”this is important, because it is a security 
issue in our world”, then I get “by-in”. We have to remember that the Pearson 
Center does most of its training, not in Canada, and does most of it among the 
top troop contributing countries. I will take my gift where I can get it, and it is 
generally if I can get a guy stand up there and have this hard conversation, and 
it does begin to change some of the approaches that we get over the long term.
Thank you.
Tom Hermansen:
I just want to comment on how to make the chain of command responsible. 
After we completed the training at one location, we had a one day of sensi-
tization with high ranking officers of the trainers. On my slide you can see 
from one the opening of the course in Bukavu (South Kivu), where also the 
Governor of South Kivu participated and proofed the political importance of 
this issue. The high ranking officers are coming from the military region and 
the different units. They are explained very carefully that they have got new 
trainers and these trainers have to make their plan for the sensitization of their 
troops, send this plan to the commanders who need to sign/approve it, and then 
send it to CESP in Kinshasa, where we have the General himself to make the 
follow up. That is the General speaking right there on my next slide. And that 
is also important to note; he is actually there at each of the locations, telling 
them about the code of conduct, why this is important, and that their training 
of the troops are supported by the president. The Ministry of Defense is also 
participating to really underline that this is important. After they have made the 
plan, these new trainers have to report monthly through the chain of command 
the progress of their work. It has to be signed by their commanders before it 
goes into Kinshasa again. We will get a copy of this report as well, isn’t that 
part of the deal, Guillota?
Guillota Ayele Ayivi: Yes.
Tom Hermansen: 
So it should be transparent. They really want us to be part of the next step of 
actually doing the training together with them, which starts in September. 
Sidsel Aas:
Thank you. Now I would like to open the floor, so if anyone have a comment 
or question, please!
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Q: 
I had two quick questions and it was for the panel in general, because it touches 
upon many of your presentations. The first question is with regard to the in-
crease in sexual violence in Afghanistan. We do not have a lot of statistics and 
something that Dr. Livingstone pointed out, and so I apologize to Dr. Livings-
tone – you said you do not necessarily want the statistics, but sometimes it is 
important to be able to see the extent of the violence. If we are not getting a lot 
of reports because there are so many social sanctions for the women coming 
forward, are there other proxy methods we could use, for instance the num-
bers of self-emulating women in Afghanistan is shocking. There are hundreds 
and hundreds of women self-emulating every month. So I am wondering if 
whether perhaps in you assessment, there might be a connection, because the 
women would not necessarily come forward to report the crimes, they might 
be doing something else. The second thing is also a very general question for 
anyone who wants to answer: Do you see differences in policies and the way 
you need to implement them in conflict zones in general versus in displaced 
refugee caps, in displaced persons’ camps. Do you have a different set of tools 
for these two kinds of locations?
Sidsel Aas:
I am going to take three questions first, and then I will let the panel answer 
afterwards. 
Please!
Q:
Thank you – all the presentations were very clear. But I have one question 
concerning the NATO briefing. The concept used there; you referred to the 
concept ”NATO’s operations and missions”. In my world, I have always thought 
the UN had missions and NATO actual military operations. Could you please 
enlighten me on the concept ”NATO missions”? What is the difference between 
those? Thanks.
Q:
I am from the Office of ... sexual violence in conflict. My question is: How do 
we breach the communication barrier between peacekeeping officers and the 
communities? I am talking actually even beyond the language, but also maybe 
the messaging within communities. The second question actually, is about how 
do we also balance for example the support to armed forces to prevent all this 
sexual violence, and limitations with regard to demobilizing for example troops 
that for example have been involved in sexual violence, but integrated maybe 
through peace processes? I remember in February we met President Kabila, 
and he said that he had 150 000 troops, but he knows that at least 50 per cent 
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of them are either illiterate or criminals, but are in the armed forces because of 
the peace processes and so forth. He does not have the money to construct bar-
racks or to actually demobilize them from the armed forces. How do we actually 
balance maybe through long-term investment or support to the government?
Thank you.
Sidsel Aas:
I think the first and last questions were to all of you, while the second question 
was maybe especially for NATO. So I suggest that you answer that question 
first, and then I will give you all an opportunity to answer the first and the last 
question.
Loredana Alemanna Testa:
With regard to the difference between the words “operations” and “missions”, 
it is a question of terminology.  We have an operation in Afghanistan, ISAF, 
but we have a NATO Training Mission in Iraq, NTM-I. In Iraq NATO trains 
the Iraqi security forces.
The NATO Training Mission of Afghanistan, NTMA, is within the wider NATO 
ISAF operation, while NTM-I is standalone.  The NATO Action Plan applies 
to all NATO-led operations and missions.
Ann Livingstone:
I can speak, not to Afghanistan, but I can speak to our experience on the places 
when we are looking at; Are there other proximate indicators? I would suggest 
there are. I think this is where the training of military and police peacekeepers 
particularly in community based processes, congregations with local women’s 
clubs, congregations or just organizations watching the market place, sharing 
of information among other stakeholders becomes a very interesting way to 
figure out what is really going on underneath the non-verbal conversation. 
And, again, that is where training comes into place. How do you observe, what 
are you observing, how do you manage that information, how do you share 
that information, how do you coordinate that information, both vertically and 
horizontally.
?: speaker not identified (ed.)
With regard to Afghanistan, specifically, NATO does not have a policy on this 
specific point, so what I am going to say is on my personal capacity. We have 
all read in the press that there are a number of women shelters in Afghanistan. 
They are run by NGO’s and that there is an attempt by the government to take 
them over and to manage those shelters. That is a concern to a number of Afghan 
women. I can also say that when the deputy minister for women affairs visited 
NATO – she has been visiting NATO two or three times already, she has each 
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time raised her concern regarding the possibility that the reconciliation process 
in Afghanistan may be due to the rights that have been so painstakingly acquired 
by NATO women in Afghanistan. So there is no straight and clear answer to 
that, I am afraid. We just have to remain vigilant. As nations or as NATO we can 
all support the government of Afghanistan making sure that the human rights, 
which are enshrined in their own constitution, are indeed respected in the field.
Sidsel Aas:
Would you like to answer the last question?
Tom Hermansen:
Yes. I can try, I am not quite sure if I got it right. If we are talking about how 
to meet the conditionality policy when we support the Congolese armed forces 
(FARDC), we can for instance look at our logistics support when they are doing 
an operation in the East. The FARDC request logistic support from MONUSCO, 
who conduct a screening process. We request the names of the commanders 
of the different units, and then we check whether they have a clean history or 
not. If it is clean, we can provide logistic support. If it is not, then the battalion 
is not eligible for any support by MONUSCO, if it is transport or whatever it 
should be, even also training. We have the same concept for the SGBV trai-
ning; both the trainers themselves have to go through this process and also the 
high-ranking officers. Then you could argue; Is it a good thing that you should 
exclude the high-ranking officers from the sensitization on the training in their 
unit because they have a bad history?  That means you are excluding them from 
getting this information and also be responsible in the chain of command, so 
you can really discuss that part. But it is a very clear decision that we should 
just follow the conditionality policy as it is, so we just have to do it like that. 
That means all the high-ranking officers that was part of our training program 
had gone through the screening process.
Q:
For the moment, in the European peacekeeping missions, it is mandatory to 
have at least one gender advisor per mission, but there is an extreme difficulty 
of finding people to fill these positions. What can be done? Is there some trai-
ning that you know of to train the gender advisors? Because we have a lot of 
people, women and fewer men, that have a human rights background, but do 
not really have an operational background, and we have military and police 
and so on that not necessarily have the human rights framework. Is there some 
kind of training, or what can be done to increase the expertise so that we can 
actually deliver?
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Sidsel Aas:
I think that question can also be taken into lunch, because I think we will have 
people in the audience that could also give you good answers to that, as how 
this is done in different countries. But please, anyone in the panel? Letitia.
Letitia Anderson:
I think it is a great question, because in a way we do need to cultivate a new 
cadre of professionals that marry the gender analytical skill-set with the opera-
tional skill-set, someone who can at once speak to the Force Commander and 
speak about women’s rights in communities and bridge that traditional divide 
between operational military and police personnel and people who work on 
women’s rights and gender issues and have the gender analytical lens. In the 
UN, we often draw upon the GENCAP (Gender Standby Capacity) roster; 
or the PROCAP (Protection Standby Capacity) roster. They may not equate 
exactly to the profile that you are referring to (both human rights and operational 
experience), but I think the fact that the Security Council has now  mandated 
Women’s Protection Advisors (or WPAs) in missions, enables us to cultivate 
that expertise even more deeply. I think Sweden has perhaps the right profile 
in their Gender Advisors to the Armed Forces, but that I think is a sui generis, 
or one of a kind, practice and I do not think many armed forces have gender 
advisors on actual operational interventions in the same way. So it is a challenge, 
and I think it is on our horizon to deepen the pool of expertise.
Thank you.
Sidsel Aas:
Ann – a short, short comment on that!
Ann Livingstone:
Yes, very quickly. I would commend all of us to read the civilian capabilities 
report that has come out from under David Harland’s work, really looking at 
what I call ”the blue briefcase brigade” is going to look like, which will include 
the wide ranging expertise that you are mentioning. I think we are on across 
with some substantive changes because of that report.
Sidsel Aas:
Thank you so much to all the panelists, and thanks to all the people that ask 
questions. I once again want to say how inspired I was by listening to you and 
all the very good initiatives that have been taken, and I hope that these initiatives 
and these examples and reviewing this training and evaluating this training, will 
be made accessible to the different armed forces in the different countries that 
do take part in international operations and peacekeeping operations. 
Thank you so much to all of you.
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Session 2
International Implication of Framework
 
66
67
What do we know about Sexual Violence 
in Conflict?
Ragnhild Nordås, PhD, PRIO 
Good afternoon. The organizers have impressed me a lot, I am very happy to be 
invited to talk to you. Thank you so much for that. I was given this topic to talk 
about, and as you can all see, it is a vast topic. What do we know about sexual 
violence in conflict? Clearly, I can only say some things about that. I cannot 
cover everything. Although we do know quite a lot, there are still some very 
major gaps in our knowledge. As a researcher, of course, we have to say that 
there is a lot of research to be done, but I think in this case this is actually true.
Some of these things have already been mentioned earlier today, so I will 
go through some of the things pretty briefly. Sexual violence in conflict has 
been recognized now as a problem of international security, and it is a possible 
weapon of war and genocide. When we talk about sexual violence we include 
various forms. It includes rape, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization. What is very im-
portant to keep in mind, is that sexual violence is not only committed against 
women by men. We do have female perpetrators and male victims, as well. 
Sexual violence includes acts that are committed directly by force, but also in 
a coercive environment, so that people have no realistic possibility to oppose 
what is being committed against them.
One of the things that has been recognized lately in the literature about sexual 
violence, is that the extent and the forms of sexual violence vary dramatically. 
Our existing knowledge has to a large extent focused on those cases where we 
know that there have been an extremely high levels of sexual violence such as 
in Bosnia and Rwanda, and also Sierra Leone, and more recently in DRC. But 
there are also cases where there is more limited use, and there are groups that do 
not engage in this behavior as much as other groups. This is variation we do not 
have a clear understanding of, and we therefore need a broader sample of cases 
to look at to capture the whole variation in extent and form of sexual violence.
Sexual violence has been presented as a possible tactic of war. People in the 
academic research have talked about how sexual violence can be a tool used to 
displaced populations out of areas, as a form of ethnic cleansing.  It is a way 
to terrorize populations, so even if they have not been the victims of sexual 
violence yet, they might move out of an area because of fear of sexual violence. 
It can also be seen as a way of punishing populations who do not comply with 
whatever the armed group in question wants to get from the population, such 
as intelligence and assistance of various kinds.  It can also be used as a recru-
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itment tool, which I guess the next speaker, Mia Bloom, will talk more about. 
The recruitment is seen both as a way that armed groups might create bonds 
within their own organization, and a way that if you have been the victim of 
sexual violence, then later on you are easier recruited because your respect 
in society, for instance, has been diminished, and you do not see any other 
options for you.
The other way of seeing sexual violence is not to see it as much as a tactic, 
but more as a collateral damage or something that is more opportunistic and 
driven by individual interests instead.
As I said, there are a lot of variations and forms, and many of these things 
have been mentioned already today, the different forms of sexual violence. It 
can be very targeted towards specific groups or individuals, or it can be more 
random. It can be committed by individuals, or it can be committed by groups, 
and also sometimes it is forced upon one victim to commit sexual violence 
against another victim of violence. It is not necessarily only the armed groups 
that engage in this behavior themselves.
Sexual violence sometimes occurs in private settings, but it also very often 
occurs in public settings to spread terror in a community and to further increase 
the shame associated with these atrocities. It can be targeted towards women, 
men and children, and there is variations over time as to when this behavior 
increases and decreases, as well.
There are four main perspectives that we have look at in the literature explai-
ning sexual violence. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they are 
different entry points into understanding sexual violence. One way in a more 
structural, overall perspective, is to see that gender inequality is a structural 
factor that might facilitate sexual violence that would reduce the norms against 
this type of behavior. Another thing that is very often put forward in the structural 
perspective is to see sexual violence as a result of militarized masculinities. 
People have also talked about how different types of conflicts might be 
particularly prone to sexual violence, for instance, it has been claimed that it 
can be a strategy in ethnic conflicts in particular because it breaks up societies 
and makes it more difficult to live together after a massive sexual violence has 
occurred, and it is a way also, like I said, of terrorizing populations to leave an 
area. Related to that, it is often seen as something that occurs a lot in genocide 
or wars, wars that include mass killings.
At group levels, looking at different armed groups in particular, the claim 
has been made in the literature that sexual violence and other violence against 
a civilian population is something that is mostly done by loot seeking in non-
ideological groups – and these groups might even be the favorite group to enter 
into by certain types of individuals – that have more aggressive tendencies, 
for instance. Other group level explanations talk about the ideology of groups 
and the norms that exist within groups as one way of explaining why there is 
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more sexual violence by some groups than others. There is also a literature 
on training and education within groups and how that can actually produce a 
variation, mostly saying that certain forms of training and education can limit 
the sexual violence that we have seen. A last explanation of variation in sexual 
violence is the socialization mechanism where sexual violence is seen as an 
organizational building tool. It is used instrumentally by certain groups to create 
a stronger group for themselves. 
At the individual level a lot has been written about wars constituting context 
where there is an opportunity for men to rape with impunity, and that certain 
men or most men (in some of this literature), have a tendency to want to take 
advantage of these situations. It could also be seen as a substitute for consensual 
sex. This is another individual level related explanation.
But there are many reasons why some groups and some leaders particularly 
of military organizations and armed groups see reasons for restraint in terms 
of sexual violence. There is a lot of talk about sexual violence being a strategy 
of war, but it is not necessarily a tool that you want to apply in all contexts. A 
lot of strategic reasons, normative and also pragmatic reasons, have been put 
forward why some groups and leaders of groups choose to try to control this 
behavior. Sexual violence could interfere  undermine commanders’ control 
their troops, and by using sexual violence there is a risk of losing the support 
of populations that you have an interest in later on controlling or using for 
intelligence gathering and so on. 
The other more normative reasons have to do with that you have an ideo-
logical commitment to certain ideals, and committing sexual violence would 
go against those ideological commitments. In some ethnic conflicts it can also 
be seen as if you commit sexual violence against the enemy, then you are pol-
luting your own group.
There are also some more pragmatic reasons. Sexual violence can be seen 
as in a battle field it is not an effective way of conducting war. It is a time-
consuming activity, and it also involves a high risk of diseases. 
In terms of some of the findings, there are a lot of case studies out there, of 
various conflict situations, but there are very few overarching global studies. I 
will focus on some of the few existing ones in that area. One study came out in 
2007, by Christopher Butler et al. looked only at state security forces and found 
that if these forces have accountability and tight control, they are actually less 
likely to commit sexual violence. This might not be a surprising finding, but 
it does show that commanding control is actually possible to restrain sexual 
violence. There is a later study by Dara K. Cohen, who shows that groups and 
armies that use forced recruitment are more likely to commit sexual violence. 
This is an important finding because if you want to have the most efficient 
ways of intersecting and avoiding sexual violence, then targeting these types 
of groups is maybe one of the more efficient ways of going about that.
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As a researcher, I see a need for more rigorous analyses of variations in 
sexual violence. As of now, we of course should do whatever we can based 
on our current knowledge, but I think that we can improve the efficiency in 
what we do in preventive measures if we have more systematic data and better 
understanding of the patterns of variation in sexual violence.
For that purpose I am part of a research group that is doing a global data 
collection on sexual violence in armed conflict. We are collecting data on all 
conflict actors in all armed conflicts in the time period 1989-2009. We might 
also continue after 2009 and produce annual updates of this data, if we have 
the necessary funding to do so. The other thing that I usually point out when I 
present this project, is that we also have three men in this research group. This 
is of course very important also from the researchers’ perspective. This topic 
needs to be researched also by men.
I am going to show you very quickly some findings from a pilot study that we 
have done on sexual violence in African conflicts. We covered twenty countries. 
This involves 28 conflicts  that were active in this time period from 2000-2009, 
177 conflict actors, including state militaries, rebel groups and militias, 2326 
units of observation - a small sample of what hopefully the global data set will 
be, but it is a beginning. So we see already from various aggregated measures 
that there are variations in the reports that we see of sexual violence in these 
conflict countries. Several countries here have reports of massive and systematic 
levels of sexual violence, but there are also several conflicts where there have 
been very few reports. A main overall finding for Africa is that not all conflict 
actors commit sexual violence. It is very often committed by state armies. It is 
not only a problem for rebel groups. The changes over time for different con-
flict actors are that they commit more sexual violence at certain times than at 
other times. In Africa we find that this violence is mostly indiscriminate, it has 
not been very targeted at specific groups. It is very often committed at times 
when there is not much battle activity going on, and it is also often committed 
post conflict.
We see that for actually a majority of the actors that are in this pilot study, 
there is no reported sexual violence, but there are still 11 per cent of the 
conflict-actor-years in this sample where there have been reports of systematic 
and massive sexual violence. So, again, there is a variation here. Over time, 
we see some potential decreasing trend in sexual violence. However, I think 
that we could potentially read this trends as a form of polarization: over time, 
groups are either moving in the direction of clearly committing a lot of sexual 
violence, or making it a big part of their repertoire of violence, whereas other 
groups try to restrain this behavior and commit less.
Since I do not have more time, I cannot really elaborate on these points, but 
we have published a policy brief titled “Sexual Violence in African Conflicts” 
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(CSCW Policy Brief no. 1, 2011) which can tell you more. I will just do my 
concluding remarks to sum up. First, there are a lot of observed variations in 
sexual violence. We see these variations also within our African pilot study. 
This variation has not been explored much in existing literature on sexual 
violence, mainly due to lack of data, and particularly because of very limited 
systematic data available across a large number of conflicts and conflict actors. 
Second, one important finding from our study that is important to remember 
is that sexual violence is also a state army problem, not only a rebel problem. 
Third, we need to keep an eye on the post-conflict situation, because a lot of 
this violence keeps going on after warfare officially has ended. Fourth, although 
the findings that have been shown from this pilot study focus on Africa, sexual 
violence is not only an African problem. This is another finding in the literature. 
Sexual violence occurs in all parts of the world. Because of all these variations 
that we see, it is one main, overall lesson also, that rape is not inevitable during 
war, or sexual violence is not inevitable. It can be controlled. It is possible to 
do something about this problem.
Thank you.
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Sexual Violence as a Recruitment Base for 
Terrorism
Mia Bloom, PhD, Penn State University
Let me just start by saying thank you so much for attending this panel. I want 
to thank Anita and Cecilie for all the difficulties in organizing this conference. 
My research is partly funded by the Office of Naval Research of United States, 
Department of Defense. I am not a member of the military, but I am supposed 
to inform you that nothing I say represents the departments of the Navy or 
the Department of Defense. Any and all errors are my own, and this research 
contains my opinions and not those of the Department of the Navy.
As you saw from one of the previous Power Points I work on issues of why 
non-state actors, states and armed troops, rape women deliberately, systemati-
cally and on purpose. In my research, I have also started to notice an increase 
in vulnerability of women in conflict zones and especially at specific places 
like check points. As I did my research in Sri Lanka among the Tamil Tigers, it 
became very clear that women were targeted for sexual abuse during conflict, 
but also that those women who were abused sexually by Sri Lankan soldiers 
were then funneled into terrorist organizations. In many patriarchal cultures 
in which these women are targeted for gender-based violence, they are often 
held to blame for the attack. In such cultures the women’s virginity is highly 
prized. Once raped, these women they cease to be marriageable. Those women 
who are already married, are vulnerable to divorce. In fact, their husbands may 
leave them. Furthermore, in certain places where an ‘honor code’ exists, these 
women face certain death from members of their own families for having been 
raped. This includes many Islamic cultures in addition to non-Islamic contexts. 
As something that was said earlier, women are victims and blamed for their 
victimization. So what became especially interesting for me was the intersection 
of women who have been sexually attacked during conflicts, and then women 
who increasingly participate in terrorist movements. Thus the sexual abuse of 
women during conflict became a source of women’s motivation to join terrorist 
movements and engage in violence. 
This is not something exclusive to Sri Lanka, as we see from my presentation. 
This is happening in a variety of contexts. This mobilization of women includes 
women’s participation as suicide bombers as well as women’s participation at 
all levels of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, gender based violence has 
emerged as a major issue of recruitment on the Internet for Muslims in Europe 
and Muslims in the United States. The fact that women are attacked in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is used to incentivize people to go and join the Jihad in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq, but also to participate in terrorist activities more locally in Europe 
and in the United States. 
The major focus of my research up until recently has been on suicide ter-
rorism. We are familiar with suicide terrorism that began in Lebanon; as well 
as in fact there has been a proliferation or even a contagion of suicide terror 
since the 1990s. Initially there were three countries, Kuwait and Sri Lanka and 
Lebanon in the 1980’s. But from 1990 up till now, you see the tactic of suicidal 
terrorism has spread. I point this out here and I think it is important, because 
in a lot of instances people start to assume that suicide terrorism is only asso-
ciated with countries in the Middle East, and further there is an assumption of 
some correlation, between suicide terrorism and Islam. However it is important 
for us to understand that there is not something specifically wrong with the 
Islamic faith. In fact, the research I have done has shown, that all of the major 
monotheistic religious traditions have at some point connected religion, death, 
martyrdom, resistance and willingness to die. 
However, what has happened in Islam, as distinct from any of the other 
religious traditions, is that there has been several sheikhs and religious autho-
rities who have come forward to legitimize this tactic, even though in the strict 
interpretation of the Koran, suicide bombing is antithetical to Islam, because 
Islam, like Judaism and Christianity is against suicide. Islam makes clear that 
it is against killing civilians, and Islam is very clear about not killing other 
fellow Muslims. And yet, if you look at any attack in Afghanistan or in Iraq 
– lots of civilians, lots of other Muslims are killed in addition to the bomber 
who kills himself or herself. So the tactic violates the major tenets of Islam, 
and yet the handful of religious authorities who have legitimated the use of 
suicide terrorism has in such a creative way, manipulated the text of Qur’an 
and the Hadith -- the sayings of the prophet. In essence, suicide terrorism is 
anti Islam nevertheless, a handful of clerics have green lighted its use by men 
and increasingly, by women.  It also means that also other religious traditions, 
if they want to, could adopt this approach, as well. 
Just as a general rule, the findings of my previous research argued was that 
suicide terrorism tended to be the tactic of first choice, it was very often asso-
ciated with the ‘second time around’ i.e. a second iteration of the same conflict. 
So we do not observe suicide terror in the first Chechen war, but we do in the 
second; the first attack against a trade center did not use suicide bombers, but in 
the second; not in the first intifada in Palestine, but the second. So this pattern 
is evident time and time again. 
There is an argument that suicide terror is rational response to occupation. 
I do not have to explain to you what I mean by rational, that it is rationally 
calculated and not a rational thing to do. By no means I think it is a good idea, 
and I think at a lot of times we talk to non-academic audiences and they do 
not like the idea of connecting rational and terrorism. But by rational I mean 
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that they make calculations, and a very good example of this is: When terrorist 
movements regardless of whether they are religious or whether they are secular, 
and regardless of their ideology, use a tactic they expect a pay off or a benefit. 
When they engage in a suicide attack that backfires, they tend to stop using 
this tactic. We have come to understand is that even terrorist organizations and 
leaders are circumscribed by their public opinion. And they have a public to 
which they must be responsive. If they engage in violence that exceeds what 
their constituents are willing to accept, they become obsolete. Drawing from 
the work of Donatella Della Porta, a well-known Italian sociologist, if groups 
engage in violence that far exceeds the levels deemed acceptable by their pu-
blics, they actually alienate themselves from their base. A notable example from 
the Al Qaeda in Iraq group springs to mind.  Abu Musab al Zarqawi engaged 
in the public beheadings in 2004, 2005 in Iraq, which were filmed and aired 
on the Internet. This garnered significant criticism from within the Islamic 
and Arab world and was one of the reasons why many members of the main 
core al Qaida disassociated from Abu Musab al Zarqawi. In fact, according to 
one of the member of the US Special Forces team that killed him, one of the 
reasons they were able to get the information to locate him in the first place 
was because the core of Al Qaeda let this information slip into western hands. 
So any terrorist group, even al Qaeda can be perceived as having gone too far. 
It is also important that, when talking about terrorism I do not want to fe-
tishize one particular form of terrorism, because for the most part terrorist tactics 
are always used together and in conjunction. But what we tend to see is when 
terrorist groups use suicide terrorists and especially if they use a woman as the 
operative, we see a lot more interest from the media and from other sources 
compared to other non suicidal attacks. This is something o which I will return, 
because as I mentioned, when it is a woman who carries out the act of terrorism, 
it will likely get eight times more media attention than when it is a man. And 
finally, my unique contribution to the whole discussion of suicide terrorism 
is that when you have more than one terrorist group in the theatre of conflict, 
there emerge opportunities for the groups to compete with one another for the 
leadership of the community. If the population is receptive to violence, which 
is not always the case, you are going to see a ramping up of violence when the 
groups begin to compete with one another. We observed this spiral in Iraq as 
well as among the Palestinians. The more groups and terrorist organizations 
in one theatre of conflict, the more likely you are to start seeing this kind of 
increase in violence and use of a tactic that grabs the media’s attention. 
The civilians’ perspective is continually important. As I mentioned previ-
ously, if a group goes too far they can alienate themselves. Both propaganda 
and framing issues are extremely important to ensure that the population is in 
fact receptive to suicide terrorism while targeting civilians.  By that same token, 
if a population is receptive to using violence against soldiers and or civilians 
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of the other side, various groups will increase violence in order to distinguish 
themselves. 
Over the forty years since the emergence of modern terrorism, we have 
observed real shifts and developments over this period of time. Going back to 
the modern terrorism starting in 1968 until the advent of the millenarian ap-
proach and End of days martyrdom that started oddly enough not among the 
Muslims, but with Om Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult. The use of suicide terror 
began as truck bombs against embassies or against physical infrastructures, and 
it has manifested in a variety of ways with the use of women used for target 
assassinations, for example against Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and then finally the 
emergence of the internet has been very important. The Internet plays a role 
for the purposes of mobilization and recruitment. This is also an area in which 
women have started to play a very important role.
For those of you over the age of 30 in the room, some of you might re-
member the women from the PFLP and the Baader Meinhof in the 1970’s who 
were extremely important in the Red Army Faction, as it is known. I had a very 
interesting conversation where someone said to me: Well, you know, Bader 
was a terrorist, but Meinhof was considered a criminal. When I thought how 
interesting it was to frame them differently based on gender. They were both 
doing the same things, but the men were labeled terrorists, but the women were 
not labeled as terrorists.  Leila Khaled became a poster child for the Popular 
Front Liberation of Palestine as Mairread Farrel did for the provisional IRA. 
So as we talk about women and terror, people mistakenly assume that this is a 
recent development that began with the Chechens, after 2000, in the last eleven 
years. In fact, we have actually have women involved at all levels of terrorist 
organizations in the 1960’s and 70’s. Leila Khaled was made infamous for her 
participation in mass airplane highjacking in 1969, at the Zarqa base, which 
was the precursor to the events of Black September.
However, here are some of the women that I have spent some time with. The 
women of the LTTE comprised frontline units, and were extremely successful. 
Up until the Sri Lankan counter terror offensive in May 2009. They were very 
successful at various conflicts routing the Sri Lankan army, especially their tank 
battalions at the Battle of Elephant Pass. The success of the women’s unit had 
a double effect not just because the military of Sri Lanka lost to the terrorists, 
but also there is an additional psychological effect of losing in battle to the 
women’s units. Again, that is something to take into account as to understanding 
gender based violence, to understand how gender is used and manipulated in 
these cultures.
Basically, according to the Guardian newspaper report in 2009, there has 
been a group of Tamil women in custody and in areas under control of the go-
vernment, and Tamil women caught during combat occurred from early 1996 
that allege gross violations of human rights and especially of sexual abuse by 
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government forces. While I was in Sri Lanka conducting my field research 
with the Tigers, there were many roadside billboards, posters and pamphlets 
telling the Tamil women: ”You will be raped [by the Sri Lankan military]. Do 
not be raped, join us”. And the Tigers made a very clear connection that by 
participating in violence and become a Tamil Tiger, it was a way of protecting 
their honor and their virginity.
If we examine the events in Iraq: In 2007 Samira Ahmed Jassim was ar-
rested for having arranged the rape of 80 girls in Diyala Province to turn them 
into suicide bombers for the organization Ansar al- sunna, an offshoot of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq. 
Although women have been involved in terrorism from the beginning, what 
has changed is that women’s roles within the movements appear to have chan-
ged, but also the ways in which women are recruited has changed. With Osama 
bin Laden’s death it is very important that we take this into account. Bin Laden 
might have been reticent to use women in activist ways as front line operatives. 
But the younger generation of al Qaeda, emerging leaders like [the recently 
target assassinated] Anwar al Awlaki and even Omar al Hamami in Somalia, 
have very different attitudes and perhaps you might even call them progres-
sive regarding the role of women in the Jihad.  Women have been increasing 
in terms of their participation. Some of the reasons why the organizations use 
women have to do with the fact that they are better able to access a target, they 
are better able to inflict higher rates of casualty and damage. According to the 
terrorists with whom I have spoken, the women might be more disposable and 
easily manipulated although this varies by organization. 
But here is the point; the women get more press and public attention than 
men engaged in the same activities. And the organization use women to con-
vey the message of ”do you need women to fight for you, aren’t you a man?” 
This is something that you are going to see whether it is in Belgium, during 
the First World War, or even in the martyrdom videos of female Palestinian 
suicide bombers who argue “I will go fight instead of the men who cower behind 
me…” We also see on the Internet that using female operatives is effective in 
shaming men into participating. The Jihadists online, often these are women, 
use gender-based violence as a clarion call, that “your sisters in Islam are being 
attacked” and that if the men were REAL men, they would do something and 
join the fight. What my research has revealed is that if American soldiers are 
not engaged in sexual violence, the terrorists are willing to rape the women 
themselves and use this violence to recruit others.
What we have seen is that we have an increase in the number of women, but 
here is what is interesting, again from my perspective, I have not been able to 
go into jail to speak with some of the Palestinian leaders, but I have the mes-
sages sent. I asked them via a middleman whether the organizations, knowing 
that they garner so much media attention, select the more attractive women as 
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operatives? The organizations know that they are going to get eight times more 
press, and among the women who have become bombers among the SSNP in 
Lebanon, in Palestine and Chechnya, the female bombers are some of the most 
attractive women of their society. 
We know for a fact, looking at the Chechen women’s involvement, again 
there are allegations that Russian soldiers have been raping Chechen women 
according to a Duma order that allow them to invasively search and strip se-
arch any women wearing hijab. That ... as a Russian Duma order 209 came out 
around ten years ago. That is when we again saw a huge increase in women’s 
participation in suicide terrorism. But some of the women, who have changed 
their mind at the last minute, have claimed that they were coerced. 
Over the years we can also observe the changes in ideology; at the outset 
of the second Intifada when suicide terror became popular, it was Palestinian 
women who approached by the various leaders of Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad 
asking to be permitted to carry suicide operations.  They asked to participate 
and they were turned away. In fact, Sheikh Yassin argued that Hamas did not 
need women to be martyrs since they had more than enough men. In one case 
a woman was turned away who wanted to volunteer and told: “Why don’t you 
go down the street and go become a martyr for another group?”  Which she 
did, for one of the secular groups who did not object to using women bombers. 
First the PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad relented to use women and the final 
hold out was Hamas. Again, once Hamas realized that there was a benefit to 
using women bombers, they adjusted their ideology to suit the exigencies of 
the time.  There was a shift in the Islamic ideology of interpreting a woman’s 
right to participate in Jihad, whether she had the same obligation as a man or 
whether it was a different obligation. Thus religious authorities began to debate 
a women’s role and several came to the conclusion that women and men were 
equal in their obligation to engage in Jihad and this opened the door for more 
and more women to participate.
This is something that has now become a focal point within the Jihad com-
munity including groups like Al Qaeda. On the one hand, Mr. Zawahiri, who has 
replaced Bin Laden as the leader says, “al Qaida does not have women, we do 
not need women. “ However at the same time, his wife, Mrs. Zawahiri   issued 
an “open letter to my sisters’ in Islam” which argued almost the reverse: ”Oh 
yes, you can be a suicide bomber and you can achieve all these many things”. 
One of the innovations that women bring to the table is being able to represent 
themselves as being pregnant. As much as we have preexisting notions about the 
inherent peacefulness of women, an expectant mother bring additional expec-
tations of her peacefulness. And this is precisely why they have created IEDs, 
improvised explosive devices that women wrap around their midsection to give 
the impression of late term pregnancy.  Some analysts argue that the women 
are depressed or want to die. In fact, according to the strictest interpretations 
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of martyrdom, anyone who actually wants to die is not allowed to be a bomber. 
There is no real sacrifice or martyrdom if the person seeks death and actually 
wants to die. So I think we have a huge gap in our understanding of why women 
participate in terrorism and what some of the multiple motivations might be.
The last point I want to emphasize because it is relevant for the member of 
the military and the counter terrorists in the room:  There is a direct connection 
between how the women are treated within conflict zones and whether or not 
the organizations mobilize women into terrorism. The more likely that women 
are targeted for sexual abuse, the more likely women will be funneled into 
terrorist groups. Even one lone case is sufficient to generate a huge amount of 
propaganda. The one case of Sergeant Steven Green, the American who rape 
and killed a young girl in Mahmoodiya was the single most reported story in 
the Arab media for the whole year. And although this was an isolate case of 
Green and co-conspirators, it gave the impression that all American soldiers 
given the chance would rape teen-aged girls. 
The next thing to be aware of is the how terrorism continued into the next 
generation. As we have seen, bombers are getting younger and younger. The 
terrorist organizations are starting to recruit children. So as much as we have 
talked about women, one should also be concerned about the growing use of 
children by terrorist groups and how this will affect both their societies as well 
as the psychological well being of soldiers and peace keepers who might find 
themselves facing very young operatives in the future.
Thank you very much.
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Why is Handling and Responding to Sexu-
al Violence a Military Responsibility?
Marsha Henry, PhD, LSE
Thank you very much. Thank you to Cecilie and Anita for inviting me here 
today. I am very pleased to be here, but I do have to say that Cecilie tasked me 
with a very difficult question. That question is: Why is handling and responding 
to sexual violence a military responsibility? Something to some extent I am 
very unqualified to answer. Probably most of you are much more qualified. So 
in thanking you for inviting me here I hope that this is not the last time that I 
am invited here, because I think that I am going to respond to this question a 
little bit provocatively. Hopefully I can gauge your response in the question 
and answer period.
I want to start a little bit by questioning the very presence of the military 
in responding to sexual violence. In particular I want to use the example of 
peacekeeping as an avenue to challenging the basis of this question. Although 
military peacekeepers originate from a variety of military backgrounds, they 
are generally trained in conventional military ways... that is, they are trained 
for combat and the discharge of violence. It is this very training that qualifies 
most for peacekeeping duty. For example, most of the peacekeepers who come 
as military observers or who are in senior ranks amongst the contingents, are 
usually required to have at least five years’ service and some combat experience, 
although, again, some of these requirements are changing.
As such, military peacekeepers are deployed specifically because they al-
ready possess military capital, that is, military qualifications, experiences and 
affiliations. Scholars such as Betts-Fetherston as well as Charles Moskos and 
Laura Miller, have outlined some of the contradictions involved for those tasks 
to undertake peacekeeping duties. For example Betts Fetherston has argued that 
there is no switch inside a blue helmet which turns the soldier into a natural 
peacekeeper or peacemaker. Studies of peacekeepers’ experiences reveal that 
their lack of training in peace promotion and conflict resolution, and the some-
times problematic sub-cultures of various branches of the military, may lead to 
their enactment of hyper-masculinity and violence against their colleagues and 
local communities. A clear example of this is documented, I think, in extensive 
length in Sherene Razack’s work on Canadian peacekeepers and the violence 
committed by them in Somalia.
The paradoxical requirement of a peacekeeper that he or she be both a warrior 
and a humanitarian, means that peacekeeping is indeed a unique military labor. 
This work involves elements of martial and conciliatory security practice. On 
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the one hand peacekeepers may have been trained and socialized to enact in 
various forms of militarized masculinity, and at the same time prescribed codes 
of conduct and daily operations that promote peace and security, as outlined 
by institutions such a the UN. So, when thinking about military responses to 
sexual violence, these contradictory orientations need to be considered. You 
can just think about the conventional image of the peacekeeper, although, if 
you look at UN, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations’ website, you 
will see a changing image of the peacekeeper. Traditionally, peacekeepers were 
often depicted in photographs either holding babies or handing out sweets to 
children. You will see a transformation in those images from that to more robust 
images where they are depicted ‘in action’. 
If we believe that these diverging objectives can coexist or be overcome, 
I think the question the becomes, to what extent are contemporary soldiers 
adequately prepared for these multiple roles?
There is also the issue of the division of labor within peacekeeping, and 
this is one that is highly gendered. It is not too dissimilar to that in traditionally 
male-dominated professions. First, the majority of military personnel in peace-
keeping missions are male. This is more so the case within the military wing as 
opposed to the police and civilian sectors. As such, there is little gender balance, 
and women unfortunately are underrepresented in both national militaries and 
in peacekeeping missions. Although there have been attempts to increase the 
number of female peacekeepers, there still exists a dearth of qualified and senior 
ranking women in military postings to peacekeeping missions. Putting women 
into key decision-making positions remains a challenge, especially for the UN. 
I believe that this continued imbalance may also exacerbate prevailing ideas 
about gender, gender roles and gender relations. 
Addressing the gender imbalance may help to establish a change in the cul-
ture of various military organizations, and potentially pave the way to develop 
gender expertise and sensitivities to issues of sexual harassment and violence 
within militaries and sexual violence in conflict. This change in culture may 
also lead to some more positive outcomes within peacekeeping missions. For 
example where peacekeepers have a reflective understanding of gender and 
gender relations within their own profession, they are likely to be more sensitive 
to the gender skewed experiences of conflict. 
But, again, there are limitations to this. An example is the deployment of 
an all-female peacekeeping force in Liberia. In addition, I have documented 
in my own research the contradictory experiences of female peacekeepers in 
the Uruguayan military. In both of these cases it was found that some of the 
duties that female peacekeepers were tasked to do, did not involve extensive 
interaction with local communities. Some of the work, for example, that the 
Indian squad did was close protection. They are also trained specifically in riot 
control and crowd control. This perhaps may put an added burden on female 
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peacekeepers if they are expected to be doing gender sensitive work, when they 
are actually not trained specifically in that area. Again, not necessarily a reason 
not to encourage the recruitment of female peacekeepers, but there needs to be 
some discussion about some of the challenges.
Then there is also the division of labor within the larger peacekeeping 
mission, which l think is important to consider when thinking about military 
responsibility. Who is responsible for what humanitarian work? Humanitarian 
NGO’s with years of experience, a range of gender specific expertise, and often 
a relationship of trust with local people, and who may have been working with 
these communities over a long and consistent period of time, may feel that they 
are best placed to meet the needs of conflict and post-conflict situations. They 
may feel the military presence to be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, 
in contacts – and I think this is important in relation to some of the issues raised 
in previous presentations. Where communities have experienced high levels of 
violence, it is often the case that this violence has been perpetrated by formal or 
informal militarized groups – gangs, militias, rebels. Sexual violence used as a 
weapon of war and during times of conflict, has a militarized nature to it, and it 
may be very difficult for military personnel to be seen as different and distinct 
from other perpetrating groups. One example that I have from my research in 
Haiti: local women often talked about how they saw Brazilian peacekeepers 
playing football with local gangs, local militias, and they began to see the local 
militias dressing more and more in militarized uniforms, as they began adopting 
camouflage. They found it very difficult to disassociate these two groups. So-
mething to think about. In addition, incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse 
by peacekeepers may inhibit their ability to offer support and services, because 
their reputations have been compromised. Second, military personnel do not 
necessarily deploy to areas for long periods of time, in contrast to some NGO 
staff, who may spend several years in post. If peacekeepers are on a six months 
or a one year long deployment, they may not have a chance to develop trusting 
relationships with local communities, something that is likely to be essential for 
effective management of trauma associated with sexual violence. Third, and I 
think most importantly, militaries do not generally specialize in dealing with 
sexual violence as a consequence of war, but – again – this is changing. For 
many, the involvement of the military may be seen as both a militarization and 
a colonization of humanitarian work. However, personnel trained specifically 
in this area, would mean that militaries could offer that expertise and share 
knowledge with civilian police and other personnel. I think, again, as has been 
developing with the DPKO as was demonstrated this morning, this could be an 
ideal area to develop, considering that most militaries have medical personnel 
and by extension could include other alternative medical health and counseling 
services, offered in collaboration with local and international NGO’s.  Especi-
ally since militaries have extensive experience in both conflict resolution and 
84
conflict management. In my previous research I found many peacekeepers from 
a variety of military backgrounds to exhibit an advanced knowledge of cutting 
edge management thinking and practice, and to exhibit empathetic approaches 
in their everyday work with other communities and cultures.
I think that there are multiple responsibilities to protect and defend alongside 
duties of care, and I think that this contradiction can sometimes cause consi-
derable confusion within the humanitarian landscape, for peacekeepers, for 
humanitarian personnel and for beneficiaries. I think other issues like force 
protection and operational effectiveness may not always be compatible with the 
objective of handling and responding to sexual violence in the most appropriate 
ways. A classic example that other peacekeepers at the Netherland’s Defence 
Academy have been using to think through doctrine and advanced doctrine, is 
around the ethical quandry that a peacekeeper might find himself – and I say 
himself, because the majority of peacekeepers are male – the quandry that he 
might find himself in when he comes across a local woman, say, on the roadside 
when he is on patrol, shouting and trying to flag down a vehicle in order to help 
her. Force protection is clearly important; and to add to this, part of the internal 
security practice is that peacekeepers are not supposed to give unauthorized 
ride to individuals who are not part of the UN personnel.
How might expert training aid the peacekeeper and let’s say, the local wo-
men? - is something militaries need to think about. Thus, after saying that there 
are many reasons why, in practice, militaries should stay as far away as possible 
from sexual violence as a professional area, there are also compelling reasons 
why contemporary militaries should make space in their professional remit  to 
deal with issues of sexual violence inside and outside of their institution. I think, 
as this workshop highlights, many governments and their national ministries 
have been taking up the challenges afforded by 1325. Gender mainstreaming 
and commitments to gender equality policies mean that national institutions, 
such as the military, need to take very seriously the gender imbalances in their 
work force and some of the consequences of this gender imbalance in relation 
to doctrine and practice locally, nationally and internationally.
I think that the last couple of points that I want to make, is that I think one 
of the ways for ( although this is not what I have been tasked to do today but in 
thinking about why the military should take responsibility I am often thinking 
about how they could do that) the military to respond could be to seriously de-
velop in-depth gender expertise within the military itself, and to deploy a kind 
military capital or view it as a military resource or to develop a gender capital 
or a gender resource.  Thus, gender expertise would be seen as something to 
be invested in.  Certainly, here today I have seen evidence that the Norwegian 
forces in particular have an abundance of gender experts and gender expertise, 
and I think it is a matter of funneling some of that. 
I think the issue of gender sensitivity training, for example, is not currently 
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sufficient. An example that I can give from attending gender sensitivity trai-
ning in Liberia for probation for prison officer staff, which is exactly the same 
course that is offered to recently deployed military personnel ...
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Female engagements; Experiences from 
Iraq, Africa, and Afghanistan
Major Fred Tanner
The purpose for this presentation is to speak about my experiences in sexual 
violence in the contemporary operating environment, and how our techniques, 
tactics, and practices have evolved over the past 10 years. But first of all, I want 
to begin by emphasizing that I’m speaking from my own experience and not 
from a position of US policy. I will be speaking strictly from my experiences in 
what we refer to in the US Army as “MTOE” units. Those experiences include 
an Infantry company commander in Post-Invasion Iraq, Stability Operations 
2003-2004, and Security Sector Reform Advisor in Horn of Africa 2006-2008, 
finally being a battalion operations officer in Afghanistan 2009-2011.  While 
we in Iraq in 2003 were primarily tasked initially to defeat Saddam’s army, 
the role was very different in the Horn of Africa. In 2006 it was much more 
what you would call the intra-theatre war in terms of preparing various African 
nations and progressing their militaries for them to defeat their own internal 
conflicts. Finally, the last experience I will talk about is, I have nearly two years 
of experience in Afghanistan, this time as an operations officer at a battalion 
level, and also that was the first time that we were formally introduced to female 
engagement teams, and I will conclude with that. 
I will speak about my experience chronologically as I believe it’s important 
to note the time and frame and context, as what I have seen in the 9 years is a 
developing recognition of addressing gender issues.
What I tell you up front, is what I found in the course of this morning liste-
ning to this morning’s presenters is that many experiences that I want to relate 
to you have been addressed, and I can validate for my own personal experience 
that they did occur. One of my takeaways is that I am very impressed with all 
the panel speakers this far and just how in tune you are with some of the chal-
lenges that we face at the tip of the spire, for lack of a better term.
In preparing for Iraq in 2003, we received no pre-deployment training with 
regard to instructions on how to deal with Host (as in the nation that is hosting 
us) nation sexual violence. Any kind of sexual violence training we received 
during this time frame was solely focused within our own organization of what 
was referred to earlier as blue-and-blue, the prevention of sexual harassment, 
sexual assault of soldiers within my own company. I say that, because in the 
United States Army, unlike some militaries, within the infantry there are no 
females assigned, or I should say: organizationally there are no females. That 
being said, in practicality and for the first time in 2003 we expected to have 
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females assigned within our company in terms of linguists, counter-intelligence 
and intelligence along with psychological operations. Based upon that, we did 
place an additional emphasis on preventing or protecting those females from 
predators both within the company and also outside the company.
I am happy to report that during that year-long term in Iraq, I witnessed 
no – or I  was a party to no – male and female gender violence issues, either 
within our ranks or with the working in the host nation population. I am not so 
naive to believe that they did not occur, certainly within the local population 
with Iraqi women. But some additional contact is probably helpful. In 2003 and 
2004 the military kind of stands and interaction with women was be respectful 
to their society by not talking or engaging to their women. Thus are my inte-
ractions with Iraqi women during that year-long deployment were extremely 
limited, and often relegated to simply segregating them while we conducted 
raids or searches of various subjective. We did, however,– or I did however – 
experience male on male sexual violence, both within the host nation and the 
host nation and the military, in that case the Iraqi National Guard – as it was 
referred to then, as well as within my own organization. 
We addressed those in two very different fashions. For these within the Iraq 
National Guard as well as – I found this both in Iraq and in Afghanistan – there 
seems to be a cultural acceptance of a stronger, almost a prison-like mentality, of 
stronger, more dominant males being able to sexually assault weaker or inferior 
males. This practice was initially put out there without any attempt to hide it 
by the Iraqis. When it was made clear to them that this was unacceptable and 
would not be tolerated, we did not see it again, but I doubt very much it stop-
ped completely. That is not to say that we buried our heads in the sand, but one 
should actually keep in mind that in the course of what was then emerging in 
uncertainty in terms of your ability to focus on your partner force along with 
the enemy along with your own unit or formation.  There are only so many 
hours and days and only so many people that you can deal with. I do not want 
to give the image that it was accepted as acceptable behavior, because it was 
certainly not, but our ability to stop it was pretty limited to relate back to only 
having a – I had a lot of different nails or a lot of different fasteners, but only 
a hammer at that point in my tool box.
Ironically, the only other sexual violence issue I did address – and I think it 
is valid because in the course of our discussion today, I think there is national 
focus to focus on male and female sexual violence, and that is certainly an 
important issue. Ironically, the only issue I addressed during that year in Iraq, 
was actually a soldier-on-soldier sexual violence, when one soldier was caught 
molesting another soldier. I take away from that our response was very different 
in that case. Clearly, this was in our case a criminal matter, to be handled by the 
criminal investigation portion of our military. But what I found most significant 
during that entire event is that after that soldier – the initial accuser – came 
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forward, four other soldiers came forward within the same unit, to say that that 
soldier had also molested them. To me, what it highlighted is that I think it is 
probably far more prevalent both within our own militaries and certainly within 
our partner nations and their society, than is given credit to at this point. In 
terms of emerging issues, I think as gender violence in general progresses, or 
rather that the recognition of sexual gender progresses, you will see  a greater 
focus or a greater awareness on male and male sexual violence.
The next ... I will speak to you about, is my experience in the Horn of Africa. 
That was much different both in terms of both the mission, obviously, and our 
ability to react to that mission. There, in certain circumstances, our overarching 
mission in the Horn of Africa was to improve certain African militaries to defeat 
both external and internal threats themselves. When we say the Horn of Africa, 
I am specifically referring to the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and 
Kenya. Within all these countries over a course of fifteen months, at some 
point or period, I was responsible for training, implementing training and then 
advising and assisting those various nations’ militaries mostly in cannon and 
certain sea operations. In that case, we were told – specifically, in fact, we 
were directed and mandated – in many cases to address both gender violence, 
but more in a larger law of armed warfare or conflict, human rights’ issues and 
training. I have to say that in terms of techniques that were used there, first and 
foremost – and this has been touched already today – was our ability or our 
requirement to absolutely set the standard for the host nations that we were trai-
ning. I could not emphasize enough the importance of your conduct and how it 
is perceived – and when I say this I speak to the fellow military members in the 
room – that when you are training the host nation military, you are absolutely 
underneath the microscope 24/7 and the requirement for your need to set the 
example in all things to the point where we would make specific instances to 
ensure that when we needed subject matter experts, we would bring women in 
to teach us whatever those specific subject matters might be in order to kind of 
change the lens  in which women were viewed at within their military. 
The second thing in that what we have already said, is that the Power Point 
generally is ineffective. Situational training is much more effective. So that 
was incorporated. And that does not only refer to only gender violence, it is 
kind of an overarching statement that you could use for any kind of training. 
Everything we did had some kind of, if not gender based, a certainly human 
rights based element to it in order to integrate it into our training.
That is a kind of the good news part of our story. The bad news part of our 
story is that I was still not resourced to react. All those I refer to is kind of 
pro-active and preventing. Basically, I am training the military to prevent them 
from doing that. What I did not have the ability to do, was train that military to 
react when they encountered due to a spoiler or an in-searching group. Again, 
we were much less prepared to react to sexual violence than we encountered in 
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the field as a result of that. When it did occur and when we did come across it, 
the general direction I would receive from either the defence attaché or the US 
Embassy, was that ”this is a fill-in-the-blank country’s problem and it needs to 
fit in the blank-country’s solution”, which is certainly true to a degree, as that 
solution needs to be sustainable, but at the same time you have to balance that 
with just kind of ”this is too complex of a problem for us to deal with”. I think 
forums like this is a great way in terms of progressing that issue, and I will talk 
more at the end in terms of how I think ultimately we will reach a conclusion.
Finally, I will talk about my experience in Afghanistan. This occurred from 
2008-2011. Training for dealing with gender violence again was similar to my 
Iraq experience in this case. We were much more focused on and rightfully 
so, a defeat of IED and the network that supports them, than we were in terms 
of responding to gender violence. I do not say that to make light of gender 
violence, it is just the again argument of limited resources, read: time, and 
unlimited problem sets which you are forced to deal with. 
One change from my Iraq experience was the incorporation of female en-
gagement teams. I am not here to preach female engagement teams as a cure 
to gender violence, but it certainly was a progression from – ”oh my god, I am 
getting three females assigned to my company, what am I going to do when 
we are in a patrol base” to ”here is a female engagement team during your pre-
deployment training; figure out how you are going to utilize them and corporate 
them in operations”. That being said, I have to confess in twelve months of 
being an operations officer within Afghanistan, it never did occur to me to use 
the female engagement team to gather atmospherics on gender violence. 
That being said, of the numerous female engagement team leaders that I 
worked with, never once did they come to me and said ”sir, we can potentially 
gain some information for you in regards to atmospherics on gender violence in 
this area”. Generally, female engagement teams were used to confirm or deny 
information we already had along with the other enablers I had in planning 
and executing operations. 
The other point I mentioned in terms of female engagement teams since 
they are kind of soup du jour (literally translated to soup of the day, which 
is to say it’s trendy or “en vogue” right now), is that the training utilization 
of female engagement teams are still very nascent in terms of the Army. The 
female engagement teams that I had were all taken out of hide – what we call 
taken out of hide, which is to say that all these women had other jobs that they 
had to perform daily, so it really disrupted the continuity in terms of being 
able to keep them for any kind of prolonged period of time, because they had 
to get back to whatever job they were doing. Similarly, at least in my experi-
ence, there was no standardized pipeline that they came through in terms of 
skill sets. Oftentimes, in order to be on the female engagement team, all they 
had to do was be a female. That generally boiled down to that ”now you are 
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dealing with a personality in terms of a confidence and skill set and what they 
can achieve for you”. 
In terms of things that I would improve in the future as I conclude here: One 
is – and we have talked about this already – you need to get buy in (ownership 
and belief) at the top. We have a saying: ”What my boss finds interesting, I find 
fascinating”. As have already been spoken to you, senior level engagement and 
allowing them to or then emphasizing the use of or the awareness of gender 
violence, is important. The second piece is: The female engagement team pro-
vides a vehicle. There are certain practices that we use within our own army 
now to prevent blue-and-blue violence, and those same practices need to be 
exported and incorporated in the female engagement training.
I am sorry I have no more time to speak about this today. I appreciate your 
time, and I would like to close and saying that you guys are absolute on point 
here in terms of being in tune with the issues. I walked away here very enligh-
tened in terms of what I could have done and what I will do in the future as 
an operations officer to mitigate gender violence.  I will look forward to your 
questions shortly.
Thank you.
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Good and Bad Examples of How to Prevent 
and Respond to Sexual Violence: The Case 
of UNAMID in Darfur
Col. Anthony Atolagbe
Conflicts of war have been catalysts for change, devastation and humiliations. 
Adversaries have had to use all sorts of strategies to overwhelm the opponents 
through the use of superior firepower, maneuvering tactics, propaganda. In the 
course of such conflicts, combatants take advantage of their possession of arms 
and other weapons to commit atrocities as well as other actions against human 
beings. There have been so many of these acts, usually perpetrated against 
defenseless persons, especially women, girls, children, and sometimes men. 
International organizations in collaboration with the other concerned bodies 
have adopted several approaches built on concepts and principles of civilian pro-
tection to combat the trend. These approaches are developed towards mitigating 
demeaning acts like sexual violence. There however, seem to be a situation in 
which different conflict environment evolves with its own face and trademark. 
The conflict in Darfur, which started in 2003, is one that can be best described 
as complex, due to its multidimensional nature. The government embarked on a 
counter insurgency operation in Darfur, and the forces on both sides exploited 
the situation by taking laws in to their hands to commit sexual atrocities. These 
actions had devastating and long lasting effects on the victims.
The UNAMID has been a major instrument in the front line of the campaign 
for protection of civilians through prevention and providing responses within 
its operational capabilities. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to briefly 
highlight the good and the bad examples of preventions and responses to sexual 
violence in the Darfur region, which is the UNAMID area of responsibility. In 
this direction, the aim of the paper is to highlight responses to sexual violence 
in UNAMID area of responsibility while identifying the challenges. The scope 
will cover an overview of the Darfur conflict, Efforts of UNAMID and then 
conclude with the Challenges. 
Sexual violence was prevalent in Darfur region during the conflicts in which 
there were cases of sexual abuses accompanied with destruction to lives and 
property. Sexual violence was perpetrated by the identified forces, who also 
viewed their acts as of spoils of war that they needed to enjoy. The victim who 
rebels is usually rewarded with killing as sexual assault became a strategic 
weapon to cause panic and awe.
At this point, something immediate had to be done, and a structure put in 
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place in order to stop this and other violent acts. The African Union Mission 
was deployed in the midst of this crisis in an effort to protect the innocent ci-
vilians, but their spread was limited, due to low number of troops. The AMIS 
troops were “re-hatted” as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission 
in Darfur. Upon the entrance of the United Nations it was mandated under 
resolution 1769 to protect civilians, assist humanitarian agencies and assist in 
the observance of rule of law. The Darfur Peace Agreement exists today, but 
there only seem to be semblance of the ceasefire, which is broken by any of 
the parties to the conflict who feels aggrieved, from time to time. 
The UNAMID has been able to take necessary steps in the implementation 
of its mandate toward this direction.  Though, highly reduced, acts of sexual 
violence are still perpetrated on the internally displaced persons, as well as 
women and girls who embark on their daily routine activities like drawing 
water and fetching firewood. The records of sexual and gender based violence, 
thanks to the UNAMID efforts has experienced a remarkable fall. We are well 
aware that we have Resolutions 1325 and 1820 and the Rome statutes. These 
have only been of help to those who are advocates and some activists within 
the country, who have not been able to make serious impact required to put a 
stop to these activities. 
It is necessary to briefly highlight the impacts of sexual violence on the 
victims. Cognizant of this, we will all find the need to take collective action 
toward awareness, mitigation, assistance and a final stop to sexual violence 
across the globe. These impacts are inexhaustible though, and they include 
victim stigmatization, unwanted pregnancies, child abuse and others like 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. The UNAMID, as the organ of 
international community, has the mandate to protect civilians in order that the 
perpetration of this violent act will be stopped. In this direction, UNAMID is 
organized for the implementation of this mission mandate through its military, 
civilian and the police units, including female police. 
On the efforts of the UNAMID, It will be necessary to discuss this aspect 
in relation to prevention and response methods. The good examples consider 
the strength of the military force within our deployment which represents 
about ninety per cent of the total force that is required. This is based on a 
contingency plan that was drawn up at the inception and which is subject to 
regular reviews. These troops cover about 65 per cent of the land area within 
operations environment. That is, to a large extent, we have access to most of 
the areas covered by our troops. In these locations, the force provides robust 
patrols to boost the confidence of the populace and provides support to agencies 
for humanitarian delivery. 
The UNAMID police are also constituted into various units, which include 
the formed police units and police advisors. The formed police units carry arms 
and have the task of escorting women into the bushes to fetch firewood and 
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draw water. Additionally, UNAMID has the police advisors who guide the local 
policemen and women on international standards. The female elements of the 
UNAMID police are usually assisting the women in the conduct of their daily 
routine activities and giving assistance to victims of abuses. UNAMID police 
has given medical aid in form of quick impact projects to victims of sexual 
violence who experience pregnancy, VVF and sexually transmitted diseases. 
UNAMID also has other awareness programs organized by its authority and 
sections like the establishment of gender advisory units. This is in collaboration 
with the Darfur state committee on gender based violence. They collaborate 
through the organization of gender based violence awareness programs and 
other social awareness programs.
On the part of the international staff, staff officers, military observers and 
correction officers, induction training is usually organized in order to create 
awareness. The induction training is mission specific and provides necessary 
information on the operations environment that will guide all personnel to be 
inducted. UNAMID has the conduct and disciplinary units to instill discipline 
on her staff involved in sexual exploitation.
Taking on some reverse aspects of the responses, we have the Sudan law 
of 1981. It punishes women who get pregnant outside marriage and you may 
go to jail if witnesses cannot be produced. This does not allow allegations by 
victims to be treated under international standard.
The challenges that UNAMID faces on the field include language barrier as 
the country is Arabic speaking. The mission experiences restrictions by local 
officials as the mission operates within a sovereign state. When the military 
and police and other officials embark on patrol, the local officials remark that 
they were not informed before coming. Victims and their family members do 
not also want to report the sexual abuse cases because they are scared of repri-
sals from the perpetrators. Sometimes women become victims of such attacks 
while proceeding on visits to other IDPs, and they do not seek escorts to do this. 
Also, the cases are under-reported, because people are afraid of arrest in which 
you might be required to make a proof. The operations environment also lack 
accessible roads. The mission operates under poor road conditions while the 
climatic is also harsh. This especially is in cases where patrols by peacekeepers 
are interrupted by “haboob”, a whirlwind situation accompanied with dust that 
engulfs the environment for between 3 to 4 hours. Driving in the rain is like in 
quick sand around the “wadhis” where patrols vehicles get stuck and recovery 
takes a long time. Thanks to college authority, other speakers and the audience 
here. It is really a great opportunity. 
Thank you.
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Q & A Session 2
Discussant Louise Olsson, PhD, Folke Bernadotte Academy
Thank you, Ole, and thank you to the organizers for inviting me here. Thank 
you also very much to the panellists for very interesting presentations. They 
present me with the huge challenge of trying to sum up the common lessons 
learned and themes from this panel. After summing up, I will ask the panel-
lists two questions, since we have such an interesting mix of practitioners and 
researchers here, which I think we should really draw on. Then I will open up 
the floor for questions. I encourage you in the audience to start thinking already 
now about what you would like to ask the panellists.
How many of you have seen a TV program called Myth Busters? For those 
of you that have not, it is a program which identifies Myths and Urban Legends 
and then tests their value against facts. I would say that these presentations do 
just that. Thereby, they bust three of the myths that exist on sexual violence in 
armed conflict. These myths are serious as they make the problem of sexual 
violence seem impossible to address. Thereby, they might prevent us from 
taking effective action to stop the violence.
Firstly, one of the main myths that exist is that sexual violence is inevitable. 
I wish it was a joke to call it ‘the ancient Greece myth’, but I do not know how 
many reports I have read about this problem that actually started by referring to 
ancient Greek plays as proof of sexual violence being an inevitable effect. If this 
is a myth, what do we then actually know? Well, what these panellists show with 
all clarity is that, yes, sexual violence has been used in conflicts over time – it 
is not new – but it is very wrong to treat sexual violence as an inevitable effect. 
There is great variation between conflicts in the forms of sexual violence that 
exists and how it is used. Moreover, as we have heard several times today and 
as Dr. Ragnhild Nordås’ presentation shows, a large part of all warring groups 
do not even use sexual violence in armed conflict. Other actors may start to 
use some forms of sexual violence but do not keep up the practice through out 
the war. This means that we have too much variation for it to be inevitable. 
Because when a researcher says that there is great variation, this means that 
the violence appears and disappears depending of concrete causes, actions and 
behaviours. It is not something that just inevitably happens. 
So, the presentations teach us to bury the myth that sexual violence is 
inevitable. This also means that sexual violence can be addressed in regular 
military analysis by identifying the usual question of ‘why, who, what form, 
when and where’.
Secondly, there is a myth that if we only stop the war, sexual violence will 
disappear by itself. This myth is dangerous as it can lead us to believe that we 
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do not need to take specific actions to stop this form of violence. It will ‘work 
itself out’ if we only deal with ‘the war’. 
As these presentations show, this is not true. Sexual violence is part of the 
war but has to be analyzed as a separate category of violence. For example, 
sexual violence can get worse when the fighting dies down on the battlefield(s) 
and it can continue after the peace agreement has been signed. Sexual violence 
can also have separate effects on the conflict dynamic compared to other forms 
of violence. For example, sexual violence can continue to generate security 
problems for both men and women over time. As Dr. Mia Bloom’s presentation 
shows, this is particularly true regarding the connection between sexual violence 
and the recruitment to terrorist activities. In addition to sexual violence being 
used deliberately in war, it can also increase as an effect of how war destroys 
a society. For example, it can be the result of the break down of the rule of law 
or of the traditional norms which otherwise prevent violence. Therefore, it is 
important to analyze the causes behind the occurrence of sexual violence if we 
are to successfully address it in the specific conflicts settings in which it occurs. 
Thus, we can say that the facts presented by the panellists mean that we can 
bury the myth that this form of violence will disappear by itself without having 
to take concrete action. As the presentations by Colonel Anthony Atolagbe 
and Major Fred Tanner gave ample examples of, there are also concrete Best 
Practices developing on how to analyze sexual violence and how to include it 
in regular operational analysis and planning.5
The third, and final, myth busted by the panellists is that sexual violence 
only affects civilian women and girls. This assumption often brings with it the 
conclusion that sexual violence is not in any way related to regular military 
operations. As the presentations show, this is not true. Men and women, girls 
and boys can be the targets. The collection of information needs to be adapted 
to that fact. Moreover, sexual violence is not a ‘civilian’ problem as it can serve 
a political purpose (by political we mean that it is done to achieve an objective 
in the war) or have political consequences (that is, be utilized to forward the 
interests of warring parties). For example, Dr. Bloom’s presentation shows how 
sexual violence is used in propaganda with a substantial effect. This means 
that sexual violence can have military consequences. Thereby, sexual violence 
can have an effect on the military operation’s ability to reach its objective of 
creating stability and security. Moreover, as Major Tanners’ presentation dis-
play, the case may even be that the local troops, with which an international 
operation collaborates, can be responsible for sexual violence and abuse. How 
do we address that?
The presentations thereby bust the myth that this is a ‘civilian problem’ of 
5 See also Louise Olsson, Gender Equality and the United Nations Peace Operations in Timor-Leste, 
Brill Publishers:Leiden, 2009 for a discussion on how peace operations affect the levels of violence 
against women and men.
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no consequence for conducting military operations. Today, it is also important 
to consider that even in a situation where systematic sexual violence was being 
directed mainly at civilians, it might still constitute a ‘military problem’. Being 
professionally prepared to prevent and halt sexual violence has become a must 
as ‘Protection of Civilians’ has broadened the responsibility of many peace 
operations. According to UN Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 
1960, systematic sexual violence is a threat to international peace and security. 
Instead of maintaining these myths, we must base our actions on facts. The 
next step – a major lesson learned from the panel – is that these facts then need 
to be translated into operational practices. That is, regular military competence 
is needed when addressing the problem and turning an awareness into effective 
action. This effort can be assisted by several tools, such as increasing general 
gender awareness and utilizing subject matter experts in the form of Gender 
Field Advisers. However, as Dr. Marsha Henry’s presentation pointed out, this 
work must also be part of a comprehensive approach to assist the creation of 
peace. In this, we need to consider which actor – military or civilian – who 
should be responsible for which aspect of addressing sexual violence and how 
we can work together.
I will now end by asking the panellists two questions. The first is directed 
to the three researchers: What is the ONE main concrete thing from your pre-
sentation that you think that the Armed Forces should take with them in their 
continued work to practically address this new form of responsibility? The 
second question is directed to the two military officers: Although we strive 
to integrate gender in, and combat sexual violence through, regular military 
operations, we often seem to fail. What would your advice be to succeed in 
integrating this knowledge into the regular work?
Researchers, would you like to start answering? 
Mia Bloom: 
Louise, as always, you do such a wonderful job, to be able to get in some ma-
terial, pull out the few colonels that are the most important. From my military 
perspective, because I work so closely with very often either the US military 
or the British military forces, it is important to know that what happened in 
the field has a direct impact on future mobilization and recruitment. So that 
the example that I had to unfortunately skip by, the Abeer Janabi attack of the 
fourteen  year old girl in Mahmudiya, does not indicate  a trend in US military. 
In other words, US military is not routinely stalking 14 year old girls, raping 
them, killing their families and burning them. However, that was the most 
publicized story in Arabic in 2006, when it happened. The point is to say that 
a small incident can be blown completely out of proportions in making any 
military force look particularly bad and incentivizing thousands of people to 
take up arms. 
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At the same time, in the absence of these kinds of attacks either by coalition 
NATO or other military personnel, the organizations themselves have started 
raping women. There is a real lost opportunity there in terms of creating some 
counter-narratives. So for people like yourself that work within the field against 
gender based violence, to emphasize that in fact, yes, we know our sisters in 
Islam are being raped in Iraq, but they are being raped by a Sunnah to turn them 
into bombers, is a story that really did not get nearly enough press, given the 
imbalance of focus and attention given to the Abeer Janabi.
So I think that on the one hand it is, sort of, ”be careful what you do, also 
be aware of what is going on”. The foul thing is, and this conforms to some of 
the mandates of 1325, more women in the field to be able to deal with the other 
women, like the units that the major mentioned, are really crucial, things like 
the daughters of Iraq or a good transition. But before there were the daughters 
of Iraq, you had female units searching in border points and check points. And 
I think it is very important to understand that if the women are not checked, 
they are an ideal weapon. If they are checked basically by men, you are shoo-
ting yourself in the foot. So it is a win-win strategy for the terrorist, because 
they are not anticipating, in fact, that militaries will be able to count on more 
women recruits to help, act as go-betweens, talk to the women, search the 
women if need be, but also provide a person who is willing to listen in cases 
of violence. So I think that they are the two takeaways for the military. Thank 
you so much for your time.
Marsha Henry:
I guess the thing that I would say is based on the research that I have been doing 
with peacekeepers and with UN civilian peacekeepers, as well. Unfortunately, 
it sounds very negative to say this, but one of the things that motivates UN 
employees is the threat of failure, and I think on the course that I mentioned in 
my talk on the gender awareness training course, at the end of the two days the 
gender advisor in the mission was so frustrated by the refusal to take on some 
basic tennants about gender relations by many of the personnel, that she failed 
all of the entire class of candidates and made them retake it. That has some 
non-motivating consequences, as well. I am sure people can get through these 
courses either way, without really believing things or without really taking it 
on-board. But I guess I would say that the way I have shifted in thinking about 
that training, is to really emphasize that having a certain kind of gender know-
ledge is part of developing a professional skill. I think if you can make having 
a certain base of knowledge as part of your professional remit, it takes gender 
– to me, gender knowledge and knowledge about sexual violence – out of the 
personal context to a certain extent and puts it into the realm of professional 
expertise, professional knowledge and professional development.
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Ragnhild Nordås:
Thank you very much, Louise, for summing up the panel. I think that you defi-
nitely pointed out some important myths that are out there as two very difficult 
questions, so it is like putting up answering. Mostly in the research that I have 
been involved in, we are trying to find these patterns of the variations in sexual 
violence. The long-term purpose of this, of course, is to try to find better early 
warning systems, more effective intersection points when things can be done. 
When do we expect things to increase? In what locations? By what actors? In 
what forms? – And so on, to be preemptively aware when we see a potential 
situation escalating. That said, though, I think what you point out is most of 
the important myths that we need to bust, is of course this notion that sexual 
violence is inevitable and that it will always occur, this notion that “boys will be 
boys”, this is just what happens in war, and so on. That is the main take-home 
message, but it is important to know for militaries and for others as well, but 
it is not necessarily concrete enough.
I think that my work is focused on trying to find out how we could get the 
most out of the limited resources that we have, what are the actors we need 
to be aware of, at what time, and in what locations, so that we can early on 
be able to intercept before things escalate out of control. But exactly how the 
interventions should be done, I do not feel I am necessarily the right person to 
respond to that. That is also maybe the case when it comes to how to imple-
ment gender into the operational and military procedures, as this is also not my 
area of expertise. Maybe I should just leave that to people with more military 
expertise to answer.
Louise Olsson: 
Thank you. We will turn to the practitioners.
Fred Tanner:
In terms of how we should operationalize the lessons learned of what we have 
spoken about in the panel today, would be to take it a step further beyond se-
nior leader by-end. Essentially, what it becomes is you need to make leaders 
accountable and evaluate leaders on their ability to respond to sexual violence 
in conflict areas. When I think back to each of the four deployments I had and 
the numerous situations that I have had to address prior to deploying, at no time 
was I evaluated or asked to respond to any kind of situational training in sexual 
violence. To picture what I think would be the ideal end status prior to the next 
deployment at the mission rehearsal exercise of win-win would be, if you have 
leaders that are going through some kind of situational training exercise where 
they would have to deal with gender violence or sexual violence, they have to 
deal with it, they are evaluated upon it, and then, even better, if there is a matter 
of a political appetite to expand the military any further, but I do see the role of 
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the gender advisor. You link that learning experience in terms of how to deal 
with gender violence, and you also bring into and you connect it now with 
what a gender advisor can do for you as a military organization. I think that 
is really the win-win in terms of end state. I am not sure how achievable it is, 
given at least my country’s current economical issues, the financial issues and 
the pending downsizing of our military, even without the gender advisor, just 
getting it into the pre-deployment training would be recommended.
Anthony Atolagbe:
I think Tanner has actually captured the essence of the first question. I would 
just go to that which affects the mission, which is the UNAMID. Currently, 
there was a military capability study that was conducted between the military 
planning section and the UNAMID towards the end of 2010. A report was 
written, having carried out an assessment of the entire operations, as it affects 
the military, the civil and the police. Just about three weeks ago, aspect of the 
report was tabled for study once more. The highlight of the study is that there is 
need for more robustness on the part of the military in conducting their patrols 
such that at any point that you get to certain areas, your robustness should give 
patrols access, for the conduct of assigned tasks. It is only then that the aspects 
of SOFA can be achieved and the mission mandate also be pursued adequately. 
In this area, where we really have problems was in the area of patrol. For 
instance, if a patrol is attacked, it needed to have adequate capability to respond. 
You need to have adequate response or get immediate support. Initially, we 
did not have attack helicopters, but the mission got attack helicopters from 
Ethiopia and in due course, from Rwanda as part of the implementation of this 
study. So I think with some level of firepower behind patrols who are going 
into some difficult areas, we will be able to instill some respect and fear in 
these perpetrators of violent acts and pursue the mission mandate.
In other areas, as it affects the addressing way to combat sexual violence, 
we conduct training for military and staff officers at the point of coming into 
the mission. It ensures that these personnel are educated on how to go about 
their interactions with the people as training is mission specific. Also, troops 
of contributing countries are also educated as part of pre induction training. 
The challenge here is that, the mission also experience air restrictions into 
some areas where the militia are actually concentrated and they continue to 
engage in conflicts. They fight most of the time there, so we are not allowed 
to fly within those areas, but as much as possible we close in on some of these 
places and we want to ensure that humanitarian hubs are established in these 
places. People within most of these areas are not reachable, and for this reason 
UNAMID insisted that team sites have to be established around some of these 
locations. The mission conducts air reconnaissance while expansions across 
the AOR continue through opening of new team sites. 
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So, generally, we are moving forward and we are hopeful that by the time 
the implementation is completed, the mission will be repositioned to do more. 
Thank you.
Louise Olsson:
Thank you. Now we open up the floor for questions. I will take two or three 
questions and then handle it back to the panel.
Q:
Thank you very much for very interesting briefs. I have to quote the major 
from the US Army: ”I’ll walk away enlightened”, probably, and hopefully later 
today. I have one concern. I have been in the business of training operators 
prior to deploying, and I do believe that it is of critical value to actually train 
the officers and shoulders for the real situation they will meet once in theatre. 
I do believe that when we discuss gender and prepare our officers and soldiers 
for gender related issues, we very often mix the real situation with what we do 
believe is the political correct situation. Let me give you an example. 
When we train our military maritime special forces for deployment to Afg-
hanistan, we prepare them for gender related issues linked to women’s situation 
in Afghanistan. We have scenario type training in order to prepare them for that. 
When I speak to my colleagues returning from Afghanistan, they sometimes 
tell me that from their experience there is different issues that might be of even 
more importance, for example sexual exploitation of children in Afghanistan. 
What do we do? We have already heard that there are limited resources and 
unlimited problems. What do we do in a situation where gender is very impor-
tant – obviously, it is very important, and we need to take it into account when 
we prepare ourselves. Can focus on one vulnerable party in the conflict make 
us less capable of taking care of other weak parties in the conflict?
Q:
I have a comment on the presentation of Major Tanner. I think an invader 
force has a responsibility. When the Americans moved into Iraq, they should 
not really repeat the kind of mistakes that they did. One example is too many. 
Talking about those children maltreated by American soldiers, talking about 
the pictures we saw from Abu Graib prison – a few examples of that nature 
contradicts, really, what you mentioned earlier in regard to the US should set 
an example for the host nation. It is very unfortunate to say that you could 
not do it because of those failures, although in the US those examples might 
be tolerated by the society because the judicial system is working and those 
perpetuators are going to be punished, and so forth. 
But in the case of Iraq I believe what happened destroyed really the whole 
notion of going into Iraq, toppling a dictator and so forth. What I would sug-
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gest, really, to the Americans, is basically what the colonel mentioned earlier, 
to get better prepared going to Iraq and Afghanistan, to-morrow maybe to 
Iran and God knows elsewhere. Those are the mistakes that are not going to 
be forgiven by the people in those countries, and as you and other colleagues 
mentioned, that this is real playing in the hands of the most extreme elements 
in that region. So, for the sake of the people in those regions, do not repeat the 
mistakes that you did in the case of Iraq, because ultimately you are simply 
jeopardizing whatever moderate element groups that exist in the region. In 
other words, you are going there for a few years and then you get back to the 
US, but those people who have to live in the region have to live with those 
extremist elements that are going to capitalize on the kind of behavior of a few 
American soldiers had in Iraq.
Q:
I welcome all panelists’ contributions this afternoon. For Marsha, I actually 
believe what you say, and I welcome the word that you use – professional – that 
it should not be just considered gender, that it should be part of our professional 
training. I actually see this as a human rights’ issue. I do not separate it. I think 
all soldiers should be trained in basic human rights. So I accept your whole word 
and use of professional, because we are supposed to be professional soldiers. 
On that point, I will move on to your second point, where you gender ad-
visor in a certain mission failed a class. First of all, they should not have been 
there in the first place, because that is in-country, it is host nation. So I pose 
the question to you: If host nations are not carrying out that type of training, 
should they be allowed deploy[ing], in the first place? 
To my two military commanders, I put the question to both of you: In Chad, 
the European Union, the method we introduced there was with focal points down 
at the lowest level. We are all talking about senior level. Yes you have to have 
it by and in the senior level, but it will be operational at a very, very low level. 
So if you concentrate too much on the higher level, you will actually loose out 
at the lower level, because of a lot of the higher level places end up just ticking 
a box for the national action plans. So what I would propose, that not alone at 
lower level, but that daily reports, weekly reports, multiple reports, the whole 
issue of gender based violence should be a paragraph, it should be one of our 
main paragraphs along with the operational and other briefs that we make. I 
will welcome comments on that. Thank you.
Col. Anthony Atolagbe:
I quite appreciate your contribution, and I also know that it is not in every cir-
cumstance that the senior leaders are usually held responsible. For example as 
I speak to you, we sent a patrol out, sometime in the month of April, and this 
patrol could not get to their destination. They were supposed to go and locate 
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a site, speak to the local community on how to get a team site there, but the 
local police officials stopped them. They turned back, but on their way back, 
they had a flat tire. One of the militia groups appeared on them and they had 
a discussion in which they requested for money and some few things and the 
patrol gave them the leftover of their food.
A report came and the minister of foreign affairs said that the soldiers who 
went on patrol so-and-so date were giving help to the other militia men and 
that they were seriously  against that. This called for a very serious handling at 
the force headquarters. The force commander had to insist that an investigation 
be conducted. This is not related to sexual violence though, but I am trying to 
relate it to a situation where there is a failure in command, because it is not the 
force commander who actually goes on patrol. The FC found that there was 
some laxity on the part of the commander in this particular incident. As planned 
by the force headquarters, I think, the commander might be repatriated. We 
have had some other issues of repatriation which the mission has had to apply 
in order to show its displeasure. 
The essence of some of these actions is not only to punish, but to see the 
seriousness on the part of the mission itself and to pass it to the commanders 
on the ground. Additionally, if you are given assets or work, surely you are 
supposed to go there and deliver and not for you to start negotiating any posi-
tion the militias. So I believe that, as much as the senior commanders are held 
responsible, the junior ones also have got to be responsible for their actions. 
Thank you.
Major Fred Tanner:
An answer to the first gentleman’s question in regards to how to address the 
training issue in the beginning. I do not disagree, I would encourage it to keep 
gathering lessons learned and incorporate it in the feedback we receive from 
those who are returning from the field. I think we are on the level gradually now 
where we can be specific towards the AO’s, especially when you are talking 
about special forces who routinely return to the same AO’s. Certainly, based 
upon how progressive an area will be, will be dependent upon how in the lay, 
for a lack of a better term, gender violence will be. I guess the point I was try-
ing to make in discussing this is, in the course of my pre-deployment training, 
I would probably go through a dozen counter-IED-lanes before I did with only 
one either child or violence or whatever, and not that there should be – I am 
not saying that it should be one-for-one, but there needs to be a better balance. 
That is what I would pass to you. 
In regards to the second question from the gentleman in the rear, I am not 
sure I grasped your exact question. I think your point had something to do in 
regards to example setting, and specifically towards Abu Graib and the native 
percussions from information operations perspective, given the enemy the abi-
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lity to exploit misconduct like the US soldiers conducted during Abu Graib. It 
is very easy for me here, within the confines of these walls, to get up here and 
say this is what we should do. It is a different story when you get there on the 
ground. I am in no way confining what those soldiers’ actions were. No one, 
and I can say this, no one was more embarrassed than us service members that 
were serving in the country at the time, who had been risking our lives on a 
daily basis, to have that respected that we garnered to disappear in the course 
of a couple of photographs due to the lack of judgment of some individuals. 
No one is more aggravated by that then those of us who are honorably serving. 
What we can only continue to do, is train and keep our forces as professional 
as possible. 
Finally, for the last question in the back in regards to NATO senior leader 
buy-in (getting senior leaders to recognize and support gender violence is-
sues). Sir, I could not agree more of what you are saying. I think we are saying 
exactly the same thing. My point is that until senior leaders think it is impor-
tant, junior leaders are not going to care. Ultimately, you are right. It is not the 
senior leaders that deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis, it is the junior 
leaders that need to, so when I described that perfect end-state, I am referring 
to a lieutenant on patrol, or sergeant on patrol, that is put in that situation in a 
training environment where he can be taught, they have a coach teacher and 
mentor and all that.
Mia Bloom:
I was going to jump in, if that is OK, to two of the points that you made. One 
about how do you protect various vulnerable communities, whereas I think it is 
important that we understand that precisely because military forces are becoming 
immune to certain kinds of attacks, they can harden their targets. There are huge 
incentives on the part of various and certain groups and terrorist groups to use 
younger and younger operators. So with something that requires training, but 
it is also something that will also require additional PTSD, psychological sup-
port, because it will be infinitely more difficult on soldiers who are ordinarily 
trained to protect women and children to have to start shooting them. 
So it is going to have to be a set of standard operating procedure across 
multiple military organizations, because there will be instances when you are 
not sure if the child is involved. Perhaps they are look-outs. But there will 
absolutely be cases where the child is wearing and IED and how do you disa-
ble the IED and not necessarily completely kill the child. What we are seeing 
coming out of Pakistan is maddrassahs that are specifically geared to getting 
the children to become suicide bombers. This is unlike anything we have seen 
before, where let us say for instance, the children grow up in ethnic conflicts 
and engage in an organization as a look out or a porter, then when they are 
older, they become more and more involved and they go in active service after 
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they are 16-17. These are children that are being deployed at a very young age 
and they have absolutely no concept of what they are doing. And they have no 
fear, because they are kids. 
These are things that we have started to see in Afghanistan, where a six-
year-old was told ”just put this on and go and find some ANA soldiers and 
blow up”. Juma Gul was his name. Even he knew that there was something not 
right about this scenario. In fact, he was able to get the IED taken off of him 
and he was embraced and lauded by President Karzai for his quick thinking. 
What this was also useful for, was that the whole Pashtun Wali of his village, 
who had never worked previously with NATO troops, completely switched 
and started to work with the NATO troops, because they was so outraged by 
the manipulation of a child at the age of six. 
On a separate issue with information operations – and this is again where I 
am not in the military so it is easy for me to say – I think it is a very good thing 
to have the military, instead of try to hide an Abu Graib  or the act of Steven 
Green is to make it very public, for two reasons. First of all to be a deterrent 
for any other soldiers who might think that there is a culture in which they can 
get away with it, that there is a culture of permissiveness that allows them to 
do, you know, ”boys will be boys”. But it is also important in the country for 
them to see that people are being punished. I think the worst thing that can 
happen, is with the military tribunals a feeling that things might be under the 
rug, and that there is really no justice. So, again, it is something to consider, it 
is definitely not the proudest moment and I would definitely agree that these are 
shameful things for the military, but at the same time it should be made public 
in a way that at least validates in the country people seeing, ”oh, you mean the 
people from Blackwater do not just get off, because the rules of evidence do 
not transfer from Iraq to the beltway. So I think that there are two things going 
on, but with information operations it is something that the military needs to 
do a better job.
Ragnhild Nordås:
I think there were some interesting things that were brought up here that we 
could think about. One thing that was mentioned was the professionalism. 
Although I am not a military person, I understand that in fact maybe militaries 
actually have an advantage in terms of dealing with these issues, because mili-
tary organizations have been built as hierarchical organizations with discipline 
and professionalisms being two sides of the same coin. I agree in what was said 
here about when the top leaders and the commanders do not have internalized 
it and do not believe this is important, then it will not trickle down. But it will 
trickle down if actually the commanders are onboard and can say this and live 
by these principles in their own combat. 
So, in a way, military organizations might have an advantage in dealing 
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with this. And I think it is very impressive what I have heard today about the 
training and how you set up the scenarios. There seems to be a lot of potential, 
actually, for having this as a part of the training. I do not think that there is 
any point of us assuming or believing that we need to have these long sorts of 
philosophical debates within the militaries about gender in general, or spend 
a lot of time on deep discussions about it. These are very standardized proce-
dures and behaviors that can very easily, I think, be incorporated into the daily 
practices and the training, and that it should not take that more time. Not being 
in the military it seems to me that it can actually be quite easily added on to the 
existing training without too much ado.  I do not know if you in the military 
disagree with that? I would be very interested to hear what you think about that 
with the actual experience that you have.
Marsha Henry:
Just on the first issue of gender issues being a priority, or certain gender issues 
being a priority, the project that some of the examples that I gave came from a 
project that I was working on that began in 2003, which was specifically to look 
at the issue of sexual exploitation abuse by peacekeepers at a variety of contexts. 
We found that everywhere we went, nobody wanted to talk about gender, and it 
was not just because it was a taboo subject. It was actually because, for a lot of 
people, it was not the main thing that they wanted to convey about their security 
experiences. So when talking to both peacekeepers and local communities, they 
had a whole host of other issues that of course have gender consequences and 
are connected with all sorts of gender issues. We could do a gender analysis of 
them, so it ended up that in the results of our research project we very much 
tried to honor what people were telling us. Some scholars have argued that a 
focus on for example male on female violence in particular in conflict zones 
also can be seen as a distraction, or can be used as a distraction, from other 
kinds of violence that are taking place that do not have a specific gender nature 
to them or other kind of incidents. For example, one of the issues that came up, 
significantly in every single mission we visited, was examples of corruption, 
both within the military and local organizations. These also have very specific 
gender consequences, so it is not to detract from that.
In terms of the professional skills, I will give you an example. One of the 
things that has consistently come up in this discussion again around sexual 
exploitation and abuse – I am just using this as an example – by peacekeepers, 
is that there has been this discussion amongst some practitioners, that not just 
that boys will be boys, but what do we do with groups of men who are deployed 
for a six months’ to a year, who do not have any access to consensual sex? 
I think this is a real problem. If we think about it in relation to professional 
obligations and professional responsibilities, I doubt we would have the same 
discussion about another professional group who was contracted. Although, 
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that is not necessarily to say that there are not necessarily engaging in sexual 
exploitation and abuse. But I think the kind of professional expectations that 
we have of soldiers, I think it is perfectly legitimate to expect them not to be 
engaged in activities that go against their own codes of conduct. I do not think 
that we need to necessarily provide them with more internet access in the hope 
that they will not rape local women or be engaged in other kinds of forbidden 
activities. So I think this issue of professionalization is very important.
 I also think that there is an additional problem which is that sometimes 
peacekeepers and soldiers tend to use other national military groups as a kind 
of scapegoat for practices and problems, so they might say that ”in our military 
we have dealt with this through whatever means, but that military over there or 
that group of peacekeepers over there are still involved in various activities” or 
”they are not promoting gender, because their culture does not promote that set 
of gender beliefs”. I think that in peacekeeping missions it is very dangerous 
for us to divide these different forms of masculinity along cultural or national 
lines. I think we have to be quite careful to acknowledge violence both within 
military institutions and violence outside of them and look at the variation in 
those.
Q:
Thank you for allowing me to have the final question to the panel. This mor-
ning we heard a quote from Dag Hammarskiöld saying that ”peacekeeping is 
not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it”. He is famous for another 
statement that we do not hear so often: ”If you want to know do what is going 
on, ask the women”. It is a pity that that quote is not as used as the first one. 
But never mind. A takeaway, I think, in terms of what the military can do, that 
is known but is worth restating, is that if you want to have control of your 
operational area, or as much control as you can have, and if you want to do a 
conflict analysis properly, you can never know if you have enough information. 
But you can always, or very often, make sure that you speak to everyone. And 
this is something that cannot be underestimated. Make sure that you speak to 
all communities, all stakeholders, all the groups vulnerable or not, and both 
sexes. Then it becomes a national standard operational procedure to speak to 
anyone, but to everyone. It does not become a gender issue, which also helps 
in what was just previously discussed, whether we make everything into a 
gender issue, but to include to make sure that we speak to everyone. Because 
we have different views. And this is all known, but I think it is worth mentio-
ning again, in terms of takeaways for the military, that everyone has a bit of 
the whole picture, and to listen to everyone. This is more a comment than a 
question. Thank you very much.
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What do we know about sexual haras-
sment in the armed forces?
Captain René Hudribusch, Austrian Department of Defense and Sport
First of all I want to say thank you to Anita and Cecilie for the invitation and 
for giving me the chance to speak in front of this audience. I also want to say 
congratulations to you both and also to Lena and Ole for the organization of 
this event. I know how difficult it is and how much work it is, and you make 
a perfect job. Thank you for this.
I would like to start my presentation with a sentence: “If we do not talk about 
a problem, it doesn’t exist!” Because it looks if this is the way many organi-
zations deal with the sexual harassment within their organization, especially 
against female employees. The attempt to ignore the problem and to negate the 
existence supports the offender and offends the victims. Sexual harassment is 
by no means a phenomenon which you will find only in a certain organization. 
No, it can happen anywhere. Therefore, sexual harassment is also a problem 
within military organization. This is the reason why the Austrian Ministry 
of Defence started a campaign against workplace aggression in the Austrian 
armed forces. Sexual harassment in military organization is still a taboo issue 
and therefore you will find just a little research on this topic. The reason for 
the limited number of research could be:
• The attempt not to admit the issue. (Organizational taciturnity)
• The shame which victims feel to talk about it. (Individual taciturnity)
• Coping strategies of female soldiers. (Therapeutic taciturnity)
A huge problem which I found out during my research was the fact that obvi-
ously the vast majority of the people under scrutiny does not know about sexual 
harassment and what it actually means. To specify sexual harassment you can 
use at least two ways. You can do it by explaining it, how it is defined by the 
national or international law, or you try to explain which methods of sexual 
harassment the offenders unconsciously or consciously apply.
Methods of sexual harassment could be for example posters of pinups and 
pornographic material in the working areas around the PC, to peep at someone, 
jokes with sexual content, gamy notes about the figure or sexual notes, unrequ-
ested invitation with a determinate aim, phone calls, letters, emails with sexual 
notes, advantages in the organization after sexual concession or the other way 
round, that you have disadvantages in the organization after sexual refusing, 
touch, request for sexual acts, or exhibitionism. Already a long list, but still 
not everything was told.
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Very often sexual harassment is linked to physical touches or a request for 
sexual acts, but sexual harassment starts much more on a subtle and inconside-
rable level. You can observe male employees telling jokes with sexual content 
in front of female employees which could harm or humiliate the females and 
this is already sexual harassment. Gerstendörfer (1997) figured out that the 
speech is a kind of weapon, which offenders use selectively as sexual violence 
against females to harm and humble them. Hornscheidt (2005) explained the 
necessity to create a feminist speech to displace this sexist speech and to avoid 
the impression that the male population is always dominating the female one. 
Referring to Gerstendörfer (1997) and Hornscheidt (2005), there is a need for 
more education within the organizations to raise the awareness that sexual 
harassment is not only the physical touch, it is also the speech. Especially in 
military organizations the use of misogynic speech is omnipresent. By giving 
weak soldiers or weapons female names the organization supports the sexist 
speech against females, it prevents the integration process and it supports 
sexual harassment. 
There are different reasons for sexual harassment in organizations. Steurentha-
ler (1994) and Wardetzki (2005) figured out that one of the reasons for sexual 
harassment within organizations is the attempt of the organization to bear po-
wer over the women and to follow own interests. Because of this exercise of 
power the women in organizations are not self-determined and controlled by 
the patriarchy. Sexual harassment as a method of the exercise of power gives 
a single offender or a group the possibility to discriminate and to terrorize the 
victim and push him or her out of the organization. Therefore it could be pos-
sible that male soldiers use sexual harassment as a method of bullying to push 
female soldiers out of the organization to keep it a male-only organization.
Now I would like to give some examples of sexual harassment 
cases,workplace aggression and bullying in the armed forces of different nations.
USA1991 the Tailhook scandal in the US Armed Forces shocked the Ame-
rican society about the conditions within the organization. During an annual 
event of the Naval Aviation Association Tailhook it comes to sexual harassment 
against female soldiers in a form which was not known before.Men touched 
women, ripped the clothes of their body and the male soldiers wore t-shirts 
with the slogan “females are property”. Despite the scandal and the media at-
tention there was no justice for the women. No one of the offenders assumed 
responsibility, they only got a warning or a fine.
Williams, a female US soldier who fought in the Gulf War wrote a book 
about her experiences and sexual harassment of female soldiers by male soldi-
ers. During her duty in the mission male soldiers solicited sex or offered her 
money to undress herself in front of them. Jokes with sexual content or sexual 
allusions were on the agenda every day. 
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Israel, Levy (2003) describes in her research the role of female soldiers wit-
hin the Israeli Defence Force as a sexual object. High-ranking officers choose 
female soldiers based on their look and treat them like a trophy. Very often 
sexual relationships arise between these high-ranking officers and the female 
soldiers, which became a central issue in the media, but they always discussed 
about the women and not about the men. So you get the impression that this 
misbehaviour is only in the responsibility of the women and not of the men.
Russia. Eifler specifies in her paper 2003 the role of female soldiers in the 
Russian Army and the problem of sexual harassment. Because of the high 
pressure due to the bad economic situation, female soldiers try to ignore sexual 
harassment or to take advantage of the situation in order not to lose the job or 
to face a complaint by the refused offender
Germany, Kümmel (2005) determined the opening of the German Armed 
Forces for women and observed bullying against female soldiers. Women be-
came very often victims of gossip and misogynic jokes. 
Concerning sexual harassment and bullying in the Austrian Armed Forces 
I wrote a PhD Thesis of my own accord to do a research in this interesting and 
unexplored field. Despite considerable effort on the part of the Austrian govern-
ment to recruit females into the military, still there is the need to take more care 
about this topic and especially in research. Policy makers state that physical 
limits are the primary reason for high female drop-out rates. Several scholars 
indicate that the masculine and androcentric culture of military organizations 
coupled with the token status of female soldiers and gendered role attributions 
impede full integration and leave women in a weak position. The underlying 
hypothesis of my study is that conflicts rooted in the military culture with its 
diverse gender constructions result in workplace aggression and eventually 
cause high female drop-out rates. 
In a survey in seven sub-units of the Austrian Armed Forces with a sample 
size of 443 persons I used standardized instruments to measure workplace 
aggression and specific culture types and attitudes toward women. My results 
show that women are more often affected by bullying than men, and all vic-
tims of bullying allege that they faced more than one offender. These results 
suggest that bullying and aggressive behavior against women is a collective 
phenomenon, unconsciously motivated/induced by micro-political differences 
rather than individually caused. Furthermore, I find significant relationships 
between perceived cultures, attitudes towards women and aggressive behavior.
Concerning sexual harassment within the Austrian Armed Forces I observed 
gender discrimination as a more significant problem than sexual harassment. 
But we have to keep in mind, that this result could be influenced by the shame 
of the victims to talk about this problem and especially in a military organiza-
tion. There was one case of sexual harassment in my research and the victim 
and the offender was a man. So we can see that sexual harassment in military 
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organizations is not obligatory a problem of females in the role of the victims. 
It can also happen to the male soldiers as well.
After my PhD thesis and the publishing of the findings, 2011 the Austrian 
armed forces started an information campaign within the Forces with the topic 
“bullying”. With this campaign the male and female soldiers should get sensi-
tized about bullying against soldiers, especially against female soldiers. With 
lectures and discussion rounds the soldiers receive information on the topic and 
also the possibility to get them self-heard and to receive contact addresses for 
face-to-face talks or further support. I’m sure that this campaign will improve 
the situation of female soldiers within the Austrian Armed Forces and this is the 
first step in the right direction to fight against bullying and sexual harassment. 
Concluding we have to say with certain constraints that there must be a 
stronger focus of military organizations on the problem of sexual harassment 
and bullying within the organization. There is the need of further research if 
we want to understand the problem and to change the situation to make the 
working environment a safe place for all members. Therefore every country 
needs a stronger support by their MOD to do more academic research, to talk 
openly about the problem, which can occur in every organization, and to estab-
lish measures to avoid sexual harassment in the organization and to support 
the victims. Thank you.
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How military culture affects the handling 
and responding of sexual violence
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, PhD, University of Tromsø
I also wish to thank the organizers very much for allowing me to present during 
this really interesting conference. I want to pose two questions: How does mili-
tary culture affect the handling and responding to sexual violence? This question, 
I would suggest, requires us to understand some of the key elements influencing 
Norwegian military culture, one important element of which is masculinity. 
Thus the following question looks like this: Can an improved understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the Norwegian, masculine-influenced, mi-
litary culture be used to enhance gender awareness in international operations, 
with the expected result that it will increase operational effectiveness by using 
knowledge, skills and logical ready present in the military system?
I do not yet have the answer to this question, but I would like to argue that 
this aspect has not been adequately investigated for its value to operational ef-
fectiveness. This is important because it is about using knowledge, skills and 
practices that already exist within the system, that emerge as a part of constant 
training and exercise. What I would like to focus on are some techniques that I 
have been learning and discussing with other colleagues to potentially enhance 
capacities within the military to deal with gender issues.
The background for what I am going to be talking about, comes from the 
research I have been doing on civil-military interaction, particularly here in 
Norway and based in many interviews– very many interviews, not just with 
people working with civil-military interaction generally speaking where gender 
awareness plays one of its most crucial roles, but also with people working in 
gender specifically. It is also based on collaborative work with people at the 
Swedish armed forces’ joint development and experimentation centre, as well 
as work that I have done in the multi-national Experiment 6 on cultural awa-
reness, that was part of the Norwegian delegation to that particular effort. In 
combination I have gathered a lot of input, a lot of it interviews, a lot of it also 
very anecdotal, but I think rather interesting stuff that maybe can contribute 
towards supporting the efforts of integrating a gender awareness in the military.
My work is generally speaking in security studies, so I look at a lot of these 
issues through a security framework. This particular discussion takes a look at 
this from a multi-actor security perspective, where we have multiple security 
perspectives that are relevant in specific contexts and trying to gain awareness 
about that. I also focus on a civil-military context - again, this is a multi-actor 
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context - and the tensions between protecting civilians while being warriors 
at the same time. 
I want to step back from a focus on sexual violence and looking at gender 
awareness more broadly speaking and specifically in terms of masculinity, but 
then return to see how this impacts our understanding of sexual violence in 
military space. I want to take a look at is masculinity and the ways in which we 
can understand military expertise and training in this particular area.
In these interviews and discussions, generally, which I have had with people 
about gender, I experienced what can be called “moments”, I would say – or 
snapshots – that I have come across either at gender conferences or in intervi-
ews or just general discussions. For example, at a gender-and-military focused 
conference last year, one particular officer who was not part of the conference, 
saw that there is this gender conference going on at a location in Holland, where 
I was at, and he was just whipping by. He however took the opportunity and 
purposefully just looked at me and said: Gender is also about men, you know! 
And that was it. He was a little bit pissed off, actually – which gave, of course, 
his impression of what he thought that we were talking about. That was one 
snapshot, and that is not the first time I have ever heard that kind of comment. 
Another time I was talking with an international group of military personnel, 
mostly Spanish, and we started talking about masculinity. It was all men, and 
they were talking about their impressions of masculinity, and speaking rather 
positively about it, associating masculinity with characteristics like strength, 
intelligence, discipline, leadership and so forth. Some of the guys said: ”Can 
we say that?” They were expressing their views on masculinity and were very 
unsure: ”Is that not like taboo for me, to admit this kind of thinking about it?” 
That was rather interesting that they were indeed uncertain about whether or 
not they could speak positively about their own views about masculinity (and 
femininity by the way).
Yet another example was in my discussions, talking to gender advisors. I 
was privileged enough to be able to go to Afghanistan and spoke to a number 
of gender advisors there. It was really interesting hearing some of them say: 
”I don’t actually focus a lot on gender, not least because I can’t” – in other 
words, coming down to ”we have this position called gender advisor, but we do 
not have the funding for it”. We have the position, but it is not prioritized. We 
want to try to develop FETs, like the female engagement teams, but it is – like 
what was mentioned in the previous session – FETs cannot just be breasts in 
a uniform, you need to have people who are trained to operate as FETs. Just 
having women who actually have other types of jobs, have absolutely no trai-
ning; cannot operationalize gender in a way that apparently it is supposed to be 
done. That was more of the challenges. So the problems that were mentioned 
to me ranged from perceptions of this thing called “gender awareness” that 
was about teaching military men about women, to gender advisors (male and 
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female) that saw the relevance of the approach but did not have the adequate 
resources to really implement anything. This is not to say that all was negative, 
but these impressions (above) cannot be dismissed or ignored. The benefits 
about a gender perspective were usually in terms of information Intel. If we 
talked to women we get 50 per cent more Intel about the area. However, not 
everyone understands even this benefit.
I have received comments from people in higher levels of command structu-
res that say: ”This stuff is useless, but we have to do it”. There we get that politi-
cal correct thing going on. Among some female personnel interesting responses 
also included: ”That does not represent me”. Because often the gender rhetoric 
when targeting women sometimes makes women who are military operators 
feel like they are subjected to a specific picture about women, a vulnerable 
distinction which focuses negative attention on female military practitioners. 
So it is a very interesting topic, this business about gender. Although we 
have acknowledged here that it is not just about women, it is also about men, 
quite often we slide into that comfort zone, where we just talk about women.
At the moment there are a lot of efforts to try to increase gender awareness. 
There are many challenges in these efforts, but it is actually increasing. I see 
that not just from what have been discussed here, but also being aware of dif-
ferent courses that are made available. What is interesting to me is that there 
is not a very strong focus on masculinity and on military culture, which is a 
strange lack of focus, in my view. The reframing process that I want to talk 
about here is meant to complement and assist these sorts of efforts of including 
an understanding of the role of masculinity.
Why am I going to start talking about reframing and about masculinity? I 
want to take a look at how gender is generally perceived. This you can find in 
a lot of material like reports about ’how well are we doing gender integrating?’ 
and ’is it functioning on the ground?’  There are two sort of main critiques that 
I have taken away from a lot of these sorts of reports. The first is that gender 
is an uncomfortable subject in the military, not least because in these discus-
sions the military is often the focus of critique; not least that military culture is 
criticized due to its masculinity roots, for linkages between masculine approac-
hes and violence, and not least sexual violence. As well, the focus on gender 
integration is often considered in relation to military work but not always in a 
clear way. We have heard some other talk about this, as well, where the whole 
thing is ”We are doing war fighting, and a lot of this gender stuff belongs to 
the civilian domain”. Again, I am looking at the civil-military context where 
gender awareness is particularly relevant for military actors since there are 
times where civilian actors are not present; there are only military actors on 
the ground in a particular situation or in a particular operations area. So it is a 
necessity to have a certain amount of knowledge about what will be required 
in that operations area. 
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So the context that I have been looking at, as I have mentioned now, frequen-
tly is a civil-military context. It is not just about winning the war, soldier against 
soldier, but it is ensuring that civilians in particular are as little negatively affec-
ted as possible, and that during an operation both prior to, during, and after, that 
the concerns of civilians are going to be addressed. Because otherwise – really 
quite frankly – you will get a backlash. If civilian needs and civilian security is 
inadequately addressed, there can be repercussions in that civilians will respond 
negatively towards those military operations, that military, in the future. This 
is also a multi-actor security environment with various political mandates. I 
want to stress that about the various political mandates, because the ways in 
which militaries have to assess their civil-military situation depends also on the 
mandate. It could be responsibility to protect, could be part of the mandate, it 
could be a peacekeeping mandate, it could be a regime change/regime change 
support, a little bit like Afghanistan. There is a difference when militaries are 
there on the ground by consent of all parties versus their being on the ground 
and fighting some of the parties. So the dynamics change the relationship of 
the military operator to that environment, so the civilian environment can be 
very different, depending on the political mandate.
What role does masculinity play in all of this? Military culture is considered 
to be very much characterized by masculine values and masculine practices 
or ways of doing things. Actually, a lot of the literature on masculinity and the 
military focus on looking at this masculine culture in a rather negative light. I 
have just pulled off a couple of quotations here that take a look at the linkages 
between certain masculine values and practices in relationship to values. That 
includes largely things that are demeaning to women and to encourage promis-
cuity and encourages sexual violence. At the same time, there has been some 
interesting work – and again there has not been so much done on masculinity, 
but what has been done and more recently, is that we do not recognize the mul-
tiplicity of masculinities within the military cultural framework. We see that in 
civilian culture; there is a multiplicity of masculinities. And we have exactly the 
same thing in military culture. We are not able through the above analyses or 
assessments illustrated by the quotes, to actually explain the behavior of military 
personnel who do not act out, who do not use aggression, who are not sexually 
violent individuals and do not act out in terms of a hyper-masculine approach. 
Therefore, the purpose here is to take a look at in what ways can we use 
masculinity, can we dig into military culture and its basis in masculine values 
to be able to support positively gender roles and also gender analysis, using 
knowledge, skills and practices which actually comes from the military sys-
tem/culture itself. If we agree that there are linkages between masculinity and 
military culture (and considerable research has explored this connection), how 
do we address some of the current conclusions, which look negatively upon 
this relationship? Does this mean militaries should work against masculinity 
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and the practices associated with it? If we are going to say that masculinity is 
the problem, are we going to eliminate it from military culture? If we do that, 
we remove a core element of military culture. And that is not very likely or 
practical. There are a lot of those characteristics that are actually necessary 
to military functioning. There are gender practices already in place, with or 
without courses in gender to guide these practices. For example in key leader 
engagement, identifying leadership is a gendered practice. You will find out who 
has got the power in the area. More than likely you are doing a gender analysis 
already without really thinking really about it, but automatically seek out older 
men in the community (as a starting point). Wearing beards – in Afghanistan 
so many of the soldiers are going around in beards. That is a gendered prac-
tice – showing respect to the male portion of the community, using gendered 
practices to gain better access to certain people. So that is in the analysis: How 
am I going to connect with this community in a better way? How am I going to 
show my respect? That is a very gendered practice.  As well as the identification 
of combatants; who do I think are the combatants on the ground? That is also 
a gendered analysis. 
The thing is that we need a better understanding of the ways in which 
multiple masculinities operate in the military to try to generate the attitudes 
that we apparently want. If we recall the Minister of Defense; she talked about 
changing attitudes in the military to be more gender friendly. This process that 
I am talking about, is trying to look for what attitudes already exist that we can 
actually draw on, that will exist within military culture. These might be in the 
type of masculine characteristics which are not so often in focus, and have been 
mentioned a little bit now, like characteristics such as protection, responsibility, 
leadership, honor, discipline, professionalism. These are aspects that should be 
encouraged within the military. The military has these already. In what ways 
can we encourage these characteristics, often associated with masculinity as 
well, to support a stronger gender analytical framework? This has to be done 
in cooperation with militaries themselves and not from outside sources.
Essentially, what the ideas here is, is taking the departure point that military 
personnel are already gender experts. They are operating in a very gendered 
institution (not only is it male dominated by that the organization operates on 
what are strongly considered to be masculine characteristics and values), and 
in what way can we use the knowledge that lies there already, that is ingrained 
within each soldier and officer and has been a part of training and practices 
since “day one”, and from there attempt to have a better gender understanding 
of what sort of knowledge the military already use which can be used to enhance 
their own gender/cultural/civil-military situational awareness.
I will just mention the first goal of using the self-awareness of military 
culture masculinity as a tool for situational awareness on the ground. That 
way military actors can analyze and adjust gender awareness according to the 
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context. Because at the end of the day, no matter how many documents one gets 
on like 1325 and this and the other – one moment you should not shake hands 
with women, but another moment you can shake hands with women – military 
operators are going to have to figure this out on their own in a specific context. 
Therefore, it has to be driven in training right from the start. What better than to 
use the military culture they already have to try to enforce this type of training?
There is a process that I have been working with our Swedish colleagues 
on framing and reframing. What that is, is to try to find out what values and 
practices lie within military culture, actually be open about military culture, 
what it is all about? What are the masculine aspects about military culture? 
What are the ways in which we take a look at other organizations, also non-
military organizations (such as NGOs), and what sorts of characteristics do 
they have or do we judge them by? Are those also masculine characteristics, or 
not? – Through reframing we try to get a sense of how we are actually framing 
our world with regards to assumptions about gender. And also understand how 
military themselves are projecting out to the civilian environment in which 
they are working. 
Essentially, the idea is to strengthen positive masculine characteristics. 
Militaries get masculinity. This is something that is a part of the system and 
therefore can be used to recognize patterns of activities amongst actors. It can 
help challenge preconceptions about civilian environment and as well increase 
civilian situational awareness, help with force protection, protection of civilians, 
and create alternative ways of communicating. Some areas where this would be 
most useful – we are talking about the top leadership, that is definitely the case, 
but Intel, CIMIC, PST ops – I might just add as a little ploy – CIMIC actually 
has many functions that are very similar to what the gender advisors have, so 
here we have an opportunity to make use of already established functions to 
try to encourage a stronger gender awareness.
Thank you.
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The effects associated with sexual assault 
and combat
Nathan Galbreath, PhD, MFS. Department of Defense
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
Hi, my name is Nate Galbreath.  As with the previous speakers, the opinions 
that I express do not necessarily represent the official policy of the United 
States Department of Defense. 
That being said, since we have been talking about the theoretical today, I 
thought I would give you a little bit of the applied focus of a program to prevent 
and respond to gender based violence. Certainly, the Department of Defense 
and United States in general has its share of problems with inappropriate sexual 
behavior. It seems to be the main topic of conversation recently. By the way, for 
those of you who were wondering, Representative Wiener did resign today. So 
it appears there will be no more “sexting” from the House of Representatives.
I thought I should talk to you a little bit about our sexual assault prevention 
and response program and its background, research about sexual assault and 
combat, and then give you some key program points. I am certainly not going to 
be able to cover everything, but I should be able to give you a quick overview.
The Department of Defense has a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response 
program largely because in 2004 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld began to get 
messages from downrange in Iraq and Afghanistan that our sexual assault vic-
tims were not being cared for in a way that they should be. So he put together a 
task force, which is typically how we do things in the Department of Defense: if 
you have a problem, you create a task force to address the problem and suggest 
solutions and recommendations. He put together The Care for Victims Task 
Force, and they took a ninety-day look at what we were doing in the Department 
of Defense in response to sexual assault by and against US Service members. 
All of the four military services – the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and 
the Air Force – had programs in place to assist victims of sexual assault, but 
what we did not have was an overarching departmental policy, nor did we have 
one that necessarily reflected best practices of the civilian world. 
Based on the recommendations of the Care for Victims Task Force, the 
Department created another task force, the JTF – Joint Task Force - on Sexual 
Assault Prevention Response. The JTF existed for a year, took the recommen-
dations from the Care for Victims Task Force, and created the DoD policy on 
sexual assault prevention and response. The JTF eventually turned into the 
sexual assault office that I’m representing today. I was the first military de-
puty director of the office, and I assisted the Director, Kaye Whitley, for about 
three years. The JTF transitioned into a permanent office, the Sexual Assault 
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Prevention and Response Office –SAPRO --in October 2005.  For the first two 
years, we put together a number of different policies to improve our response to 
victims. For example, we established improved training programs for criminal 
investigators and prosecutors.  In addition, we created specialized positions that 
specifically take care of victims on our military installations all over the world. 
After we took those initial steps, we realized that we should really be looking 
at the problem of sexual assault itself. While we can always improve how we 
take care of victims, there should really be no victims in the first place. There 
just should not be any at all. So we began to turn our focus to prevention in 2007. 
We contacted the experts in the United States that really were at the forefront 
of some of this work and got them together. I made them sit in the room for 
three days in Washington DC and I would not let them out until they crafted a 
prevention strategy for the Department. In 2008 we began to put the strategy 
in place. That is essentially the history of our program. 
Just to let you know about the hierarchy of our programs, the office that I 
represent, the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, sits within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are only a couple of steps down from – 
at least as far as our organizational structure goes – our senior leadership, and 
we try to brief our program information to them often. You may have noticed 
that Secretary Panetta, our new Secretary of Defense, just went through his 
confirmation hearings last week, and one of the questions posed to him, of 
course, was on sexual assault. Each of the military departments has their own 
headquarters level sexual assault prevention and response office, staffed by a 
program manager.
Just in case you were curious, I gave you the references for each of our policy 
documents that cover our sexual assault programs. If you go to http://www.
militaryhomefront.dod.mil, you can download each one of these documents. 
DoD Directive 6495.01 and DoD Instruction 6495.02 are the Department of 
Defense policy documents that address the Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response Programs.  While the Services must all follow this published policy, 
they have written corresponding policy documents that implement the policy 
at their Service level.  You may obtain the Service policies by searching for 
them at the militaryhomefront.dod.mil website.
At the core of this programs a concept that promotes prevention of sexual 
assault. It is DOD policy to prevent sexual assault by establishing a culture 
where prevention thrives, where response and accountability all work together, 
and where we work to ensure the safety and wellbeing of all of our Service 
members. That is not just our people in uniform; those are families, kids, civilian 
workers, and contractors as well. 
A little bit about research on sexual assault. The inquiry I often get when I 
lecture is: ”How does the military sector to the civilian sector? The press sug-
gests that the military has a worse problem than the civilian population – aren’t 
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conditions in the military horrible?” The answer is yes and no.  Sexual assault, 
regardless of context is horrible.  However, there are some protective factors 
associated with the US Armed Forces, and there are circumstances that make 
the US military more difficult for sexual assault victims. There is really no 
other way to answer that. To demonstrate this to you, I have taken some natio-
nal US studies, tried to break them down to their components, and identified 
some points of comparability. There are some reasons for why Department of 
Defense statistics look a little bit higher than sexual assault statistics for the 
general population, and I will show you those in just a second. However, one 
caution is that the military and civilian sectors aren’t really comparable.  The 
US Armed Forces are indeed a subset of the US society, but we have a different 
legal system, a unique culture, a much younger population, and a number of 
other key differences that make such comparisons problematic at best.
One of the classic studies that was done in the late 1990’s on the incidence 
and prevalence of sexual assault in the United States was done by Tjaden and 
Thoennes. It was called the National Violence Against Women Study. They 
found that, in the United States in the twelve months prior to being surveyed, 
0.3 percent of women and 0.1 percent of men indicated they had experienced 
an attempted and/or completed rape, which was defined as oral, vaginal or anal 
penetration. Those are the behaviors that they asked about. 
My active duty population is a little bit different. We researchers do not 
all match our studies when we do them and so we pose our questions a little 
bit different. Every four years we draw a sample of about 100 000 military 
members, with a 25-33 percent response rate. We ask how many of them expe-
rienced an attempted or completed incident of unwanted sexual contact in the 
twelve months prior to the survey. An incident of unwanted sexual contact is 
oral, vaginal or anal penetration, plus unwanted sexual touching. So essentially 
it is a much broader question than what was asked in the National Violence 
Against Women Study. As a result, the Department has more people endorsing 
the problem -- it is more inclusive than the NVAWS. We found that 4.4 percent 
of women on active duty and 0.9 percent of men on active duty said they had 
experienced unwanted sexual contact. As you see, there is a wide difference 
between the two studies. 
What contributes to this difference in incidence rates? Thinking about the 
demographics of the US Armed Forces, who comprises most of the active duty 
force? 18-25 year olds. This is also the demographic where most sexual assaults 
occur in both the military and civilian sectors.  As a result, it makes sense that 
the US Armed Forces has a higher incidence rate of sexual assault than does 
the US population in general.  
There is additional research that indicates that the US Armed Forces are on 
par with the civilian population, when you look at this age 18 to 25 year-olds 
group. Another study was done more recently by Dean Kilpatrick, who is our 
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national guru on studies of incidence and prevalence of sexual assault. He went 
out and surveyed a representative sample of both US women and college-aged 
women. About 1 percent of US women and – look at this – 5.2 percent of US 
college women experienced an attempted and/or completed rape (vaginal, oral 
or anal penetration) in the twelve months prior to the survey.  While the studies 
are indeed quite different, I think there is a convergence here in the data:  about 
4 to 5 percent of younger women experience a sexual assault each year.
That, then, is really the conversation we should be having in the US. Sexual 
assault is not just a military problem. Sexual assault is also a problem that kids 
going off to college .. at least in the United States .. face as well.  
Just to call out some differences between the studies, Kilpatrick used a 
bit narrower definition of sexual assault than what we use in the US military. 
Consequently, we are really comparing apples to oranges here. However, the 
bottom line is that these two statistics are really on par with each other. 
Let’s move on. In the US, about how many people currently are experiencing 
psychological trauma? The answer is about 3 to 4 percent.  However, over the 
lifetime, 10 percent of women and 5 percent of men experience post-traumatic 
stress disorder. 
What about the rates of PTSD in our troops that engages in warfare? What 
does that look like? We have some fairly good studies, and I have listed all the 
study sites on the slides. So feel free to look these up yourself. Back in 2004, 
our pre-combat rate of PTSD in four combat units that were studied in this one 
journal article was about 5 percent. This rate is largely on par with what we saw 
in the nation as a whole. However, after returning from their first deployment, 
about 12 percent had symptoms that would qualify for a PTSD diagnosis. We 
now expect that rate to be somewhat higher, given that people are on now on 
their third, fourth and fifth deployments. We have this expectation because 
of the findings of other research indicating that multiple exposures to trauma 
erode resiliency.
Another study found that, based on the pre- and post- deployment health 
assessments conducted on US military personnel, about 20 percent of our ac-
tive duty and about 40 percent of our reservists experienced a traumatic event 
and noted symptoms that would qualify them to see a mental health provider 
for screening. 
It is one thing to have symptoms of PTSD, but in order for it to be diag-
nosed; it must interfere with daily living. This next study conducted in 2010 
essentially found that about one-fifth of our guard and one-fifth of our active 
duty experience PTSD symptoms that interfere with daily living when they 
come back from combat. 
The US Department of Veterans Affairs takes a different approach than the 
Department of Defense when studying the problem of sexual assault in the 
military. Many of their surveys use the term Military Sexual Trauma.  Military 
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Sexual Trauma, or MST, captures both sexual assault and sexual harassment 
experienced throughout ones military career.  This is appropriate, as the mission 
of the VA is to treat people.  As a result, they cast a wider net with the term 
MST.  In the DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, we only 
report sexual assault statistics in our annual report to Congress. 
In this next study, the VA found that women who experienced military 
sexual trauma are about nine times more likely to have a diagnosis of PTSD. 
For males reporting MST,they are about three times more likely to experience 
PTSD than those that do not report MST. For both men and women, PTSD was 
just one of the problems associated with MST.  Male and female veterans who 
experienced MST were also two to three times more likely to have diagnoses 
relating to depression, anxiety and substance abuse.
This next study is a little more difficult to understand.  The authors asked 
respondents about their most upsetting trauma in their lifetime. If your most 
upsetting trauma was rape, then 46percent of women and 65 percent of men went 
on to develop a diagnosis of PTSD. If your most upsetting trauma was combat, 
about 40 percent of men went on to develop PTSD.  There were similar findings 
with molestation and physical abuse, but with lower rates of PTSD. But the 
surprising finding from this study was that more men than women developed 
PTSD from trauma associated with a rape. This study also indicates that that, 
for men, rape may also be more traumatic than combat. 
As a matter of fact, we see this phenomenon replicated in another study of 
Gulf War veterans.  This study found that men and women were more likely to 
develop PTSD from sexual assault than from high combat exposure.  Military 
people in this study were not just people who were in a deployed area.  Rather, 
these were people that were actually taking hostile fire. Once again, men who 
experienced a sexual assault were more likely to develop PTSD than women 
who experienced a sexual assault.
This next slide show that we have a large portion of people joining the US 
military with a history of sexual assault. 
This next study comes from a research program called the Millennium Study. 
It is being run out of San Diego, California. In the year 2000, the authors enrol-
led one hundred thousand active duty members to follow the impact of military 
life on health outcomes. This study will follow the participants for the next 
20 years. One of the first study findings was that any prior assault, whether it 
be physical or sexual, doubles the chance that you are going to develop post-
traumatic stress disorder when you are exposed to combat stress. So, if there is 
any reason for why you should have a sexual assault prevention and response 
program, I feel this is this reason. Victims of sexual assault should be offered 
treatment to restore some of the resilience that is lost through combat or through 
multiple exposures to violence. 
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Sexual assault has a number of implications for our warriors. Military people 
rarely come in for treatment or overtly say, ”I’m having problems.”  Rather, 
they are more likely to have problems that have to be assessed by behavioral 
observation, such as alcohol abuse, aggression towards self and others, and 
avoidance of traumatic memory cues.
In addition to that, military life can complicate the experience of sexual 
assault. Some complications are listed here on this slide. Essentially, our mi-
litary members are not free to leave. When they are sexually assaulted, they 
might have to stay in the same unit as the perpetrator. They cannot just move 
away. The victim also might be dependent on the perpetrator for safety or for 
food and shelter. 
In the Department of Defense, we have been centrally tracking reports of 
sexual assault since about 2004.  On this next slide, I have listed four years 
worth of reports. But as you know, reports of sexual assault do not tell the full 
story. It only tells you what is reported to military law enforcement. Anonymous 
surveys indicate that there are a whole host of reports that never come to the 
light of law enforcement. 
We have two forms of reporting in the Department. With a Restricted Report, 
a victim may come forward for care and services.  However, the victim does not 
have to participate in the military justice process. With an Unrestricted Report, 
a victim may also obtain the same care, but they also participate in a criminal 
investigation and prosecution. Most of our reports involve rape, aggravated 
sexual assault, and wrongful sexual contact – which is illegal touching of the 
genitals. 
As I previously mentioned, most reports of sexual assault fall short of the 
incidents estimated to occur via anonymous surveys.  This is called “underre-
porting.” If you are going to do a program like this in your service, you really 
need to implement two measures:  reports and estimated incidents. When I first 
started as the Deputy Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response 
Office in the Pentagon, my staff said that nobody knew how many sexual 
assaults there were that involved active duty military. I thought, “We measure 
everything in the Department of Defense – I know there has got to be some 
kind of data out there.”  So, sure enough, I found the Workplace and Gender 
Relations Survey of Active Duty Members wherein such data is collected. This 
survey is repeated every four years by the Defense Manpower Data Center in 
the DoD. In 2006, we estimated that we had about 34,000 victims who experi-
enced at least one incident of unwanted sexual contact in the year prior to the 
survey. Unwanted sexual contact captures a range of contact sex crimes between 
adults, from unwanted touching to completed rape. Again, these are victims 
that reported anonymously to us on a survey. However, that same year, I was 
only able to account for about 2300 active duty victims in reports made to De-
partment authorities. In essence, only about 7 percent of the estimated number 
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of victims of sexual assault in 2006 made a report to a Department authority. 
However, last year we got much better news. After four years of having a 
sexual assault prevention and response program, the Department experienced 
a significant drop in sexual assault --to about 19,000 thousand incidents. The 
2,600 or so victims that were in our sexual assault reports to DoD authorities 
account for about 14 percent of the victims of sexual assault estimated to exist 
in 2010. You may think that an increase in reporting and visibility over the crime 
from 7 percent to 14 percent is not much.  However, I do not know of any other 
institution the size and the scope of the US military that has been able to effect 
such a change. This is a very good thing:  In 2010 there were one-third fewer 
sexual assaults against women and one-half fewer sexual assaults against men 
than there were in 2006.
As I have run out of time, I will very, very quickly run through my remai-
ning slides. Essentially, the three program pillars of our program are prevention, 
victim care, and system accountability. We have a host of professionals that help 
our victims of sexual assault. I will be happy to talk about them a little bit later. 
We have a strategic plan for the program.  Our goals are to prevent sexual 
assault, to increase reporting, to improve our response to victims, to ensure the 
program works as designed, and then to publicize the good work we are doing. 
Over time, we want the number of sexual assaults estimated to occur each year 
to come down. We also want to increase the number of reports being made to 
DoD authorities. While we never expect that we will get 1 for 1 reporting of 
sexual assault, we think we can continue to improve from the 14 percent we 
currently receive.
On this next slide we have some of our social marketing materials. In our 
messaging, we want everyone to understand that sexual assault prevention is the 
right thing to do – it’s part of one’s duty. Sexual assault is primarily a readiness 
issue. Our latest campaign featured the slogan, “Hurts one. Affects all.”
When we talk about prevention in the US military, we refer to bystander 
intervention.  We are attempting to provide our people with the skills to identify 
those situations that might be a risk for sexual assault, and then safely intervene. 
For example, the text in this poster is: ”So when that guy tried to cross the line 
with my wingman (a fellow airman), I got her out of there. ”That is the kind 
of behavior that we want to have happen.
Here is a brief public service announcement that we ran, too. [DVD is 
shown.] Our campaign is backed up with multiple web sites. This is a brand 
new website called ”Safe Helpline.” You can text, click, or call for assistance 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week. The Rape Abuse Incest National Network (RAINN) 
runs it for the Department of Defense. It just stood up last month in April.
I have exceeded my time, so thank you very much for your attention.
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Sexual harassment, military psychology 
and operational effectiveness
Commander Jarle Eid, PhD, Norwegian Defence Medical Services
Dr. Eid did not want to participate to the conference report with a transcript 
or reviewed transcript version of his speech. This resume is therefore my own 
subjective summary of his contribution to the conference and can under no 
circumstances be referred to as his statements. Dr. Eid’s answers in the Q and 
A session are not included (ed.) 
Dr. Eid started his presentation appreciating the opportunity to come and share 
some of his research and experience from about 25 years in the military as a 
clinical psychologist and researcher. He used a national perspective, with data 
from Norway, to present figures and numbers, risk and resilience factors and 
implications for operational readiness.
When he had studied the Norwegian civilian sector, data basically showed 
that repeated and unwanted sexual attention shared many similarities with 
bullying. But sexual harassment was different form bullying because of the 
clear risk group. You were more at risk if you were 35 and younger, and the 
numbers indicated that it was more frequent in male dominated occupations. 
Sexual harassment could be associated with high turnover and cause trouble 
for the organization. Same sex harassment was more hidden and had more 
serious consequences.
From the military studies, Dr. Eid referred to a recent report on unwanted 
sexual attention and sexual attention and harassment among Norwegian con-
scripts. The average reported that 5.3 % had experienced unwanted sexual 
harassment in 2010. That was disturbing, because this is a slightly increasing 
trend from 2008 and 2009. And it made him wonder why? There was a clear 
increased relative risk if you were a woman conscript, but 2,9% of the men 
were also a substantial number. 
Looking at the numbers from employed personnel from the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, he could see a similar trend. Younger employees reported that 
one out of five or four will report that they have been exposed to unwanted 
sexual harassment. The most frequent negative acts from employed members 
of the armed forces were the 17% that reported verbal comments with sexual 
content, jokes or sexist statements. 14% reported that they experienced remarks 
about their body codes or way of life. 10% reported physical contact with sexual 
implications, while 7% reported sexually charge, staring, unpleasant looks, 
pictures or objects of sexual nature as unwanted or unpleasant. Harassment can 
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take many forms, and come in all sorts of combinations. The data was average 
data from 6 000-7 000 employees surveyed. That should make people wonder 
what their unit is like.
Looking at the true cases from the same survey, they found that two females 
reported telephone calls with sexual contents, request for sex with promise 
of rewards, request for sex with threat of punishment – two women reported 
sexual assault. But at the same time nine men reported that in 2008 they were 
assaulted and attempted raped in the Norwegian armed forces, a higher num-
ber than the females. This told us, as was mentioned earlier in the conference, 
that it is important to remember that gender issues are about men and women. 
The risk factors for harassment were summarized as being age less than 35 
years, out of the normal context, deployed, sailing, poor communication with 
your leader, an unclear job role, lack of peer support, low cohesion – all factors 
that had been found to be associated statistically with increased risk of haras-
sment. From this there could be a lot of potential operational consequences, 
for both conscripts and active duty officers. 
Dr. Eid thought the way ahead would be to look at and work on the indivi-
dual units and our service academies, to get more sophisticated surveys on our 
units, especially deployed ones. It would be possible to include gender issues 
to existing surveys. He also found it essential to bring behavioral sciences back 
into the Office of Education and the service academies. He emphasized that 
officers need better understanding of the dynamics in their own unit, because 
it would be an illusion to think that we would be able to go out and deal with 
gender issues on the international arena, if we were not able to confront and 
deal with gender issues in our own units. 
133
 
Q & A Session 3
Discussant Anders Berggren, PhD, Swedish National Defence College
Good day, everybody. Of course, initially, I would like to thank you for in-
viting me to participate in this very interesting conference. Secondly, one of 
the reasons why I quit as an officer was that I got my hearing impaired during 
exercise, so I may have some problems hearing in a room this size and with 
these acoustics. I am far too vain to use my hearing aids, so bear with me! If I 
am ignoring you, it is just my ears that do not work fine.
Session three – national implications of the framework; what have you heard 
and what kind of questions do that raise? The panel has been kind enough not to 
send in their material in advance, so I have tried to pick out the goodies while 
I have been sitting here. Well, two of you did. I must give you credit for that. 
Starting off with Captain Hudribusch, who discussed the construction of 
gender, how the different constructions of gender may create conflicts within 
the military culture, and also discussed different aspects of sexual harassment, 
which Dr. Eid later on developed further in terms of different dimensions and 
equivalent. Dr. Hudribusch also hypothesized that sexual harassment eventually 
could cause a high female soldier dropout. That is an interesting point to make, 
because if that is the case that will contradict our possibilities to live up to UN 
Resolution 1325, with more women serving in our deployed units. 
Dr. Hoogensen Gjørv talked about the dilemma of protecting civilians while 
being warriors at the same time. It was an argument that was raised from the 
troops. She talked about masculinity in an interesting sense, also remarked that 
gender is also about men, I think that was some quotation from interviews, or 
something like that, and that is also a question or a claim that is made every 
now and then in the Swedish Armed Forces. And also the very frank way of 
saying: ”This is useless, but we have to do it. This is something we are forced 
to deal with, the gender perspective, Resolution 1325, we have to do it, but it 
is useless. ”I think we have something interesting going there, because – and I 
will come back to that – this is a challenge to really get the gender perspective 
in the broader sense really integrated into the military operations for the actual 
units that are deployed, so they can see the point of doing this when they are 
there. We also had an interesting point about the macho myth about the military. 
I worked with one of the special operations units in Sweden, and that was the 
most reflective unit I have ever met in term of gender perspective and gender 
awareness. You should assume that this unit – consisting of mainly men but 
also a distinct group of women – should really be the machos of the Swedish 
Armed Forces. But they were the most reflective in terms of thinking about 
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gender awareness, but also how to integrate gender, how to deal with women 
within the troops, and the importance of having women within the units when 
they are deployed. 
Dr. Galbreath, I think you made a very important point when you said that 
at one point you started to realize that instead of focusing on taking care of the 
victims, we should try to deal with the real problem. There should not be any 
victims at all, right? I think this is something we will come back to. How do 
we actually work with this on a daily basis with our troops, addressing that so 
we can minimize sexual assault, sexual harassment from the beginning, and 
not just take care of the fires when they hit the fan? The fires do not hit the fan, 
but you get the point? I will not discuss direct and indirect measures with you, 
but we can have a discussion later on regarding that.
Dr. Eid; Very interesting point you made that sexual harassment also is 
a problem for men, but it is not so often discussed. I am going back to Dr. 
Galbreath - you talked about the implications of men being sexually assaulted 
was a bigger problem than for women. That leads to the thought in direction 
about construction of masculinity and femininity and what sexual assault does 
with masculinity and so - very interesting point. There are a lot of things that 
Dr. Eid brings out that are very parallel to findings from the Swedish Armed 
Forces as well as the United States Armed Forces, especially your final point 
about the importance of having a stronger focus on units and leadership, and 
the importance of talks on the pre-deployment on an everyday basis. 
If I dare to make a summary of the presentations we have heard, and what 
the challenges are, it would look something like this:
• SGBV takes it starting point in gender constructs, socially constructed 
 and deeply rooted in the individuals. 
• In order to achieve an increase in gender awareness during operations, 
 including the topic of SGBV, we must affect the individual soldier, i.e. 
 transforming policies and rhetoric on the political level into practice at 
 the individual level.
• We must increase the knowledge among our units how gender 
 awareness, including knowledge regarding SGBV, will increase the 
 effectiveness of the military operations given their mandates, and how 
 this truly is a part of military operations.
And this leads us to the following questions to the panel:
• Is there a relation between the internal and external gender constructs, 
 i.e. can a unit be gender aware externally during operations without being 
 internally gender aware?
• The taboo/resistance towards discussing gender and SH, including SGBV, 
 is deeply rooted in the armed forces. How do we overcome that at the 
 local level?
• Leadership is crucial in dealing with these issues, and establishing a 
135
 healthy and trustworthy organization. How do we do that?
Before I go into the questions I would like to share some results with you 
from our armed forces wide surveys on sexual harassment in the Swedish Armed 
Forces 1999, 2002, and 2005. 
The overall purpose, from an academic point of view, was to test the fol-
lowing model, which we found empirically support for.
Very briefly the model proposes that the higher the proportion men in an 
organization, and the worse the equality climate, the more sexual harassment. 
The model further postulates that there is a correlation between experiencing 
sexual harassment and the following variables: Job Outcomes, Psychological 
Outcomes, and Health Outcomes. I.e. the higher the frequency of sexual haras-
sment, the lower e.g. productivity, well-being, and Health Satisfaction.
Apparently, there is a relation between productivity and internal gender 
awareness or in other words, Internal gender awareness is a presumption for 
external gender awareness.
I must make one more comment here. You can see the red arrow in the 
figure. What we see is that with a bad equality climate, even though people 
did not experience sexual harassment, it still affected their job outcomes, 
Figure 1. Model over sexual harassment (Estrada & Berggren)
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psychological outcomes and health outcomes. And that also goes for men. All 
men do not approve of pornographic material, sexist jokes and stuff like that, 
but they are not allowed to talk about it, because this is assumed to be a part 
of the masculinity. But they do not like it, and it affects their productivity and 
their work environment. 
We further asked the people that had experienced sexual harassment: ”How 
did you deal with it?” In 1999 7 per cent of approached the sexual harassment 
advisor, and 5 per cent filed a complaint. In 2002 those figures have increased. 
In 2005 it decreased. That is strange. ”If you have reported sex harassment, to 
whom did you do it?” You can see the same pattern, that in 2002 you have an 
increase in who you report to, and then you have a decrease again. 
Figure 2. The figure shows the outcome on the question “How did you deal with the sexual 
harassment?” over the years 1999, 2002, and 2005. (Berggren & Estrada)
One way of understanding this decrease in the 2005 survey is that when 
they initiated the survey in 1999 people understood that this survey is actually 
the start of a change. The armed forces wanted to change something and they 
established an organization. People started to file complaints and what did they 
learn? It does not help. We can actually see in our data that people are feeling 
worse after filing a complaint than before filing a complaint, because the organi-
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zation cannot deal with the question. They cannot take care of the victims; they 
do not actually prosecute towards the offender. So one way of understanding 
this drop that you can see here, is that the organization did not really live up 
to the expectations and they did not fill out the uniform. And people started to 
distrust the organization.  This is a key issue if you really want to change the 
climate and the culture of an organization; it calls for a strong organization that 
can deal with the question.
Thus, the taboo/resistance towards discussing gender and SH, including 
SGBV, is deeply rooted in the armed forces. How do we overcome that at the 
local level?
Leadership is crucial, and we must have a healthy and trustworthy organi-
zation. How do we do that? That is my two initial questions to the panel.
Nathan Galbreath:
One of the things that we did in the Department of Defense with our prevention 
strategy is that we went to each of the military services, and we talked to them 
about bringing their leadership on board. The Army led the way. The Secretary 
of the Army at that point was Mister Pete Geren. He told his folks to sponsor 
Figure 3. The figure shows the outcome on the question “If you reported it, to who?” over the 
years 1999, 2002, and 2005 (Berggren & Estrada).
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a leadership summit. This was not just the guys on the ground, these were the 
three star and two star generals in the Washington DC area. Both the Secretary 
and the Chief of Staff, General Casey, came out. They all said: We want to talk 
to you about this problem of sexual assault. They brought on some experts and 
they talked not only about sexual assault, but also harassment as well, and the 
continuum of sexual violence. 
That was particularly effective in letting folks know that this is a leadership 
issue:  the Secretary of the Service and the Service Chief had it on their dash-
board, and they wanted their generals to take hold of this problem, as well. The 
Army set up a general officers’ steering committee for their program within the 
service, and then pushed it on down throughout the ranks.
Since that time the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps have all done 
something very similar.  They had a summit with their leadership, with their 
service secretary and chief, to show their senior most leadership how to sup-
port such a program. Until you have that “buy in” from the most senior level, 
nothing is ever going to happen. The major mentioned that to you. It does not 
matter what the people on the ground do, it is what their leadership says, and 
that ultimately influences the behavior of everybody down the chain. That was 
our approach.
René Hudribusch:
Our approach in the Austrian forces, as I have mentioned before, is the infor-
mation campaign about bullying and workplace aggression, and we started 
with this campaign on the level of the military academy. We train now the 
cadets on the military academy, because they are the leaders of the future, 
they are the multipliers, and so we want to fight against sexual harassment and 
bullying in the Austrian armed forces. Later we want to go on with the other 
soldiers, with the recruits, and also at the same time we also want to work on 
the general staff level.
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv:
You said a couple of things there that speak to how to move forward. The first 
was: if it does not make sense to them, they will not deal with it – and then 
link that up with internal gender awareness. I did not give myself enough time 
to go into the process that I and my Swedish colleagues are developing, but it 
is exactly that internal gender awareness which is already capsulated within 
military culture and in notion of masculinity. A number of things that need to 
be made clear is that masculinity is not just one hegemonic form in the military. 
I was saying that before. There are national differences of masculinity. In the 
United States it is going to be different than in Norway, than in Austria and 
whatever. Then you have different masculinities operating within the different 
units or different functions. Special Forces have certain masculinities exhibiting 
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in intern CIMIC.
The idea is to take a look at how do we generate an internal gender aware-
ness? To do so, we actually have to take a look at masculinity. We cannot just 
avoid it and just say: Imposed from the outside here are documents about what 
gender awareness is about. We are not going to take onboard what military 
culture is about, and we are not going to make use of – well, there are two 
different ways we can go. We can either say: masculinity has been charged 
with causing part of the problem, like those quotes we are showing that there 
is linkages between forms of masculinity and sexual violence. We can either 
suppress masculinity or perception in any case of what that is, and just do 
what the documents say – in a bullet form. Or we can examine the different 
masculinities that are taking place in our military structures. Say: OK, let us 
just admit it; this is what our military culture is about. Fine, because there are 
aspects of masculinity that are very productive, very positive, that can be used 
towards preventing gender violence and towards supporting – in the case that I 
was looking at – civilian communities as well as within the military framework. 
The point is exactly that internal gender awareness is crucial. But I think we 
should stop ignoring masculinity and the role that it is playing.
Nathan Galbreath:
I think there is an interesting mixture here between a strategic approach to 
the problem, and the more personal/interpersonal approach in this panel as it 
pertains to the problem. It is very exciting.
Q:
Thank you very much for your presentations. I found that really a fascinating 
mix to conceptual issues raised and operational issues raised. I have a couple of 
questions that I am going to try and squeeze in. The first is that perhaps in my 
own presentation I exaggerated this divide between the warrior requirements 
in soldiers and the caring or humanitarian side. I want to really ask a question 
about whether we need to also challenge the myth of the macho military it-
self. Regina Tetzner has an article from – I think, I cannot remember the year 
exactly – 2005, where she argues that the military itself should not be seen as 
hyper-masculine, as ultimately macho. There are many feminine characteris-
tics, or what she labels as feminine characteristics, within the military itself. 
If we were to take that challenge onboard, what would that mean for thinking 
about masculinity? There are a number of feminine characteristics and there 
are a number of issues around femininity that we would also need to take into 
account in our analysis of masculinity. 
Just following up from that, I would want to think about some of the negative 
aspects of masculinity as it is manifested in military culture, because if we think 
about the examples of male and male violence, one of the primary reasons why 
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it is so taboo and why it is so difficult to deal with, it precisely because male 
and male violence feminizes the victim. So there is underlying message that 
we need to think about; there is an asymmetry in thinking about masculinity. 
So I was just wondering if anybody would like to comment on that.
The last question that I have is really about, Anders, the last slide that I think 
you showed, or the last point that you made, which was about the negative 
impact on male soldiers of this climate of inequality. I was just wondering, if 
we applied the typical masculinity concept of the patriarchic dividend, what is 
going on then that men – some men, perhaps – are not benefiting from sexual 
harassment? Does that mean that we are under caps of organizational change? 
Will sexual harassment be naturally eliminated if there is no direct benefit to men 
in power? Or is there something else going on? Could you comment on that?
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv:
There is a mix, obviously, between masculine characteristics, as well as feminine 
characteristics in the military. The military is not just masculine characteristics. 
One area where this plays out, particularly, I know the Norwegian case best, 
is in civil military interactions. They might suffer from what is called a ”do-
gooder-syndrome”, which means ”oh, we are actually going to care about the 
people, the civilians, who are in the operation area. No, they are not allowed 
to now. This has to do with a bit of Norwegian politics – Who is doing what. 
The NGOs should take care of civilian issues whereas the military are just 
there to, you know, ”you can shoot them, but you cannot talk to them” kind 
of an attitude. Pardon me for really reducing the whole debate. It gets to that 
point in a sense, that you can be the warrior, but do not try to do anything else, 
because that is someone else’s territory. That is largely wrong. Not only is it 
so that that warrior might be the only person or the only unit who can be doing 
something under given circumstances in an operations’ area, because there are 
no other actors. But also the notion that our militaries cannot exhibit a sense 
of humanity when they see suffering and they cannot do something about it, 
and that it is not only about hearts and minds and buying the population. In 
fact, under international mandatory law they are obliged to take care of civilian 
populations when no other actors are there. And that is considered a feminine 
characteristic. And these two need discussion, but we don’t! It is just – hush! 
Don’t talk about it! Go shoot them, and then somebody else will take care of 
those more feminine things. And it is not helping. I will just leave it at that.
Anders Berggren:
We are running out of time. A quick question – bear in mind that my hearing is 
very bad. I think one question here is the challenge of the hegemonic masculi-
nity, that everybody reconstructs over and over again, and if we approach this 
with Dr. Hoogensen’s words, suggestions that we should understand and accept 
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the multiplicity of masculinities, we would erode the basic of the hegemonic 
masculinities and we would actually alter the power balance and how we look 
at masculinity and how that contributes to the relations between women and 
men. I think that is a crucial part.
Thank you very much to the panel. Thank you for listening.
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Closing remarks
Lt Col Lena P. Kvarving
Together with the commandant of the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff 
College I have the distinct pleasure of sharing with you some closing remarks 
after this very informative and inspiring day. First of all, I will have to extend 
an overwhelming thank you to all the participants here today. We, the gender 
project at the Norwegian Defence University College, have only facilitated the 
event, brought you together, but it is you with your expertise and enthusiasm 
that inspire us all to keep working to prevent sexual violence, to prevent sexual 
harassment and to find tools and strength to deal with the situation when it 
does happen.
Our first session presented the conceptual framework for handling and 
responding to sexual violence. We learned about UN’s inventory and training 
guidelines for military peacekeepers, NATO’s Action Plan for implementing 
resolution 1325, before we had some very good examples on how to train and 
respond to sexual violence. The main message I take away from this session is 
that we need new and different education and preferably scenario based trai-
ning. We might need to redefine the traditional view of the good soldier, and we 
might need soldiers with a new variety of capabilities. And we need to act to 
be credible, and realize that we are models of behavior whether we act or not. 
And finally, we need to hold our leaders accountable for progress in this area. 
And again; never to forget the faces behind the statistics of sexual violence. 
Our second session focus on the international implications of the conceptual 
framework presented in Session 1, with examples and experiences from the 
field and the link to why this is a military responsibility. I guess we all had our 
moments of deeper understanding of the implications of sexual violence and 
the need to act as a military force. And I think that my moment of revelation 
came with the worriers as peacekeepers. Just think about that – those words put 
together. What does it mean? The consequences for education? For training? 
Our mandate? - And our possibility and ability to succeed?
Major Tanner’s timely reminder, that this issue is both an internal and exter-
nal problem, and very much so also a male issue. And the need for our military 
force to set good examples and to have all necessary tools in the toolbox. 
Our final session focused on the national implications of handling and re-
sponding to sexual violence. I think that we can all agree that these are issues 
that we do not really like to talk about. First of all, because we do not want our 
organization to be the one that has alarming numbers when it comes to sexual 
harassment. Secondly, because we do not want to be an organization known 
to have been part of or witnessed sexual violence, human trafficking or other 
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unacceptable behavior, and not responded correctly. And definitely not when 
representing our king and country wearing a uniform with the Norwegian flag 
on our shoulder. We will all like to be known as the one with no negative inci-
dents and leave a pristine impression on the rest of the world.
Our core values tells us, though, that hiding from the truth, refraining from 
addressing the difficult issues, will only leave us without credibility. No co-
untry is without negative incidents, but it is the willingness and the ability to 
deal with the incidents that will decide if we are respectable, responsible and 
bright. We have learned that sexual harassment in own forces has impact on 
our operational effectiveness, a logical consequence that we need to address.
So with this short summary of today’s events, I would first like to ask the 
contributors and our international guests to stay put in the room after the last 
closing remarks, and then I am proud to leave the final closing remarks to the 
Commander of the Norwegian Defence and Staff College, Håkon Tronstad. 
The floor is yours!
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Closing Remarks
Commodore Håkon Tronstad, Commandant Norwegian Defence Command 
and Staff College
I would like to start by mentioning an experience I had from having the opp-
ortunity to work as a member of the US armed forces. I was on loan to the US 
for five years. I do believe they got tired of me, so after some weeks they told 
me that an expert is someone that is at least 3 000 miles away from home. I do 
believe they tried to stop my mouth. Unfortunately, I do live in Oslo. Oslo is 
my home town, so today I am not an expert.
The topic we have been discussing today, sexual violence in military opera-
tions; I have to admit that I have never witnessed sexual violence in a military 
operation, but, on the other hand, I have been commanding the Norwegian fleet 
for five years and I do know that we have a real problem with sexual harassment 
in the Norwegian fleet, which is an issue we need to take very seriously. The 
topic we have been discussing – sexual harassment, sexual violence – is both 
depressing and important. We cannot ignore the problems. If we try to ignore 
them, we will never do anything in order to make the situation better.
I do believe Dr. Louise Olsson hit the nail on the head when she told us 
that this conference could be compared to the TV show Myth Busters. I really 
had several eye openers to day. I have learned something new and I do believe 
that some of my colleagues wearing uniform are in the same situation today. 
I found the input from a very experienced operator, Major Fred Tanner from 
US Armed Forces, of value. He told us, or he reminded us, that we have limited 
resources, but unlimited problems. That is probably a very good definition of 
the situation. Then Dr. Marsha Henry – if I do not quote you correctly, please 
apologize – said that there is no switch inside the soldier’s helmet to turn the 
war fighter into a peacekeeper. I do believe that was brilliant. She also had a 
recommendation. If we want to do something in order to improve the situation, 
we need to develop in-depth gender expertise. That is probably the best course 
of action.
At the Norwegian Defence and Command Staff College we are focusing on 
educating our future military leadership also in the aspect of gender. Obviously, 
we need to put even more focus on that, but that is my duty, that is my goal.
We have been given the task of implementing gender standards into the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, and you have already listened to the leader of the 
Gender Project, Lieutenant Colonel Lena Kvarving, and you know we are in 
good hands. You know we have people working with the issue, and you know 
that we have put focus on this.
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I would really like to thank the Gender Project, Lena Kvarving, and her 
colleagues in the Gender Project. This has been a very, very useful conference 
and I hope that the rest of you agree with me on that.
To the rest of you, who have travelled far to participate in the conference, 
we really appreciate your participation. This would have been a completely 
different learning experience for the natives, for the people living in the com-
munity here in Oslo, if you had not participated. This is a very, very useful 
participation on your side.
To the speakers, who have come far to participate – I am impressed. You 
have managed to focus on very important issues. I do believe that you still 
qualify to call yourselves experts when you return home.
To all of you – thank you for great participation, interesting arguments. This 
has been a very useful Friday.
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Louise Olsson (PhD) is a researcher and project manager at the Folke Ber-
nadotte Academy, Sweden, and has a PhD from the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Her main research areas are peace 
operations and international conflict resolution. Olsson published the book 
Gender Equality and UN Peace Operations in Timor-Leste at Brill publishers 
in 2009. The book focuses on the effects of peace operations on political par-
ticipation and security equality for men and women in the host country. She 
has also co-edited two special issues (in Security Dialogue and International 
Peacekeeping) addressing a wide range of gender-specific dimensions of secu-
rity policy and international peacekeeping. At the Folke Bernadotte Academy 
she is responsible for organizing a Research Working Group on UNSCR 1325 
to promote empirical research of value for peace operations and international 
conflict resolution. In addition, Olsson has worked with applied research as a 
project manager of an international project on the use of UNSCR 1325 in the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (published at FOI 2009) 
and conducted a study on the use of gender-specific pre-deployment training 
in the EU’s CSDP missions. Olsson has extensive pedagogical experience and 
has been the Director of Undergraduate studies at the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University. She lectures on the broader effects 
of peace operation and conflict resolution, specifically in relation to UNSCRs 
1325 and UNSCR 1820 to students, policy makers and practitioners.
Ragnhild Nordås (PhD) is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study 
of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She holds a PhD in 
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political science from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 
NTNU. Nordås has conducted research on various aspects of political violence, 
including religious conflicts, state repression, demographic factors in conflict, 
the climate change-conflict nexus, inequalities, and child soldiering. Her main 
current research projects focus on (1) developing a global database from 1989-
2009 on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts (SVAC), (2) a database on Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by Peacekeepers from 1999 to today, and (3) 
mapping the motivation and modus operandi characteristics of non-state conflict 
actors.  Nordås has been a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Ken-
nedy School, and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University 
of Notre Dame. She has received post-doctoral funding from the Norwegian 
Research Council and project funding from the National Science Foundation in 
the United States. Her work has been published in inter alia Political Geography 
and International Studies Quarterly. 
Mia Mellissa Bloom (PhD) is an Associate professor in International and 
Women’s Studies at the Pennsylvanian State University and a fellow at the 
International Center for the Study of Terrorism. She is the author of Dying to 
Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press 2005 
and 2007), Living Together After Ethnic Killing edited with Roy Licklider 
(London: Routledge 2007) and Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terro-
rists (Toronto: Penguin 2011). Dr. Bloom is a former member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and has held research or teaching appointments at Princeton, 
Cornell, Harvard, and McGill Universities. With research foci in Ethnic Conflict, 
Political Violence, and the mobilization of women and children into terrorist 
networks,  Blooms work bridges theory and policy issues. Bloom has a PhD 
in political science from Columbia University, a Masters in Arab Studies from 
Georgetown University and a Bachelors from McGill University in Russian 
and Middle East Studies. Bloom speaks nine languages.
Capt. René Hudribusch is Chief Instructor in the Austrian Armed Forces 
International Centre and Division Manager at the Gender Mainstreaming 
Department of the Austrian Armed Forces. René Hudribusch studied military 
leadership at the Military Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces and Business 
and Administration at the University of Vienna. He received his Masters degree 
of military leadership in 2004 and his PhD in Business and Administration in 
2010. Since 2008 he has studied gender issues at the University of Vienna. 
His interests encompass organizational culture, workplace aggression, gender, 
liaison and negotiation and combating trafficking in human beings.
Mrs. Loredana Alemanno Testa has held several positions at NATO with 
increasingly higher levels of responsibility, progressing from technical to ma-
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nagement and policy areas. As head of the section dealing with the Implemen-
tation of Conventional Arms Control agreements and treaties, she chaired the 
NATO Verification Coordinating Committee on Conventional Arms Control. 
In January 2005 she became Executive Officer in the Operations Division and 
Head of the Division’s Coordination Section, reporting directly to the Assistant 
Secretary General for Operations (ASG OPS).  She is responsible for providing 
advice and support to ASG OPS in areas related to executive management and 
operations, including on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led 
Operations and Missions. She is now leading NATO’s efforts to implement the 
NATO Action Plan on Mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led Operations 
and Missions. In 2006 she received from the President of the Italian Republic 
the honorary title of Commander (“Commendatore della Repubblica Italiana”). 
Mrs. Alemanno Testa studied Mathematics and Physics at the University of 
Rome and conducted Computer Science studies at the National Research 
Centre, Rome, Italy.
Anders W Berggren (PhD) has a background as an officer in the Swedish 
Army, the armoured troops, but left the Armed Forces for an academic career. 
In 1998, Berggren commenced a position as a researcher at the Swedish Na-
tional Defence College, where he established the Gender Research Programme 
funded by the Swedish Armed Forces. In 1999, Berggren conducted a major 
study on sexual harassment in the Swedish Armed Forces. This study has since 
been replicated by the Swedish Armed Forces in 2002 and 2005, the Danish 
Armed Forces in 2002, and by the Swedish Rescue Service Agency in 2007. 
Berggren defended his PhD thesis, entitled “Under-cover Operations in No-
women’s Land. The Swedish Armed Forces Through a Gender Lens,”in 2002 
and served, between 2004 – 2008, as scientific research director for a research 
programme entitled “Human Aspects in the Network Based Defence”. Today his 
research interests are within the areas of leadership, organization, organizational 
culture, gender and critical theory. Berggren is currently doing research related 
to the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces from a conscript system 
to an All Voluntary Force, mainly focusing on the relations between the new 
professional categories employed soldiers, NCO’s, and officers. 
Sidsel E. Aas is an independent consultant in the area of international women’s 
and gender issues. She has been Head of Information for the Norwegian um-
brella organization FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development), and editor 
of the FOKUS magazine and website, undertaking strategic work as well as 
developing policy papers. In recent years Aas has focused on the UN Security 
Council Resolutions on women, peace and security resolutions – 1325, 1820, 
1888 and 1889. She holds a degree in world history, social policy and media 
communication from the University of Trondheim and has studied journalism at 
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Bodø University College. In 2010 Aas was engaged by Noref (The Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Centre) to conduct a qualitative mapping of good practices in 
international responses to sexual violence in conflict, whereupon she provided 
the Norwegian Government with recommendations on how to strengthen its 
effort to combat sexual violence in conflict. In 2010, Aas also wrote an annex 
to the Norwegian Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 for the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. She is currently engaged by DCAF (the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces) to carry out a cross-country analysis of 
gender-sensitized human resource policies in the armed forces.
Major Fred Tanner (US Army) was commissioned into the Infantry in 1997 
upon graduating from the State University of New York. Throughout his 14-
year career he has served in a host of operational positions, including leading 
two different platoons and commanding three separate Infantry companies. 
Tanner has served in various conflict areas, such as Iraq, the Horn of Africa, 
and Afghanistan. In May 2011, Tanner completed his second tour in Afgha-
nistan where he served as a battalion operations officer for 1st Squadron, 2nd 
Stryker Cavalry Regiment.  Currently he holds the position as the Regimental 
Operations Officer for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. 
Tanner is a graduate of the US Army Ranger, Jump master, Pathfinder, and 
Air Assault schools. In addition he is a graduate of the French Army’s Desert 
Tactics Course.  Tanner has been awarded with: the Bronze Star Medal (with 
Oak leak cluster), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious 
Service Medal, the Joint Accommodation Medal, the Army Accommodation 
Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) and the Army Achievement Medal (with Oak 
Leaf Clusters).  
Colonel Tom Hermansen has been a colonel in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
since 2002. Since August 2010, Hermansen has served on secondment as the 
deputy adviser at the Security Sector Development (SSD) Unit in MONUSCO. 
Besides his military education, Hermansen holds an MSc in engineering at 
the Royal Swedish War and Staff College (1986-1988) and completed the 
NATO Defence College in Rome in 2002. Hermansen has worked in various 
positions with the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency between 1988 and 2010 
and has served as a staff officer at the military NATO HQ in Mons, Belgium 
(1993-1996), a consultant for Norconsult International in Kuwait (1997) and a 
Defence Attaché at the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2007.
Lt. Col. (ret. US Air Force) Nathan Galbreath, PhD., M.F.S, is currently a 
licensed clinical psychologist and forensic science specialist in independent 
practice in the greater Washington, DC metropolitan area.  He is currently 
serving as a subject matter expert for Booz Allen Hamilton in its support to 
151
the Department of Defense’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, 
The Pentagon, Washington DC. Dr. Galbreath was assigned as the first Deputy 
Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office from 2007 to 
2009. He retired from active duty on October 1, 2009. Galbreath entered the 
Air Force in 1989 after completing a BA in Spanish and International Affairs 
at the University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA. He was assigned to Howard 
Air Force Base, Panama, from 1989 – 1990 as a Special Agent for the Air 
Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). He went on to serve a total of 
11 years with AFOSI as an agent, a forensic science specialist, and a Special 
Agent in Charge at bases in New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. Dr. Galbreath 
earned a Master of Forensic Science from the George Washington University, 
Washington, DC in 1993, and a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology, from the Uni-
formed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD in 2004. He 
serves as a professorial lecturer of forensic sciences at the George Washington 
University and is also an adjunct associate professor in the Department of 
Medical and Clinical Psychology at the Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences.  
Commander Jarle Eid (PhD) has extensive service experience from vari-
ous positions as a clinical psychologist in the Norwegian Defence Medical 
Services and as lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. He is a 
national member of the NATO HFM-panel and recently hosted the HFM-205 
symposium on “Mental health and well being across the military spectrum” in 
Bergen, Norway. His research and professional experience includes personnel 
selection, training and intervention following critical incidents and deployment. 
In collaboration with researchers from USA, Sweden, Belgium, Great Britan, 
and Norway his work includes more than 100 peer review publications, book 
chapters and international presentations. Most recently he co-edited a book 
on “Enhancing Human Performance in Security Operations: International and 
Law Enforcement Perspectives” by Charles C. Thomas publishers, and also 
has two chapters forthcoming in the “New handbook of military psychology” 
to be published by Oxford publishers in 2012. Eid is also a professor in orga-
nizational psychology at the University of Bergen and member of the research 
group for operational psychology. 
Colonel Anthony Atolagbe is a seasoned infantry officer of the Nigerian Army 
whose experiences spans command, instruction and staff appointments. He 
completed his Higher Management of Defence Studies at the prestigious Na-
tional Defence College Nigeria. Additionally, Anthony holds a Masters Degree 
in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 
and Bachelor of Arts Degree in French from Usman Dan Fodio University, 
Sokoto. Upon completion of his Higher Management of Defence Studies, 
152
he was appointed Deputy Director Combat Readiness in the Department of 
Army Standard and Evaluation, Headquarters Nigerian Army and later he was 
Deputy Chief of Staff in Headquarters 81 Division Lagos between 2010 and 
2011. A knowledgeable and respected teacher, he was a Directing Staff and 
Chief Instructor at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Kaduna 
between 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 respectively. Anthony also has had several 
peacekeeping experiences as he was Commanding Officer of Nigerian Battalion 
(NIBATT) 6 in the African Union Mission in Sudan in 2006 during which he 
gathered enormous mission experience in the Darfur conflict. He was Staff 
Officer Grade one at the Headquarters 1 Mechanised Brigade. He was a Mili-
tary Observer in the MONUC DR Congo from 2000 to 2001. He was Acting 
Commanding Officer NIBATT 21 (1997) and Adjutant/Operations Officer of 
NIBATT 4 (1992) in the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group in Liberia (Operation Liberty).He has been awarded fellow 
of defence college and passed staff college dagger. He has also been awarded 
the Silver and Golden Jubilee Medals, ECOMOG medals with NIBATT 4 and 
NIBATT 21; MONUC Medal, AMIS Medal with NIBATT 6, Forces Service 
Star Medal and Meritorious Service Star Medal. Colonel Anthony Atolagbe is 
currently the Chief J5 Plans in the Force Headquarters, African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur(UNAMID). 
Letitia Anderson (Advocacy and Women’s Rights Specialist, UN Action/ 
Office of the SRSG-SVC) is the Advocacy and Women’s Rights Specialist with 
the inter-agency network, United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in 
Conflict (UN Action), chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. In this role she serves as speechwriter 
and ICC liaison, as well as undertaking strategic advocacy in relation to the 
Security Council and UN system, and popular advocacy to galvanize global 
condemnation of sexual violence as a tactic and consequence of war. Letitia 
previously worked for UNIFEM (now UN Women) in Governance, Peace and 
Security and in Communications. For UNIFEM, she conducted training for 
Security Council members, coordinated a Wilton Park conference on peace-
keeping, and wrote news briefs on women, peace and security issues. She has 
designed and delivered peacekeeper training for UNITAR in Kosovo, Timor-
Leste and Cambodia and trained members of the armed and police forces on 
women’s rights in several countries. She has undertaken field research on sexual 
violence in the DRC, Liberia and Rwanda. Prior to joining the UN, Letitia 
worked as Policy Adviser on Women and War to the ICRC in Geneva, Legal 
Adviser to the ICRC Regional Delegation for the Pacific, and IHL Officer for 
the Australian Red Cross. She has co-authored two ICRC manuals on IHL, a 
tool for peacekeepers (Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Ana-
lytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice) and articles for Open Democracy 
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and the Journal of International Peacekeeping. Her law thesis focused on the 
irregular rendition of war crimes suspects.
Guillota Ayivi, 30 years old Togolese, French native. I studied Law in Paris 
II-Assas, have a master’s degree in International Business and Development 
focused on Africa and South America, and a second master’s degree in develop-
ment policies and projects planning and management. I acquired experience 
through direct up and downstream projects development from design to im-
plementation and assessment phases, and was involved in research, advocacy, 
project management and coordination in different contexts. I mainly worked 
on transversal issues, among which child labour (International Labour Orga-
nization/Senegal), gender promotion (United Nations Framework Convention 
for Climate Change/Germany), and vulnerable people capacity reinforcement 
(NGO/Ecuador). I started a thesis on conflict prevention through education in 
Laval University in Canada that I put on hold since I joined the United Mission 
for Stabilization in Congo (MONUSCO) in August 2008. I have been mostly 
responsible for the creation of Security Sector Reform pillar of the Sexual 
Gender Based Violence Strategy, its coordination and implementation at the 
central level and in the Congolese conflict zone.  
Ann Livingstone, PhD, Vice President, 
Research, Education and Learning Design
Dr. Livingstone joined the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) in 2003 follo-
wing her career as a university professor. During her university tenure, she was 
responsible for the design and implementation of interdisciplinary academic 
programs focused on international relations, economics and philosophy. 
She is a graduate of Anderson University, Indiana, and earned her Masters at 
Vanderbilt University in Tennessee. Dr Livingstone did post-graduate studies at 
Oxford University (UK) and was awarded her Ph.D. in International Relations 
from University of Keele (UK). Her dissertation was an analysis of Canada’s 
role in peacekeeping in Suez, Congo and Cyprus.
At the PPC, Dr Livingstone heads the Research, Education and Learning 
Design Department. The department is responsible for conducting applied 
research on emerging trends and issues in complex peace operations. As well, 
the department creates the learning products that are delivered by colleagues 
in the Programs Department.
Dr Livingstone was drawn to working at the PPC as it reflects her analysis 
that concepts of peace and conflict are best approached from a multi-dimensional 
perspective. At the PPC, she has the opportunity to research and work with 
the civilian, military, and police personnel who play a critical role in complex 
peace operations.
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Marsha Henry, PhD, is Lecturer in Gender, Development and Globalisation. 
Prior to joining LSE, she previously taught at University of Bristol, University 
of British Columbia, Canada, the Open University and Warwick University. She 
read English at the University of British Columbia, Canada, before studying for 
a Master’s in Gender and International Development and a PhD in Women and 
Gender at the University of Warwick. Following this, she held a postdoctoral 
fellowship at the Centre for Women’s Studies and Gender Relations, University 
of British Columbia, followed by a return to the UK in order to take up a posi-
tion at the University of Bristol in 2002 where she was a lecturer in the School 
for Policy Studies (2002-2006) and the Politics Department (2006-2009). Her 
research interests focus on three main research areas: gender relations in South 
Asia; feminist, diasporic and qualitative methodologies; and gender, develop-
ment and militarisation. Her recent work has been concerned with security 
experiences in peacekeeping missions and two future projects include a study 
of peacekeepers leisure activites; and the experiences of female peacekeepers 
from the Global South.
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The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, 
Peace and Security has put gender on the international agenda. Since then, 
the international community has renewed its commitment to UNSCR 1325 by 
adopting UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009) and UNSCR 1960 (2010) on 
Sexual Violence in conflicts. They recognise sexual violence as a tactic of war, 
war crime and crime against humanity and call for preventive actions and end-
ing impunity. Fulfilling these obligations requires adequate handling of sexual 
violence in military operations and the prevention of sexual harassment within 
the ranks. The international conference on Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces 
and Military Operations in Oslo, June 2011, offered a unique forum for experts 
and practitioners to discuss the interconnectedness between these issues and 
to draw implications for the armed forces. 
Targeting military personnel, keynote speaker and UN Secretary General’s Spe-
cial Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, urged:
“… As commanders, you have to make sure that the message is clearly conveyed 
that there can be no impunity for this type of crime. “This will not happen on my 
watch. You will be punished; you will be pursued if you commit such a crime.” We 
should also talk about men as victims, because today men and boys are among 
the victims of sexual violence; I still remember a young man who we met in the 
DRC in a panel where we interviewed for a reparation scheme. This young man 
told us that he did not even know about rape before. He was totally traumatized. 
He said: “I have nothing left. I have the shirt, the clothes that I have on my body, 
but that is all.” He lost his wife and his child, and is now totally lost in a world that 
he could no longer really understand and in deep shock over having been gang 
raped… 
… It is not only, although it is still primarily, women or girls who are victims of 
sexual violence, but it is also boys and young men. Does this mean that we can 
mobilize more men to fight with us against sexual violence in war and conflict? I 
hope so… “
